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ARTICLES 
EQUALITY WITHOUT TIERS 
SUZANNE B. GOLDBERG* 
“There is only one Equal Protection Clause.” 
– Justice Stevens1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The immediate impact of Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger 
is nothing short of momentous.2  Not only do the Supreme Court’s most 
recent affirmative action decisions settle the deeply contested question of 
whether race may be considered in higher education admissions, but they 
also, more broadly, envision permissible and impermissible uses of racial 
classifications in that context, and surface new, challenging questions about 
the official use of affirmative action.3 
Yet Grutter and Gratz are also momentous for what they tell us about 
the long-term struggle over the structure of equal protection doctrine.  This 
 
         *  Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law—Newark; A.B. 1985, Brown 
University; J.D. 1990, Harvard Law School.  This Article received the Outstanding Scholarly Paper 
Award from the Association of American Law Schools in 2003.  Many thanks to Michelle Adams, 
Norman Cantor, Sherry Colb, Michael Dorf, James Ellis, Paula Ettelbrick, Katherine Franke, Nan 
Hunter, John Leubsdorf, Deborah Malamud, John Manning, Martha Minow, James Gray Pope, Arun 
Subramanian, George Thomas, Kenji Yoshino, and the participants in the Rutgers School of Law—
Newark Faculty Colloquium series for their insights and excellent suggestions.  The Dean’s Research 
Fund of Rutgers School of Law—Newark provided helpful support, and Heather Bernard, Elizabeth 
Mazza, and George Tenreiro provided invaluable research assistance. 
 1. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 2. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (upholding the use of race as a factor in law 
school admissions); Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003) (striking down the use of race in an 
affirmative action plan for undergraduate admissions). 
 3. For an extended discussion of the Court’s application of strict scrutiny in these cases, see 
infra notes 25, 106. 
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struggle, which has been under way for decades,4 will affect the future of 
equality analyses far beyond affirmative action. 
Specifically, two interrelated developments have shaken the 
foundations of the Court’s three-tiered equal protection framework.5  First, 
as evidenced in Grutter and Gratz, the categorical application of rigorous 
review to suspect classifications has become its own battleground, 
complete with disputes over whether context should affect the strictness of 
strict scrutiny.6  Second, at the other end of the equal protection spectrum, 
the Court’s rational basis jurisprudence wavers between its typical 
deference to government decisionmaking7 and the occasional insistence on 
meaningful review,8 without a unifying theory for meshing the two 
seemingly distinct approaches.9 
Rather than simply tinker with the three tiers of equal protection 
review to address these theoretical and doctrinal challenges, this Article 
takes a step back from the front lines of equal protection jurisprudence to 
consider how and why the tiered framework evolved and whether we still 
 
 4. See infra Part II (reviewing the development of suspect classification analysis and rational 
basis review). 
 5. Throughout this Article, references to equal protection analysis encompass review under both 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and the equality guarantee incorporated into the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 
(1975) (“This Court’s approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely 
the same as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 
497, 500 (1954) (stating that “it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser 
duty on the Federal Government” than on the state governments to protect against certain forms of 
unequal treatment). 
 6. See infra notes 25, 106 and Part II. 
 7. See infra Part II.  The Court enshrined the dismissive treatment of nonsuspect classifications 
and the distinction between this treatment and the rigorous treatment of suspect classifications during 
the 2002 Term by reinforcing the tiered framework’s additional role as a cornerstone of Eleventh 
Amendment jurisprudence.  See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003).  In Hibbs, 
the Court invoked its intermediate scrutiny of sex-based classifications as the reason Congress could 
address sex discrimination by states more freely than age or disability discrimination.  See id. at 1982 
(commenting that it is “easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations,” as the 
Court requires for classifications such as sex, which it subjects to heightened scrutiny, than to prove a 
state’s  “‘widespread pattern’ of irrational reliance” on traits such as age or disability, which are subject 
only to rational basis review) (quoting Kimel v. Fla.  Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 90 (2000)). 
 8. See infra Part II.  In Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003), which was also decided in 
the 2002 Term, Justice O’Connor made the latest entry into the debate over the contours of rational 
basis review by advocating more stringent review for laws aimed at “harm[ing] a politically unpopular 
group.”  Id. at 2485 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting U.S. Dep’t 
of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973)).  Justice Scalia, in his dissent, charged Justice O’Connor 
with further muddying the rational basis inquiry.  See id. at 2496 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 9. See infra Part II. 
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need it.10  The fault lines within suspect classification analysis11 and 
rational basis review, as well as the overlapping values expressed within 
high and low levels of scrutiny, prompt an urgent, though rarely addressed, 
question for equal protection jurisprudence: can a single standard of review 
effectively screen all types of classifications without negating either the 
deference to government decisionmaking traditionally accorded under 
rational basis review or the bias-sensitive review effectuated by strict and 
intermediate scrutiny?12 
 
 10. The focus here is exclusively on the Court’s approach to differentiating between 
classifications.  The tiered framework, however, is not the only aspect of equal protection jurisprudence 
that warrants reconsideration.  In particular, the Court’s insistence that discriminatory purpose 
necessarily be proven to trigger scrutiny of facially neutral measures, see Washington v. Davis, 426 
U.S. 229, 244–48 (1976), has been extensively criticized as interfering unduly with effective equal 
protection analysis.  See, e.g., Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, but Now I See”: White Race 
Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 970 (1993) 
(advocating “deliberate skepticism [by whites] regarding the race neutrality of facially neutral” 
legislation); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991) 
(asserting that the “color-blind” approach to constitutional analysis legitimates racial inequality); 
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 
39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (arguing that the intentional discrimination requirement fails to address 
unconscious racial motivation); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving 
Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1147 (1997) (maintaining that the 
intentional discrimination requirement in Washington v. Davis “sanction[s] practices that perpetuate the 
race and gender stratification of American society”); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the 
Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935 (1989) (criticizing the Court’s purposeful discrimination 
requirement as a troublesome retreat from the mandate of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954)). 
Critique of the fundamental rights strand of the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, which 
dovetails partially with the critique offered here, also falls outside the scope of this Article.  For a 
discussion of the Court’s fundamental rights jurisprudence, see generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-6 to 16-13 (2d ed. 1988) (addressing fundamental rights 
theory and doctrine), and Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. 
REV. 1175 (1996) (same). 
 11. Unless otherwise indicated, this Article’s references to “suspect classification” encompass 
classifications deemed quasi-suspect as well, because the Court treats both types of classifications as 
meriting its suspicion.  Similarly, references to “heightened scrutiny” encompass all levels of review 
above rational basis unless otherwise indicated. 
 12. This question presupposes at least two important points that are the subject of considerable 
debate.  First, the effort here to assess and revamp a judicially created test accepts that, notwithstanding 
the countermajoritarian difficulty presented by appointed life-tenured judges reviewing legislative acts, 
courts will continue to review official enactments for compliance with the Equal Protection Clause.  Cf. 
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF 
POLITICS (2d ed. 1986) (analyzing the countermajoritarian difficulty and defending judicial review as 
located in our national and constitutional history); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY 
FROM THE COURTS (1999) (advocating that the Court should be relieved of the final power of 
constitutional construction).  The relationship between the countermajoritarian difficulty and the 
analysis presented here is addressed later in this Article.  See infra text accompanying notes 320–24. 
Second, the reconceptualization of the equal protection doctrine presented here assumes that 
doctrinal analysis and critique have some value beyond illuminating (or obscuring) the broader political 
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My principal aim is not to revisit and reshape core elements of the 
current doctrine;13 instead, I take the bulk of the current doctrine “as is” to 
demonstrate that the problems with the three-tiered framework for judicial 
scrutiny are sufficient to warrant immediate consideration of an alternative 
standard for review, such as the single standard proposed here, even absent 
other doctrinal transformations. 
 
or ideological agenda of the Supreme Court.  Cf. Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 
111 YALE L.J. 1141, 1177 (2002) [hereinafter Rubenfeld, Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda] (suggesting 
that scholars consider “jettison[ing] the whole enterprise of taking constitutional doctrine seriously” in 
light of the Court’s manipulation of cases and doctrine to achieve ideological aims).  Although 
Rubenfeld makes a compelling case for the simultaneous doctrinal dissonance and political coherence 
in contemporary constitutional analysis and, as conceded below, any doctrinal test is ultimately 
malleable, the Court’s doctrine continues to warrant scholarly attention for several reasons.  See infra 
notes 239–41 and accompanying text.  First, doctrinal tests are the Court’s central mode of discourse 
with the lower courts, which render the bulk of constitutional decisions.  Moreover, although doctrinal 
tests lack the ultimate power to dictate outcomes or constrain judicial overreaching, they have 
tremendous potential either to cloak or to highlight the Court’s principles of decisionmaking. 
 13. As many thoughtful critiques have demonstrated, particular doctrinal elements are in need of 
transformation.  See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 427–28 (1997) 
[hereinafter Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action] (criticizing the theory underlying affirmative action cases); 
Siegel, supra note 10, at 1113 (challenging the requirement that discriminatory purpose be shown 
before state actions are found unconstitutional).  Among these critiques is a challenge to the 
symmetrical treatment of classifications burdening dominant and vulnerable classes.  See generally 
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Unexplainable on Grounds Other than Race”: The Inversion of Privilege 
and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 617–18 (2003) 
(critiquing the Court’s simultaneous solicitude for socially advantaged classes and lack of solicitude for 
socially disadvantaged classes).  As antisubordination theory suggests, powerful reasons support 
reviewing burdens on politically marginalized groups more strictly than burdens on dominant groups 
that enjoy full, meaningful access to the political process.  See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 135–81 (1980) (arguing that the intensity of equal 
protection review should hinge on a group’s access to the political process); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and 
the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 147–56 (1976) (advocating “the group-
disadvantaging principle” to focus constitutional review on the actual harms to a burdened group).  Cf. 
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (observing that “prejudice against 
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation 
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities” and that classifications 
burdening those minorities may warrant “more searching judicial inquiry”).  If equal protection review 
were reconceptualized in this manner, many of the problems identified above would be addressed, if not 
fully resolved.  Nothing in the Court’s current record, however, suggests that such a transformation is 
imminent.  See generally Rubenfeld, Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, supra note 12 (arguing that an 
“anti-antidiscrimination” agenda underlies many recent Supreme Court decisions, which the Court 
justified on other doctrinal grounds, and that this agenda firmly underlies the current Court’s thinking).  
Cf. Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Action and Discrimination, 39 HOW. L.J. 1, 92 (1995) (arguing that 
racial prejudice has driven the Court’s affirmative action decisions). 
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The long-standing stasis of the set of classifications deemed suspect or 
quasi-suspect initially suggests the need to reconsider the tiers.14  The 
Court did not articulate detailed indicia for discerning which classifications 
should fill this set until the early 1970s15—decades after it first referred to 
race as a suspect classification.16  Almost immediately, the “set” closed 
when a majority of the Court accorded sex-based classifications quasi-
suspect status.17  It has not expanded since.  Notwithstanding advocates’ 
efforts to demonstrate that measures based on traits outside the “set” 
similarly embody prejudice, the Court repeatedly has rejected suspect 
status for classifications based on other characteristics.18  While lack of 
expansion does not necessarily mean the screening system is flawed, it 
does suggest possible ossification of the governing framework that 
warrants careful examination. 
Further raising concern are the indicia the Court developed in 1973 to 
identify which classifications are more likely than not to be prejudice laden 
and, therefore, suspect.  A close look reveals intractable internal 
contradictions.  The indicia, which focus on, inter alia, a history of 
discrimination based on the trait, the trait’s immutability, and the relative 
political powerlessness of those bearing the trait,19 are at once overbroad 
and underinclusive.20  Considered as a group, the inquiries could sweep out 
 
 14. This set includes classifications based on race, alienage, national origin, sex, and nonmarital 
parentage.  For a discussion of these classifications and the development of the suspect classification 
process, see infra Part II.A–B. 
 15. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (articulating “the 
traditional indicia of suspectness”).  See also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682–88 (1973) 
(Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (elaborating on the same). 
 16. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
 17. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (declaring that sex-based classifications “must 
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those 
objectives”).  Preceding Craig, in 1973, a plurality of the Court explicitly subjected a sex-based 
distinction to heightened scrutiny.  See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 688–91 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).  
Some have argued that the Court had actually been applying a form of heightened review since Reed v. 
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).  See TRIBE, supra note 10, § 16-26; Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of 
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
33–34 (1972).  See also infra note 226 (discussing the timing of the application of heightened scrutiny 
to classifications of nonmarital children). 
 18. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985) (rejecting 
heightened review for classifications of people with mental retardation); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 
427 U.S. 307, 312–14 (1976) (declining to treat age as a suspect classification); James v. Valtierra, 402 
U.S. 137, 140–42 (1971) (refusing to extend suspect status to wealth-based classifications and rejecting 
the argument that wealth amounted to a proxy for race). 
 19. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28 (detailing suspect and quasi-suspect classification 
inquiries).  See also infra Part II. 
 20. Ironically, over- and underinclusiveness of classifications are some of the very evils the 
Equal Protection Clause forbids.  See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the 
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some of the traits that currently receive the Court’s extra attention and 
sweep in others, such as disability and sexual orientation, that the Court has 
not yet subjected to heightened scrutiny.21  In fact, if faithfully applied, the 
“test” potentially would support removal of race from the set of 
classifications deemed suspect because—although it has historically (and 
today) been the basis for significant discrimination and is arguably 
immutable22—race, and in particular the problem of race discrimination 
against members of minority racial groups, has received significant positive 
attention from the majoritarian political process in recent years.23  Given 
that suspect classification analysis was conceived initially to streamline and 
intensify review of race-based classifications, which were presumed to be 
infected with impermissible prejudice,24 a test that would result in race not 
being considered a suspect classification has questionable calibration. 
 
Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 343–53 (1949) (explaining and criticizing both types of classifications and 
their relationship to equal protection jurisprudence). 
 21. See infra Part II.B.  Compare Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (noting that racial 
“classifications are subject to the most exacting scrutiny”), with Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 
(1996) (applying rational basis review to sexual orientation-based classifications, although not deciding 
whether such classifications should be considered suspect or quasi-suspect), and Cleburne Living Ctr., 
473 U.S. at 442 (declining to find mental retardation to be a quasi-suspect classification).  This is not to 
suggest that it would be ill-advised to add disability and sexual orientation to the list of suspect traits, 
but to underscore the lack of fit between the inquiries and the current set of classifications considered 
suspect. 
 22. The Court has recognized that the significance accorded to race in American society may be 
socially constructed, acknowledging that “[c]lear-cut [racial] categories do not exist.  The particular 
traits which have generally been chosen to characterize races have been criticized as having little 
biological significance. . . . [R]acial classifications are for the most part sociopolitical, rather than 
biological, in nature.”  Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610 n.4 (1987) (citations 
omitted).  See also IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996) 
(analyzing the role of courts in defining race); infra notes 100–01 and accompanying text. 
 23. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (2000) (prohibiting, inter alia, race discrimination 
in programs receiving federal funds); id. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (prohibiting employment discrimination 
because of, inter alia, race); Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964–65), reprinted as amended in 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e app. at 606–09 (1994) (authorizing the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
to study the barriers to promotion for members of racial minorities and women).  The current test, if 
applied literally, would also likely support removal of sex from the set of suspicious characteristics in 
light of the similar legislative commitment to eradicating sex discrimination.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1) (1994) (prohibiting employment discrimination based on, inter alia, sex); 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) 
(2000) (prohibiting discrimination based on, inter alia, sex in credit transactions); 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) 
(2003) (prohibiting sex discrimination in education programs and activities receiving federal funds).  
See also infra note 175 and accompanying text.  Cf. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 443–46 (noting 
that although people with mental retardation have historically suffered discrimination and bear an 
unchangeable characteristic, their receipt of positive attention from elected officials supports the 
determination that retardation-based classifications not be deemed quasi-suspect). 
 24. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (finding that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s “strong policy” to eliminate official race discrimination “renders racial classifications 
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If suspect classification analysis operated well, notwithstanding the 
flawed indicia and fixed set of suspicious classifications, rethinking the 
heightened scrutiny tiers would not be warranted.  There is more, however.  
Perhaps the most pressing issue raised by the Court’s equal protection 
jurisprudence is the now primary use of suspect classification analysis to 
invalidate or call into question measures seeking to remedy past racial 
discrimination or limit the effects of racial bias in electoral politics.25  Put 
another way, the suspect classification label has made it more, rather than 
less, difficult for government to remedy the effects of hostility toward 
racial minorities in employment, voting, and other arenas.26  Instead of 
serving primarily to ensure freedom from race-based discrimination, the 
Court’s categorical use of rigorous review for all suspect classifications, 
 
‘constitutionally suspect,’ and subject to the ‘most rigid scrutiny,’ and ‘in most circumstances 
irrelevant’ to any constitutionally acceptable legislative purpose”) (citations omitted). 
 25. Even in Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court made clear that it was sustaining the law school’s 
consideration of race in admissions in part because “universities occupy a special niche in our 
constitutional tradition,” and not necessarily because it intended generally to permit race-based 
affirmative action in other contexts.  Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2339–41 (2003).  See also 
Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 547 (1999) (stating that “strict scrutiny applies if race was the 
‘predominant factor’ motivating the legislature’s districting decision”); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 218–31 (1995) (discussing the evolution of the application of strict scrutiny to race-
based affirmative action plans); infra note 106 (discussing limitations of Grutter’s application of strict 
scrutiny for other affirmative action cases).  Cf. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 245–46 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the majority’s insistence that strict scrutiny be applied consistently to all racial 
classifications, including those made for remedial purposes). 
 Since Adarand and the explosion of redistricting cases addressing the use of race, substantial 
commentary has pondered the effects of the Court’s strict scrutiny mandate for measures that purport to 
remedy the effects of past and current race discrimination.  See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Easing the 
Spring: Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action After the Redistricting Cases, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1569, 1570 (2002) (explaining how “[s]trict scrutiny has been rather useless to the groups whose 
mistreatment prompted its adoption” and addressing differences in the application of strict scrutiny 
redistricting and affirmative action cases); Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action: 
Lessons and Caveats, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1847 (1996) (exploring possibilities for class-based affirmative 
action in the wake of the Court’s insistence in Adarand on strict scrutiny for racial classifications); 
Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach to Strict Scrutiny 
After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2000) (maintaining that courts often invoke strict 
scrutiny as an outcome-determinative device, rather than a useful analytical tool, and proposing a 
solution to this problem); Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 1 (2002) (engaging in public policy analysis of affirmative action plans based on race and 
ethnicity). 
 26. See, e.g., Cromartie, 526 U.S. at 546 (stating “that all laws that classify citizens on the basis 
of race, including racially gerrymandered districting schemes, are constitutionally suspect and must be 
strictly scrutinized,” regardless of the legislative purpose); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 234–35 (requiring an 
affirmative action program aimed at remedying the effects of racial discrimination to meet the rigorous 
strict scrutiny standard, which insists that a racial classification “serve a compelling governmental 
interest, and . . . be narrowly tailored to further that interest”).  See also Rubenfeld, Anti-
Antidiscrimination Agenda, supra note 12, at 1169–77. 
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regardless of context, functions today as a barrier to programs designed to 
redress race discrimination.27 
 The Court’s reorientation of an analysis originally conceived to ferret 
out governmental reliance on arbitrary or biased assumptions regarding 
individual traits28 may point to intractable structural contradictions within 
suspect classification analysis regarding the purpose of, and triggers for, 
skeptical scrutiny.  Alternatively, the analysis might work well in theory 
 
 27. See Siegel, supra note 10, at 1143 (“[T]oday doctrines of heightened scrutiny function 
primarily to constrain legislatures from adopting policies designed to reduce race and gender 
stratification . . . .”).  See also Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003) (invalidating a university’s 
effort to diversify its student body by according weight to race in a numerically scaled admissions 
process).  Because sex-based classifications are subjected to a less rigorous, though still demanding, 
standard of review, the Court retains greater flexibility in evaluating affirmative action programs that 
seek to remedy past sex discrimination than in assessing race-based remedial measures.  Compare 
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (stating that a sex-based classification must be 
“substantially related” to an “exceedingly persuasive” government interest to survive equal protection 
review), with Adarand, 515 U.S. at 235 (affirming strict scrutiny’s application to a race-based 
affirmative action initiative).  See also Sidney Buchanan, Affirmative Action: The Many Shades of 
Justice, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 149, 157–58 (2002) (arguing that all affirmative action challenges should be 
reviewed under intermediate scrutiny to reconcile the paradox that sex-based programs face more 
lenient review than race-based remedial plans).  As the Court demonstrated recently, it views 
intermediate scrutiny as allowing broader freedom to uphold sex-based distinctions.  See Nguyen v. 
INS, 533 U.S. 53, 70 (2001) (upholding different immigration rules for men and women seeking to 
naturalize a child).  Perhaps the flexibility afforded by intermediate scrutiny would not have given rise 
to the immediate need for reconsideration of the tiered approach.  On the other hand, as contended here, 
a single standard could achieve the positive effects of stabilizing equal protection doctrine, ensuring a 
focused, meaningful inquiry and diminishing the real problems flowing from the extant standard.  See 
infra note 105 (discussing cases in which the Court sustained sex-based classifications).  Cf. Lawrence 
G. Sager, Of Tiers of Scrutiny and Time Travel: A Reply to Dean Sullivan, 90 CAL. L. REV. 819, 820–21 
(2002) (characterizing intermediate scrutiny as neither sensible nor consistent).  Applying the proposed 
standard to sex discrimination cases, infra Part V.B, shows how intermediate review likewise can give 
way to a single standard of review without abandoning the current and necessary careful review of sex-
based distinctions. 
 28. For a discussion of these traits, see infra notes 65, 75–87 and accompanying text.  The cases 
that led the Court to articulate the suspect classification standard in McLauglin, 379 U.S. at 192, all 
involved government distinctions based on race that were imbued either explicitly or implicitly with the 
assumption of white supremacy, see, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (addressing 
the harm caused by the separate-but-equal theory), or of a danger whites perceived to be posed by 
people of color, see, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218, 223–24 (1944) (upholding 
detainment of Japanese Americans during World War II based on fears of “espionage and sabotage”).  
Cf. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967) (voiding Virginia’s antimiscegenation law because it 
was based on “invidious racial discrimination”).  Indeed, as will be addressed at greater length below, 
notwithstanding its invocation in McLaughlin nearly forty years ago, strict scrutiny has often not been 
necessary to invalidate racial classifications.  See infra notes 63, 68 and accompanying text.  Even in 
Loving, which invoked the strict scrutiny and compelling government interest language from Korematsu 
and McLaughlin, the Court ultimately invalidated Virginia’s antimiscegenation law using the language 
of rational basis review: “There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious 
racial discrimination which justifies this classification.”  Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (emphasis added). 
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but lack sufficient constraints against misapplication in practice.29  For the 
purposes of this Article, the questions raised by the critique of suspect 
classification analysis are whether a different analytic framework could 
play a role in (1) enabling and encouraging courts to consider the 
legislative context in reviewing a classification’s compliance with the 
Equal Protection Clause, and (2) constraining, or at least exposing, 
individual judges’ reactions to particular traits or particular uses of 
classifications, such as remedial legislation. 
At the other end of the equal protection spectrum—rational basis 
review—the Court highlights its deferential approach to the law- and 
policymaking branches.30  So long as a classification is neither suspect nor 
quasi-suspect, the Court promises that it will give every beneficial 
presumption to the government when assessing the validity of differential 
treatment.31  And the Court has done so, for the most part, by upholding 
over one hundred classifications on rational basis review since 1973.32 
Notwithstanding this deference, the Court has invalidated almost a 
dozen classifications since 1973 as lacking a rational basis for equal 
protection purposes.33  For example, in cases addressing subjects as varied 
as access to absentee ballots,34 distribution of dividends from state 
projects,35 and taxation of out-of-state car purchases,36 the Court has 
departed from its habitual approval of governmental distinctions.  Finding 
that the differential treatment in these and related cases either lacked a 
legitimate and specific explanation or gave effect to stereotypic 
assumptions or hostility toward a class, the Court firmly rejected the 
measures at issue.37 
 
 29. See Rubenfeld, Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, supra note 12, at 1172–77; Spann, supra 
note 13, at 92. 
 30. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (emphasizing that rational basis review 
does not “authorize ‘the judiciary [to] sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of 
legislative policy determinations’”) (quoting City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) 
(per curiam)) (alteration in original). 
 31. See, e.g., id. (stressing that “a classification neither involving fundamental rights nor 
proceeding along suspect lines is accorded a strong presumption of validity”) (citations omitted).  See 
generally infra Part II.D (describing rational basis review). 
 32. See Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971 
Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 416–19 (1999) (listing rational basis cases 
decided from 1973 through May 1996). 
 33. See id.  See also infra notes 118, 120 and accompanying text. 
 34. See O’Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 530–31 (1974). 
 35. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982). 
 36. See Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 27 (1985). 
 37. See supra notes 34–36; infra note 120. 
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Against the backdrop of the Court’s respect for government’s need to 
distinguish between constituents and the related commitment not to intrude 
on most government decisionmaking, this set of rational basis invalidations 
has challenged scholars—as well as the Court—to identify some unifying 
theory.38  Yet, while the Court regularly explains its approach to rational 
basis review,39 it has not offered a theory for making collective sense of its 
variable lot of decisions.  Nor has the Court broadly embraced any of the 
rational basis review theories proffered by scholars during the past three 
decades as holding the key to its rational basis jurisprudence.40 
As with strict scrutiny, however, the problems of extant rational basis 
review go beyond doctrinal instability.  In particular, the deferential 
formulation of rational basis review can skew judicial analysis where the 
government appears to have acted to achieve a legitimate goal.  In these 
cases, the standard’s emphasis on deference at times leads courts to skip 
over the required step of evaluating the link between that permissible goal 
and the government’s action.41  For example, although a government body 
may have a legitimate interest in conserving scarce financial resources as a 
general matter, that goal alone does not explain why a government would 
single out one group from among all others to bear the cost-savings 
 
 38. See infra Part V.  One could argue that a dozen or so cases not adhering to the usual 
deferential rule do not merit treatment as anything other than odd or random cases falling outside the 
doctrine, as some cases inevitably do.  However, the analytic consistency among these cases, the 
regularity of their appearance over time, and the sheer number—nearly ten percent of all equal 
protection cases decided under rational basis review during three decades—make it unreasonable to 
brush off these cases as exceptional, unusual, or unrelated to the Court’s overarching equal protection 
analysis. 
 39. For recent characterizations of the standard, see, for example, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 
632–33 (1996), FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313–16 (1993), and City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441–42 (1985). 
 40. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 13, at 145–79 (analyzing the courts’ role in enforcing the 
constitutional equal protection guarantee when groups are disadvantaged in the lawmaking process); 
Gunther, supra note 17, at 20–24 (advocating that rational basis review should insist on meaningful 
justifications for government action); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 
COLUM.  L. REV. 1689, 1713–17 (1984) [hereinafter Sunstein, Naked Preferences] (arguing that “naked 
preferences” for interest groups do not constitute legitimate justifications for government action).  See 
also infra notes 294–316 and accompanying text.  Cf. Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah 
Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 257–58 (1996) (contending that the “pariah principle” explains the 
Court’s invalidation of the antigay amendment in Romer, and that the principle falls outside and does 
not explain the lowest level of the three-tiered equal protection framework). 
 41. Cf. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631–33 (explaining rational basis review’s insistence on a rational 
connection between a legitimate government interest and the government’s action).  See also infra notes 
332–42 and accompanying text (illustrating how the highly deferential approach to rational basis review 
interfered with the Court’s review of whether a proffered justification actually explained a 
governmental classification in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)). 
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burden.42  As a result, the rational basis “test” may fail to ensure even a 
baseline of meaningful review.43 
As an alternative to reworking the three tiers in response to the 
conflicts within suspect classification analysis and the Court’s uneven 
maneuvering between deferential and meaningful rational basis analysis, I 
contend that a single standard of review may provide a starting point for 
revitalizing meaningful equal protection review at the highest and lowest 
levels.  By the same token, a unitary standard potentially would narrow the 
gap between the virtually assured fatal blow dealt to classifications under 
strict scrutiny and the rubber stamp regularly received by classifications 
subjected to rational basis review.44  In addition to offering a forward-
looking device45 for balancing the dual competing priorities of scrutiny and 
deference, the single standard proposed here—by slipping out from the 
Court’s current tiered categorization—may shed light on the cohesiveness 
not readily apparent in the Court’s rational basis cases.46 
The proposed single standard consists of three inquiries that emerge 
from the Equal Protection Clause’s fundamental opposition to laws 
 
 42. See infra note 211 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which the Court considered a 
cost-savings justification for official action). 
 43. See infra notes 332–42 and accompanying text (illustrating how the highly deferential 
approach to rational basis review interfered with the Court’s review of whether a proffered justification 
actually explained a governmental classification in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)). 
 44. As Gerald Gunther observed, the most rigorous version of judicial review has often been 
“‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact,” in contrast to “the deferential old equal protection . . . with minimal 
scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact.”  Gunther, supra note 17, at 8 (footnote omitted).  But see 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (emphasizing that strict scrutiny is not 
always fatal to suspect classifications). 
 45. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship 
Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (1988) [hereinafter 
Sunstein, Sexual Orientation] (referring to the Equal Protection Clause as a forward-looking measure in 
contrast to the history-oriented Due Process Clause).  But see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Destabilizing 
Due Process and Evolutive Equal Protection, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1183, 1185–86 (2000) (arguing that 
analysis under the Equal Protection Clause frequently defers to past practices, whereas the Due Process 
Clause has destabilized traditional forms of discrimination). 
 46. This lack of cohesiveness could be tolerated and, indeed, embraced if the flexibility of 
rational basis review enabled occasional extra-rigorous review as its sole consequence.  Cf. Craig v. 
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.* (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that “candor compels the 
recognition that the relatively deferential ‘rational basis’ standard of review normally applied takes on a 
sharper focus when we address a gender-based classification”); Gunther, supra note 17, at 18–24 
(characterizing this heightened form of review as rational basis with “bite”).  However, no standards 
guide when the “bite” should be imposed, perhaps because the Court has not acknowledged this 
heightened form of rational basis review other than in cases reviewing classifications based on traits of 
sex and illegitimacy that were ultimately deemed quasi-suspect or suspect.  See infra notes 88, 205, 226 
and accompanying text. 
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distinguishing between classes for no legitimate purpose47—best known as 
“class legislation” in the pre-Lochner era.48  The three distinct yet 
overlapping inquiries grow out of commitments common to equal 
protection review at the highest and lowest levels.  First, the standard 
proposes an “intracontextual” inquiry, which asks courts to consider 
whether a plausible, nonarbitrary explanation can justify the government’s 
singling out of a particular trait from among all others within the regulatory 
context.49  Second is an “extracontextual” inquiry, which seeks to ensure 
that justifications are not simply generalizations about a characteristic that, 
though plausible, lack specific relevance to the regulatory context and 
could support broad, acontextual distinctions based on that trait (i.e., class 
legislation).  Finally, where a trait-based distinction is justifiable in context 
based on a government interest that would not support broad-scale 
burdening of the trait holders, the proposal urges courts to pursue a “bias” 
inquiry.  This inquiry would determine whether the line drawing reflects 
impermissible government purposes, such as hostility toward or 
stereotyping of the trait being regulated. 
To lay the foundation for the proposed single standard, I focus initially 
on tensions in the current tiered approach to equal protection review.  
Turning first to suspect classification analysis, Part II explores the genesis 
and development of the suspect classification indicia, and then highlights 
weaknesses within and conflicts between the indicia.  I also consider the 
role that suspect classification analysis has played in driving the Court’s 
categorical, rigid review of racial classifications.  Finally, Part II turns to 
suspect classification’s lenient counterpart within the tiered framework and 
sketches the Court’s wavering between reflexive, unfocused deference and 
meaningful review during the past thirty years.  Part II ultimately concurs 
with the Court and other scholars that the extant rational basis 
jurisprudence lacks internal coherence. 
Part III initiates consideration of whether a single standard might 
respond to the structural and analytic problems identified in Part II.  Can a 
 
 47. See infra Part IV.A. 
 48. See generally Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 
96 MICH. L. REV. 245 (1997) (discussing the original understanding of “class legislation” within the 
public debate and early judicial interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause). 
 49. The phrase “regulatory context” is used throughout this Article to refer to the context in 
which a classification operates or has its effect.  So, for example, the regulatory context of a measure 
restricting the adjustment of eyeglass lenses would be the eye wear business and all who work in it.  
Although the parameters of this context may be set broadly or narrowly, as will be addressed below, the 
determination of whether a classification is reasonable (or not arbitrary) under any review standard can 
be made only by reference to the context in which the distinction is made. 
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single standard provide sufficiently careful review to capture prejudice-
infested classifications while not becoming excessively rigid?  Can a single 
standard also provide for meaningful review of ordinary classifications 
without unduly restricting the government’s need, at times, to draw 
imprecise distinctions between its constituents?  Further, would a single 
standard entirely disrupt contemporary jurisprudence or, more positively, 
provide the focused analysis and theoretical and doctrinal coherence that is 
currently lacking? 
As background to later efforts to answer these questions, I consider 
why the tiered structure remains in place even while many of its flaws have 
received judicial and scholarly attention.  Because suspect classification 
was first adopted as an analytic device, justices on the Supreme Court have 
repeatedly taken issue with the dual (and ultimately triple) track taken by 
equal protection analysis.  I look first to how and why these justices have 
called the multiple tiers into question.  This part next considers why, in 
light of widespread criticism of the tiered framework’s operation, no 
judicial or scholarly consensus has emerged to date in favor of a single 
standard of review. 
Part IV distills a single standard from the Court’s equal protection 
jurisprudence.  This part first demonstrates the essential concern with class 
legislation that permeates review of all classifications, and then derives the 
three specific inquiries described above from the common concerns of high 
and low levels of review.  Part IV then considers the proposed standard in 
light of various equality theories, including three of the leading positions in 
the ongoing debate regarding the values equal protection review should aim 
to protect. 
Turning a critical eye toward the proposed single standard, Part V 
examines some of the issues that might arise in application.  In particular, 
Part V applies the standard to reconsider a number of rational basis and 
heightened scrutiny cases to assess the standard’s effect, if any, on equal 
protection jurisprudence. 
In Part VI, I conclude that the three tiers may be understood best in 
historical terms; that is, they may have served as a “training” tool for the 
Supreme Court and lower courts that lacked an inclination or ability to 
identify bias or outmoded stereotypes within familiar classifications, such 
as those based on race, sex, and nonmarital parentage that pervaded much 
long-standing legislation.  At this point in the evolution of constitutional 
doctrine, however, I contend that the tiers may have outlived their role in 
streamlining judicial analysis of distinctions based on race, sex, and other 
traits that historically enjoyed wide acceptance as bases for differential 
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treatment.  Instead of effectuating the Court’s ability to enforce the basic 
constitutional equality guarantee, the high degree of deference flowing 
from rational basis review and the rigidity of strict scrutiny have become 
obstacles to equality.  In contrast, a single standard, such as the one 
advanced here, would provide sufficiently careful scrutiny to capture 
invidious classifications currently screened under heightened scrutiny.  At 
the same time, a unitary standard’s insistence that deference be coupled 
with meaningful review would ensure genuine review of all other 
classifications without overly burdening the leeway and flexibility essential 
to an effective legislative process. 
II.  PARSING THE LANDSCAPE: A CLOSE LOOK AT SUSPECT 
CLASSIFICATION STANDARDS AND THE “MIXED BAG” OF 
RATIONAL BASIS JURISPRUDENCE 
Within a relatively brief time period, the equal protection guarantee 
moved from being “the usual last resort of constitutional arguments”50 to 
enjoying a new status as “the Court’s chief instrument for invalidating state 
laws.”51  In scores of cases throughout the past fifty years, the Court has 
woven together first principles with additional underlying concerns to 
create a multifaceted doctrinal framework for the analysis of government 
action that differentiates between classes.52 
Today, this framework has evolved to a point where suspect 
classification analysis has become the Court’s “chief instrument” for 
invalidating measures intended to remedy rather than perpetuate past race 
discrimination,53 and rational basis review has been applied so variably that 
even the Court admits that “[t]he most arrogant legal scholar would not 
claim that all of these cases applied a uniform or consistent test under equal 
protection principles.”54 
 
 50. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). 
 51. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 395 (1978). 
 52. See generally Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 
MICH. L. REV. 213 (1991).  Klarman notes that in McLaughlin, for the first time, the Court “both 
articulated and applied a more rigorous review standard to racial classifications.”  Id. at 255. 
 53. In contrast, under the Court’s current jurisprudence, affirmative action plans aimed to benefit 
green-eyed people would face far less rigorous review than plans that seek to eradicate the effects of 
conceded racial or sex-based discrimination.  Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2360 (2003) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (maintaining that the Equal Protection Clause 
“does not . . . prohibit the use of unseemly legacy preferences or many other kinds of arbitrary 
admissions procedures,” but “does prohibit . . . classifications made on the basis of race”). 
 54. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 176 n.10 (1980).  See also Schweiker v. Wilson, 
450 U.S. 221, 243 n.4 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“Members of the Court continue to hold divergent 
views on the clarity with which a legislative purpose must appear, and about the degree of deference 
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To lay a foundation for reconsidering the tiered framework, this part 
will examine how equal protection jurisprudence has evolved by first 
exploring the genesis and evolution of suspect classification analysis.  As 
shown below, the indicia of suspectness and the categorical application of 
strict review have inhibited the Court’s ability to review carefully the full 
range of classifications embodying bias and to conduct a nuanced, 
contextualized analysis of a classification designated as suspect but adopted 
for benign or remedial purposes. 
Second, this part will look closely at the “mixed bag” of rational basis 
cases decided following the Lochner era’s demise.55  For the most part, 
these cases are laissez-faire in approach, embracing nearly all instances of 
government line drawing.56  Yet even with this determinedly deferential 
posture, the Court has invalidated nearly ten percent of all classifications 
reviewed during the past twenty years.57  What links these cases—and what 
separates them from the majority of their doctrinal peers that have upheld 
official classifications—is not apparent at a glance.  Indeed, scholars have 
puzzled over the driving force of rational basis review for the past quarter 
 
afforded the legislature in suiting means to ends.”) (internal citations omitted); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 
U.S. 441, 462 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (stating that “[t]he doctrinal difficulties of the Equal 
Protection Clause are indeed trying”).  Justice White also noted the Court’s inconsistent approach to 
rational basis review: 
[W]e employ not just one, or two, but . . . a “spectrum of standards in reviewing 
discrimination allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause.”  Sometimes we just say the 
claim is “invidious” and let the matter rest there . . . . But at other times we sustain the 
discrimination, if it is justifiable on any conceivable rational basis, or strike it down, unless 
sustained by some compelling interest of the State . . . . 
Vlandis, 412 U.S. at 458 (White, J., concurring) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. 1, 98–99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). 
 55. Cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  While the Court invalidated a number of 
measures during the Lochner era, the analytic strength of these rulings is questionable as the Court 
continues to distance itself from the active role in reviewing government action that it assumed during 
the early 20th century.  See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 459–60 
(1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The suggestion that the traditional 
rational-basis test allows this sort of searching inquiry creates precedent for this Court and lower courts 
to subject economic and commercial classifications to similar and searching ‘ordinary’ rational-basis 
review—a small and regrettable step back toward the days of Lochner v. New York.”) (citation omitted); 
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484–85 (1970) (“[The Lochner] era long ago passed into 
history.”).  See also Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874 (1987) 
[hereinafter Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy] (“The basic understanding has been endorsed by the Court in 
many cases taking the lesson of the Lochner period to be the need for judicial deference to legislative 
enactments.”). 
 56. See, e.g., Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 230 (recognizing that the equal protection guarantee does 
not impose “an obligation to provide the best governance possible,” and that the “Court properly 
exercises only a limited review power over Congress, the appropriate representative body through 
which the public makes democratic choices among alternative solutions to social and economic 
problems”) (citation omitted). 
 57. See supra note 32 and accompanying text; infra notes 118, 120 and accompanying text. 
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century in an effort to enshrine some sense of doctrinal stability.58  To date, 
none of their proposed theoretical constructs has been fully embraced by 
the Court.59  Nor has the Court articulated its own connective link between 
the cases. 
A.  THE GENESIS AND REFINEMENT OF SUSPECT CLASSIFICATION 
ANALYSIS 
Shortly after United States v. Carolene Products Co. pronounced in 
1938 that certain forms of governmental discrimination warrant closer 
review than others,60 the Court made its first explicit reference to race as a 
“suspect” basis for discrimination.61  Given that “[a] core purpose of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was to do away with all governmentally imposed 
discrimination based on race,”62 the initial application of the “suspect” 
 
 58. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 13, at 31, 146, 151, 156–70; Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra 
note 40, at 1713–17; Gunther, supra note 17, at 20–24. 
 59. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.  See, e.g., Brian Boynton, Note, Democracy and 
Distrust After Twenty Years: Ely’s Process Theory and Constitutional Law from 1990 to 2000, 53 
STAN. L. REV. 397, 421–22, 439–46 (2000) (identifying “crucial differences” between Ely’s process 
theory and the Supreme Court’s equal protection analysis). 
 60. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (noting that “a more 
searching judicial inquiry” may be warranted where government action burdens “discrete and insular 
minorities”).  As Bruce Ackerman has suggested, “anonymous and diffuse” classes may be equally or 
more at risk of unequal treatment by prejudice-infected governing bodies than “discrete and insular” 
minorities, but the Court has not, at least overtly, wrestled with that important observation.  See Bruce 
A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 722–24 (1985).  For additional 
discussion of footnote four, see also Lea Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts, and the Fate of the “Insider-
Outsider,” 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1294 (1986) (critiquing the process-based theory in Carolene 
Products as “substantially at odds with the United States Constitution”), and Louis Lusky, Footnote 
Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1982) (describing footnote four’s 
historical development and examining its enduring legacy). 
 61. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).  The Court opined that racial 
classifications are “immediately suspect” and “subject to the most rigid scrutiny.”  Id.  In Hirabayashi 
v. United States, the Court upheld a wartime curfew for people of Japanese ancestry and declared that 
race is “in most circumstances irrelevant” to any permissible government interest.  Hirabayashi v. 
United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943). 
 62. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (footnote omitted).  See also Strauder v. West 
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 303–08 (1879); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM 
POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 8 (1988) (asserting that the purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is “to reaffirm the lay public’s longstanding rhetorical commitment to general principles of 
equality, individual rights, and local self-rule”).  Even with this mandate, a willingness to recognize the 
invidious nature of racial classifications was neither immediate nor wholehearted following the 
enactment of the Equal Protection Clause.  Although explicitly burdensome classifications were 
invalidated regularly for many years, the Court maintained the view that separate treatment could 
constitute equality.  See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. 
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 (1954).  Cf. Derrick Bell, Racial Libel as American Ritual, 36 
WASHBURN L.J. 1, 13 (1996) (“The spirit of Plessy’s ‘separate but equal’ standard is revived in the 
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designation in 1944 to a racial classification made historical sense.  
Although racial classifications were regularly invalidated in light of this 
purpose well before the concept of suspect classification became associated 
with strict judicial scrutiny,63 the embrace of a suspicious stance64 toward 
the government’s differential treatment based on particular traits was 
new.65  By incorporating this suspicion into a legal test,66 the Court took its 
 
Court’s willingness to employ disingenuous terms to disguise its continued willingness to sacrifice 
black rights to further white interests.”). 
Of course, the Equal Protection Clause also has long been applied to assess classifications based 
on characteristics other than race.  See, e.g., Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 574 (1949) 
(invalidating a value-added tax imposed on foreign but not domestic corporations); Valentine v. Great 
Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 299 U.S. 32, 33 (1936) (striking down a gross receipts tax as arbitrary and, 
therefore, violative of the equal protection guarantee); Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 566–67 (1931) 
(observing that “the constitutional guaranty of equal protection of the laws is interposed against 
discriminations that are entirely arbitrary”).  Indeed, the Court had, early on, completely accepted an 
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause that extended the equality guarantee beyond the specific 
rights envisioned to be protected by the Framers.  See Klarman, supra note 52, at 216.  See also Michael 
J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 
1028–32 (1979) (arguing that early interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause reflected a “broader 
understanding of the amendment”). 
 63. Although Korematsu deployed the term “suspect,” “the Court actually applied its most 
deferential brand of rationality review” to the racial classification at issue.  See Klarman, supra note 52, 
at 232.  Michael Klarman has argued persuasively that the Court did not apply more rigorous review of 
racial classifications for another two decades, until McLaughlin was decided.  See id. at 254–57.  In 
McLaughlin, the Court utilized the concept of suspectness it had first introduced in Korematsu and 
Hirabayashi, but it enhanced the rigor of its review, emphasizing that racial classifications 
presumptively contravene the Fourteenth Amendment’s “strong policy” against distinguishing between 
individuals based on race.  McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).  The Court in Cleburne 
reinforced McLaughlin’s centrality to contemporary analysis of racial classifications by citing it to 
explain strict scrutiny.  See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).  
For examples of racial classifications struck down prior to McLaughlin, see Watson v. City of Memphis, 
373 U.S. 526, 533 (1963) (rejecting a plan to delay desegregation of city recreational facilities nine 
years after Brown), Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (invalidating racial segregation in education as “inherently 
unequal”), Sipuel v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631, 632–33 (1948) 
(ordering Oklahoma to provide legal education without regard to race), and Strauder, 100 U.S. at 303, 
307–08 (rejecting a race-based restriction for jury service).  But see Plessy, 163 U.S. at 537 (upholding 
racial segregation of railroad cars). 
 64. As the Court has explained, “[Racial] classifications are subject to the most exacting 
scrutiny; to pass constitutional muster, they must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and 
must be ‘necessary . . . to the accomplishment’ of their legitimate purpose.”  Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432–
33 (quoting McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 196) (omission in original). 
 65. The designation of certain traits as warranting a heightened level of review broke sharply 
with the Plessy regime’s view that race-based differential treatment should be reviewed no differently 
from other government distinctions between classes.  See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 543–45.  Even prior to 
Plessy, however, the Court occasionally evaluated racial classifications with reference to the recognized 
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment: combating racial discrimination.  In Strauder, for example, 
Justice Strong asked, “What is [equal protection] but declaring . . . in regard to the colored race, for 
whose protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be made against 
them by law because of their color?”  Strauder, 100 U.S. at 307. 
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first formal step since the adoption of the Equal Protection Clause in 1868 
toward streamlining review of governmental trait-based distinctions.67  The 
suspect classification formulation also put governing bodies on explicit 
notice that any race-based decisionmaking was going to meet skeptical 
judicial review.68 
During the fertile period of social change in the 1960s and 1970s, 
American cultural ideas of equality and impermissible discrimination 
changed dramatically regarding traits in addition to race.  Moving beyond 
an awareness of the pervasive harm caused by racial discrimination, albeit 
grudging in some jurisdictions, American society faced new demands for 
 
 66. The elaboration of what is commonly thought of as the suspect classification test—indicia 
that signal which classifications merit close judicial review—did not come until years later as the Court 
contemplated applying heightened scrutiny to classifications of characteristics other than race.  See 
infra text accompanying notes 73–87.  The delay between the conceptualization of suspectness and the 
crafting of a test to determine which traits fit within the suspect category may have resulted from the 
widespread awareness that the equal protection guarantee condemned race discrimination.  This 
background assumption rendered unnecessary the creation of a test to explicate or justify the Court’s 
suspicion of racial classifications. 
 67. The Court illustrated the streamlining effect of the new analysis by explaining that 
“[c]lassifying persons according to their race is more likely to reflect racial prejudice than legitimate 
public concerns; the race, not the person, dictates the category.”  Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432 (citation 
omitted).  See also McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 196 (insisting that racial classifications be “necessary, and 
not merely rationally related” to a legitimate government interest). 
 68. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2427 (2003) (“‘[A]ny person . . . has the right to 
demand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification 
subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest of judicial scrutiny.’”) (quoting Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995)). 
Given that explicit racial classifications were almost invariably invalidated after Plessy and well 
before the adoption of suspect classification analysis and its accompanying heightened review, one 
could argue that the Court’s “new” approach represented a largely external stylistic shift rather than a 
fundamental change in analysis.  See, e.g., Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 401–02 (1964) 
(invalidating—before the Court decided McLaughlin—a law requiring a candidate’s race to be posted 
on electoral ballots because it lacked a legitimate purpose); Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (holding that 
“[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal,” but not referencing heightened scrutiny); 
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 426–27 (1948) (invalidating a statute denying 
commercial fishing licenses to “alien Japanese”); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 361–62 (1939) 
(finding an equal protection violation in the systematic exclusion of African Americans from grand jury 
venire). 
Further, one could argue that the truly significant shift for purposes of assessing racial 
classifications occurred in the abandonment of Plessy’s separate-but-equal formulation.  See Brown, 
347 U.S. at 494–95.  Nevertheless, because a majority of the Court treats the shift to strict scrutiny as 
analytically important for racial classifications, I will proceed from that premise for purposes of 
revisiting the applicable standard of review.  See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 236 (referencing Korematsu’s 
validation of a now-condemned racial classification and observing that “[a]ny retreat from the most 
searching judicial inquiry can only increase the risk of another such error occurring in the future”). 
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equality in a wide range of arenas.69  Building on the legal and social 
change sparked by the civil rights movement, the movements for women’s 
rights and lesbian and gay rights raised challenges of unprecedented 
breadth to then widely accepted forms of discrimination based on sex and 
sexual orientation.70  Advocates for people with mental retardation, the 
poor, noncitizens, and others likewise pressed for the removal of barriers to 
their constituents’ equality.71  The creation of legal defense funds, inspired 
by the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund’s triumphs, provided 
the legal tools to complement the organizing accomplished by their 
grassroots counterparts.72 
 
 69. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and 
Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419 (2001).  The concept of equality advocated by many of these 
groups in their public rhetoric and legal actions was a broad and varied one.  See generally, e.g., Mary 
Becker, The Sixties Shift to Formal Equality and the Courts: An Argument for Pragmatism and Politics, 
40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 209 (1998) (discussing the evolution of feminist thought regarding legal 
rights); Cynthia Grant Bowman & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Feminist Legal Theory, Feminist 
Lawmaking, and the Legal Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 249 (1998) (addressing the relationship 
between feminist theory and law reform).  Numerous cases also reflect the varying efforts through 
legislation and litigation to achieve equality.  See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 
719–21 (1982) (challenging the denial of admission to men desiring nursing degrees); County of Wash. 
v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 164–65 (1981) (demanding a pay increase under comparable worth theory to 
compensate for the undervaluation of jobs performed predominantly by women); Hampton v. Mow Sun 
Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 90–91 (1976) (seeking to end discrimination in civil service based on alienage); 
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 165 (1972) (arguing that the recovery of workmen’s 
compensation benefits not be denied to children whose parents did not marry); Brown, 347 U.S. at 486–
88 (challenging the constitutionality of racial segregation in public schools on the ground that separate 
schools were unequal).  Cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 331–33 (1972) (asserting that a one-year 
residency requirement for voting rights denied equal treatment). 
 70. See generally DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, WOMEN, GAYS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE 
GROUNDS FOR FEMINISM AND GAY RIGHTS IN CULTURE AND LAW (1998).  For a comprehensive list of 
sex discrimination cases beginning with Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), through mid-1998, see 
Becker, supra note 69, at 273–77.  For early judicial responses to challenges brought by lesbians and 
gay men to discrimination based on sexual orientation, see, for example, Singer v. U.S. Civil Service 
Commission, 530 F.2d 247, 255 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977) (upholding a gay man’s 
dismissal from federal employment for “openly and publicly flaunting his homosexual way of life”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted), Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1161, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1969) 
(sustaining a gay man’s challenge to employment discrimination based on sexual orientation), Gaylord 
v. Tacoma School District No. 10, 559 P.2d 1340, 1341 (Wash. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 
(1977) (rejecting a teacher’s challenge to sexual orientation-based employment discrimination), and 
Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1188 (Wash. App. 1974), appeal denied, 84 Wash. 2d 1008 (1974) 
(rejecting a gay couple’s challenge to the denial of a marriage license).  See also Developments in the 
Law: Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1508 (1989). 
 71. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (mental 
retardation); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (citizenship); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) 
(poverty). 
 72. See generally Jack Greenberg, War Stories: Reflections on Thirty-Five Years with the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 587 (1994).  See also In re Thom, 301 N.E.2d 542 
(N.Y. 1973) (per curiam) (reversing denial of charitable organization status to Lambda Legal Defense 
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In addition to engendering popular discussion and debate, these 
advocates pressed the Supreme Court to complicate its analysis of barriers 
to equality.73  Through legal challenges to nonracial classifications, 
advocates demanded the same skepticism that the Court was already 
applying to race-based laws and policies.74  Taking up this gauntlet, the 
Court began the process of articulating more precisely than it had in the 
race discrimination cases75 exactly when a classification would be accorded 
close judicial scrutiny. 
In 1971, the first phase of this articulation began with the invocation 
of the concern expressed in Carolene Products for “‘discrete and insular’ 
minorit[ies]”76 in a case strictly scrutinizing a state law denying welfare 
benefits to noncitizens.77  Declaring in Graham v. Richardson “that 
classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, 
are inherently suspect,”78 the Court opined that noncitizens “are a prime 
 
and Education Fund, the first national organization focused exclusively on gay and lesbian civil rights 
litigation); COUNCIL FOR PUB. INTEREST LAW, BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: FINANCING 
PUBLIC INTEREST LAW IN AMERICA 34–40, 107–11 (1976) (discussing the NAACP Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund and the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund); PATRICIA A. CAIN, 
RAINBOW RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS AND COURTS IN THE LESBIAN AND GAY CIVIL RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT (2000) (reviewing and analyzing the history of lesbian and gay civil rights litigation); 
ROBERT WEISBROT, FREEDOM BOUND: A HISTORY OF AMERICA’S CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 8 (1990) 
(noting that the NAACP “anchored” the “escalating protests against discrimination [d]uring the 1930s 
[with] a concerted attack on school segregation”); Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Barbara Flagg, Some 
Reflections on the Feminist Legal Thought of the 1970s, 1989 U. CHI LEGAL F. 9, 11 (discussing the 
Women’s Rights Project of the American Civil Liberties Union); Eric L. Muller, The Legal Defense 
Fund’s Capital Punishment Campaign: The Distorting Influence of Death, 4 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
158, 158–63 (1985) (reviewing the history and strategic decisionmaking process of the NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund); Karen O’Connor & Lee Epstein, A Legal Voice for the Chicano Community: The 
Activities of the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 1968–82, 65 SOC. SCI. Q. 
245, 245–56 (1984) (examining the history and activities of the Mexican American Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund); William B. Glaberson, Puerto Rican Legal Fund: 10 Years Old and Growing, 188 
N.Y. L.J. 1, 1 (July 9, 1982) (discussing the origins and litigation strategy of the Puerto Rican Legal 
Defense and Education Fund); NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHTS FUND, OUR HISTORY, at 
http://narf.org/intro/history.html (reviewing the history of the Native American Rights Fund) (last 
visited Mar. 17, 2004). 
 73. Cf. J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2315–16 (1997) (addressing 
the relationship between constitutional analysis and social movements). 
 74. See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text. 
 75. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).  As discussed above, supra notes 60–65 and 
accompanying text, in its earlier race discrimination cases, the Court had not developed a test for 
suspectness even while designating racial classifications as suspect. 
 76. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. 
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)). 
 77. Id. at 376. 
 78. Id. at 372 (footnotes omitted). 
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art2
GOLD14.DOC 4/2/2004  6:20 PM 
2004] EQUALITY WITHOUT TIERS 501 
 
example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority for whom such heightened 
judicial solicitude is appropriate.”79 
Unadorned reference to footnote four of the Carolene Products 
decision gave way to a more elaborate analytic framework, still in place 
today, as cases continued to present the Court with a wide range of 
potentially suspect classifications beyond race, nationality, and alienage.  
Just two years after Graham, in 1973, Justice Lewis Powell outlined what 
he called the “traditional indicia of suspectness,”80 adding history and 
political power to the growing set of judicial concerns.  He explained that, 
to be deemed suspect, “the class [must be] saddled with such disabilities, or 
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to 
such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary 
protection from the majoritarian political process.”81  Also in 1973, a 
plurality of the Court added that a characteristic’s “relation to ability to 
perform or contribute to society” was an important indicator of whether 
government’s use of a characteristic should be deemed suspect.82  By way 
of example, the plurality in Frontiero v. Richardson contrasted sex with 
“such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability.”83  In an 
apparent effort to further refine and control the set of classifications 
 
 79. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 
(1938)).  After Graham, the Court regularly invoked the discrete and insular minority concept in 
discussing laws drawing distinctions based on alienage.  See, e.g., Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 
n.5 (1984); Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 20 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 
454 U.S. 432, 438 (1982); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 302 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting); 
Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 17 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Examining Bd. of Eng’rs, 
Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 602 (1976); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721 
(1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642 (1973). 
 80. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).  Notwithstanding Justice 
Powell’s reference to tradition, this precise formulation—involving history, immutability, and relative 
political powerlessness—had never before appeared in the Court’s analysis.  Notably, too, Justice 
Powell referred to the “class,” not the “classification,” in setting forth these indicia.  See id.  See infra 
notes 91–99 and accompanying text regarding the consequences of the focus on the burdened subclass 
within the classification. 
 81. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.  Later decisions assessing whether potential classifications should 
be treated as suspect have tended to require all three criteria—history of discrimination, immutability, 
and relative political powerlessness—to be satisfied.  See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442–47 (1985) (finding that although mental retardation is immutable, 
classifications based on mental retardation did not satisfy all the indicia of heightened scrutiny). 
 82. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).  See 
also Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976) (identifying this concern as relevant, although 
rejecting an argument that classification based on illegitimacy warranted strict scrutiny).  In Murgia, the 
Court formulated this inquiry to focus on whether the group at issue (people aged fifty and over) had 
been singled out “on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities.”  
Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312–13 (1976) (per curiam). 
 83. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). 
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potentially eligible for close review, the Court in Frontiero inquired, for the 
first time in the suspect classification context, whether the characteristic at 
issue was “an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of 
birth.”84 
This set of indicia, as developed over time, aimed to identify 
characteristics that “are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any 
legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are 
deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy,”85 and, as a result, warrant the 
extrajudicial suspicion that comes with suspect classification analysis.  As 
John Hart Ely observed, “the doctrine of suspect classifications is a 
roundabout way of uncovering official attempts to inflict inequality for its 
own sake—to treat a group worse not in the service of some overriding 
social goal but largely for the sake of simply disadvantaging its 
 
 84. Id. (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).  In some cases, the immutability inquiry was 
characterized as a concern with whether the characteristic at issue was “obvious” or “distinguishing.”  
See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313–14.  See also Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (citing Murgia, 
427 U.S. at 313–14).  The concern with the relationship between judicial review and personal agency 
had surfaced earlier in the rational basis review context as the Court assessed whether an individual’s 
membership in the prejudice-laden category was voluntary and, therefore, avoidable.  The Court, while 
applying rational basis review to a nonmarital parentage classification a year before Frontiero was 
decided, explained that it would be “illogical and unjust” to penalize an infant for a status out of his or 
her control.  See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (footnote omitted).  See 
also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (finding that children of undocumented noncitizens were 
“not accountable for their disabling status” and, therefore, should not be denied public education).  In 
contrast, the Court in Cleburne observed that an immutable status might, in some instances, correlate 
with ability and provide a basis for sustaining a classification.  Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 442 
n.10.  See also infra text accompanying note 104. 
With some frequency, lower courts have relied on the “immutability test” to refuse close review 
of sexual orientation-based classifications.  See, e.g., Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City 
of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 293 & n.2, 300–01 (6th Cir. 1997) (explaining that sexual orientation-
based classifications merit only rational basis review because “attempted identification of homosexuals 
by non-behavioral attributes could have no meaning”); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 101–03 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987) (upholding the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s refusal to hire a lesbian applicant and 
rejecting heightened scrutiny in part because “[i]t would be quite anomolous [sic], on its face, to declare 
status defined by conduct that states may constitutionally criminalize as deserving of strict scrutiny 
under the equal protection clause”).  But cf. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726, 728 (9th Cir. 
1989) (en banc) (Norris, J., concurring) (concluding that “homosexuals constitute a suspect class” in 
part by defining immutability to encompass “those traits that are so central to a person’s identity that it 
would be abhorrent for government to penalize a person for refusing to change them, regardless of how 
easy that change might be physically”). 
 85. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 440.  Cf. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (“The 
Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will 
eventually be rectified by the democratic process . . . .”) (footnote omitted).  Although later cases set out 
the suspect classification criteria in different ways, the basic indicia—history of discrimination, 
immutability, and political power—were fully in place in the early 1970s.  Later decisions simply 
wrestled with their application.  See, e.g., Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 440–47. 
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members.”86  And the demanding review imposed on suspect 
classifications, requiring that use of the protected trait be narrowly “tailored 
to serve a compelling state interest,”87 takes a lesson from Carolene 
Products: that bias-infected discriminatory classifications based on that 
trait are unlikely to be corrected promptly by legislative means. 
B.  CONFLICTS WITHIN AND AROUND THE INDICIA OF SUSPECTNESS 
The suspect classification indicia—including the history of 
discrimination, the immutability or distinctiveness of a trait, and relative 
political power—currently suffer from both misapplication and theoretical 
inconsistencies.  As a result, the set of classifications that might be 
considered suspect or quasi-suspect has remained largely unchanged for 
more than a quarter century.88  Given the strong correlation between the 
indicia and some nonsuspect traits, it appears that a central reason for 
heightened scrutiny’s restriction to five traits is temporal, in that those traits 
received the Court’s protection before slippery slope-type fears about the 
potential reach of rigorous review set in.89  By privileging temporality over 
equity, this “first in time is first in right” approach underscores the urgent 
need to revisit the framework for equal protection review.90 
 
 86. ELY, supra note 13, at 153. 
 87. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 440. 
 88. The point in time at which the set actually closed is somewhat debatable.  The Court’s 1976 
decision to apply intermediate scrutiny to a sex-based classification in Craig was arguably the last time 
the Court altered its method of analyzing a particular classification.  Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 
(1976).  But see Gunther, supra note 17, at 33–36 (arguing that the Court had already begun applying 
heightened scrutiny in Reed v. Reed, 494 U.S. 71 (1971), although it did not acknowledge that it was 
doing so).  In fact, it was not until 1988 that the Court formally acknowledged its application of 
intermediate scrutiny to classifications of nonmarital children.  See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 
(1988).  But long before that decision, the Court tended to rigorously review classifications based on 
illegitimacy.  Gunther, supra note 17, at 33–36.  With respect to sex-based classifications, the battle 
continues over where exactly those classifications should fall on the suspect/quasi-suspect spectrum.  In 
United States v. Virginia, the majority described the heightened scrutiny test as requiring an 
“exceedingly persuasive justification” for sex-based classifications, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996), while 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, concurring, characterized the test as requiring that the classification “‘serve 
important governmental objectives and . . . be substantially related to [the] achievement of those 
objectives.’”  Id. at 558 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (quoting Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (citations 
omitted)).  In dissent, Justice Scalia maintained that the Court has “no established criterion to determine 
when to apply ‘immediate scrutiny.’”  Id. at 568 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 89. Cf. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 445 (voicing concern that “if the large and amorphous 
class of the mentally retarded were deemed quasi-suspect . . . it would be difficult to find a principled 
way to distinguish a variety of other groups”); Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: 
The Visibility Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485, 562 (1998) 
(describing as “restrictive animus” the Court’s “desire to limit the number of groups protected” under 
heightened scrutiny). 
 90. See Yoshino, supra note 89, at 562. 
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The quieting of a once-vibrant analytic tool also suggests that the 
indicia themselves have become ossified or that they lack the specificity 
necessary to constrain misapplications of suspect classification analysis.  
As this section argues, the contradictions between indicia and outcomes, 
whether the result of deliberate manipulation or logical error, support 
reconsideration of the tiered framework. 
 The most apparent conflicts within the suspect classification 
framework occur between the Court’s insistence on symmetrical evaluation 
of all classifications, whether or not they burden a vulnerable group, and 
the indicia’s targeted focus on the vulnerable group.91  With respect to the 
history-of-discrimination inquiry, for example, a dominant group, such as 
whites, will not have suffered a history of discrimination based on race 
while the minority or subordinated group, here people of color, will be able 
to demonstrate that history.  Similarly, the inquiry into relative political 
power is, by definition, answered differently by members of a dominant 
class, such as men, than by women who have been subordinated based on 
the same characteristic of sex.  Whether race, sex, or alienage negatively 
influences political power depends on the particular race, sex, or 
citizenship status of the respondent.  Subgroup membership is what 
matters.  Yet to the Court, the classification—and not the affected class—is 
what will trigger heightened review.92  This deeply rooted conflict suggests 
that the current analytic framework, or at least the way it has been 
developed by the Court, may not be as carefully conceived or applied as its 
widespread acceptance suggests. 
As a practical matter, moreover, the indicia conflict with the Court’s 
own assessment of which traits warrant heightened review.  The political 
powerlessness criterion, for example, asks whether a group is “powerless in 
the sense that [the burdened group has] no ability to attract the attention of 
the lawmakers.”93  If pursued to its logical end, this inquiry could actually 
 
 91. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutionalizing Women’s Equality, 90 CAL. L. REV. 735, 750–
54 (2002) (discussing the tension between symmetrical and asymmetrical approaches to the review of 
discriminatory laws).  See generally Hutchinson, supra note 13 (criticizing the Court’s insistence on 
symmetry). 
 92. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 222 (1995) (“‘[T]he standard of 
review under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited 
by a particular classification . . . .’”) (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–
94 (1989) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion)). 
 93. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 445.  Similarly, in Foley v. Connelie, the Court subjected 
an alienage classification to strict scrutiny because “aliens—pending their eligibility for citizenship—
have no direct voice in the political processes.”  Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 294 (1978) (citation 
omitted).  In making this assessment, the Court also examined whether the legislative response to those 
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support removal of traits such as race and sex from the list of suspect 
classifications, contrary to the Court’s expressed intent,94 in light of the 
substantial legislation prohibiting differential treatment based on race and 
sex.95  Other traits that receive far less legislative attention but nonetheless 
affect individual opportunity, such as intersexuality or transgender 
identity,96 would enjoy a better fit with the Court’s stated concerns.97 
Graham’s earlier and simpler version of the Carolene Products’ 
political power inquiry into whether classifications would prejudice 
“discrete and insular minorities” does not escape this tension between the 
dichotomous commitments to generally applicable scrutiny of a trait 
regardless of the trait bearer’s identity and heightened protection for 
vulnerable “minorities.”98  Instead, it reinforces the position that the 
Court’s chief concern should be with the latter, and that the dominant group 
presumably should be able to redress grievances effectively through the 
political process.99 
In addition to the tension between concern for the class and for the 
classification reflected in the history and political power inquiries, the 
 
with the particular trait “belies a continuing antipathy or prejudice and a corresponding need for more 
intrusive oversight by the judiciary.”  Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 443. 
 94. See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001) (sex); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (race). 
 95. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7201(b) (2000) (ensuring equal employment opportunities in 
government employment regardless of race); 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000) (prohibiting educational 
programs that receive federal financial assistance from discriminating on the basis of sex); 29 U.S.C.    
§ 206(d) (1994) (prohibiting employers from paying different wages based on sex).  See also James W. 
Ellis, On the “Usefulness” of Suspect Classifications, 3 CONST. COMMENT. 375, 380 (1986) (“If the 
fact that advocates have obtained passage of some noninvidious, protective legislation precludes 
heightened scrutiny, women and racial minorities should now be consigned to the rational basis test.”). 
 96. See generally Taylor Flynn, Transforming the Debate: Why We Need to Include Transgender 
Rights in the Struggles for Sex and Sexual Orientation Equality, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 392 (2001) 
(describing and analyzing the discrimination against, and the legal claims made by, transgendered 
individuals); Julie A. Greenberg, When Is a Man a Man, and When Is a Woman a Woman?, 52 FLA. L. 
REV. 745 (2000) (discussing the legal status of transgender, transsexual, and intersex individuals). 
 97. Justice Brennan’s suggestion that the Court consider a group’s demographic representation in 
government likewise evinces concern for the minority or marginalized bearers of the trait at issue.  See 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 n.17 (1973) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (noting that 
“women are vastly underrepresented in this Nation’s decisionmaking councils”). 
 98. Then-Justice Rehnquist separately criticized this indicator as insufficiently selective, 
observing that “[o]ur society, consisting of over 200 million individuals of multitudinous origins, 
customs, tongues, beliefs, and cultures is, to say the least, diverse.  It would hardly take extraordinary 
ingenuity for a lawyer to find ‘insular and discrete’ minorities at every turn in the road.”  Sugarman v. 
Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 657 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 99. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (discussing the 
constitutional presumption “that even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the 
democratic processes” absent some defect in those processes, such as unconstrained bias against a 
particular group). 
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importance accorded to immutability as an indicia of suspectness runs 
contrary to the Court’s own recognition that society, not nature, gives many 
traits their significance.100  The immutability requirement also finds itself 
in conflict with the factual reality that purportedly fixed traits, such as sex, 
are in fact more alterable and flexible than commonly presumed.101  Other 
characteristics deemed suspect or quasi-suspect, such as alienage and 
illegitimacy, may also be changed.  Moreover, the Court itself has 
acknowledged that the immutability requirement for suspect classification 
status fails to filter classifications meriting heightened judicial skepticism 
in a meaningful way.102 
“Surely one has to feel sorry for a person disabled by something he or 
she can’t do anything about, but I’m not aware of any reason to suppose 
that elected officials are unusually unlikely to share that feeling.  
Moreover, classifications based on physical disability and intelligence 
are typically accepted as legitimate, even by judges and commentators 
who assert that immutability is relevant.  The explanation, when one is 
given, is that those characteristics (unlike the one the commentator is 
trying to render suspect) are often relevant to legitimate purposes.  At 
that point there’s not much left of the immutability theory, is there?”103 
 
 100. See, e.g., St. Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610 n.4, 613 (1987).  See also Flynn, 
supra note 96, at 395 (advocating “that gender identity, rather than anatomy, is the primary determinant 
of sex”).  Cf. Suzanne B. Goldberg, On Making Anti-Essentialist and Social Construction Arguments in 
Court, 81 OR. L. REV. 629 (2002) (analyzing the potentially destabilizing effect of antiessentialist and 
social construction arguments on the fixed categorical definitions preferred by most courts). 
 101. See ELY, supra note 13, at 150 (criticizing the Court’s reliance on immutable traits for 
suspect classification status, noting that “even gender is becoming an alterable condition”). 
 102. The immutability criterion also has been the suspect classification inquiry subject to greatest 
misapprehension by lower courts.  For example, in analyzing whether sexual orientation-based 
classifications may be deemed suspect, courts typically have made two errors: (1) they fixate on the 
science related to sexual orientation and the control an individual has over his or her sexual practices; 
and (2) they treat the legal test as though physical immutability is an absolute requirement, instead of 
properly examining whether the characteristic of sexual orientation is obvious, immutable, or 
distinguishing.  See, e.g., Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 
293 (6th Cir. 1997) (acknowledging the Sixth Circuit panel’s earlier conclusion that the law cannot 
“successfully categorize persons by subjective and unapparent characteristics such as innate desires, 
drives, and thoughts”) (citation omitted); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 
1989) (maintaining that homosexuality is primarily behavioral in nature and, therefore, cannot be 
considered an immutable trait).  Another court, following a trial at which extensive evidence was 
introduced regarding the genetic and biological origins of sexual orientation, rejected heightened 
scrutiny for a sexual orientation-based classification based in part on the court’s determination that the 
scientific evidence related to immutability was not conclusive.  Evans v. Romer, 1993 WL 518586, at 
*11 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 1993).  See also LISA KEEN & SUZANNE B. GOLDBERG, STRANGERS TO 
THE LAW: GAY PEOPLE ON TRIAL 43–73 (1998) (discussing scientific and other evidence regarding 
sexual orientation presented to the Colorado district court in Romer). 
 103. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 442 n.10 (quoting ELY, supra note 13, at 150) (citations 
omitted).  See also Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, 
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Indeed, the Court has raised its own questions about whether all of its 
indicia, taken together, actually provide a useful and principled test for 
determining which types of classifications merit close judicial attention.  
Commenting on its decision not to apply heightened scrutiny to 
classifications of people with mental retardation, the Court stated that 
if the large and amorphous class of the mentally retarded were deemed 
quasi-suspect . . . it would be difficult to find a principled way to 
distinguish a variety of other groups who have perhaps immutable 
disabilities setting them off from others, who cannot themselves mandate 
the desired legislative responses, and who can claim some degree of 
prejudice from at least part of the public at large.  One need mention in 
this respect only the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the 
infirm.104 
Although the Court has shown no signs of abandoning these criteria, 
its concession that the value of the indicia is limited reinforces the prospect 
that the current three-tiered framework could benefit from reconsideration. 
 
Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915, 923–32 (1989) (analyzing and critiquing the use 
of immutability arguments). 
A related flaw, not addressed by the Court, is that protecting only fixed, unchangeable 
characteristics provides little useful assistance in assessing classifying measures that discriminate based 
on outward, changeable manifestations of these deep-rooted traits, such as personal appearance, beliefs, 
and practices.  To the extent that the Court is also committed to focusing the inquiry on characteristics 
that are “obvious” or “distinguishing,” rather than immutable, it succeeds in avoiding the problems 
outlined above.  But, as with an examination of political powerlessness that turns on a particular 
demographic group’s representation in government, a requirement that a characteristic be merely 
“obvious” or “distinguishing” offers little to limit the potential set of suspicious classifications.  Further, 
like the immutability inquiry, a characteristic’s status as obvious or distinguishing provides minimal 
information, if any, about whether government’s use of the characteristic is likely to reflect 
impermissible bias.  Cf. Yoshino, supra note 89, at 498 (observing that since visibility is relational, 
whether a trait is visible will “depend not only on the trait but also on the ‘decoding capacity of the 
audience,’ which in turn will depend on the social context”) (footnote omitted). 
More useful perhaps, though still suffering from some of the flaws identified above, is the inquiry 
made in the asylum context regarding whether possession of a trait gives rise to “membership in a 
particular social group,” which is one of the five grounds on which a person may be eligible for asylum 
in the United States.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2000).  The Board of Immigration Appeals has 
explained that the trait “‘must be one that the members of the group either cannot change, or should not 
be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.’”  
Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1092 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. 
Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985)). 
 104. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 445–46.  Dissenting from the decision to strike down the 
Virginia Military Institute’s (“VMI”) sex-based admissions policy, Justice Scalia described the Court as 
applying different levels of scrutiny “whenever we feel like it,” adding that “[w]e have no established 
criterion for ‘intermediate scrutiny’ . . . but essentially apply it when it seems like a good idea to load 
the dice.”  United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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C.  THE RIGID APPLICATION OF STRICT SCRUTINY 
The virtue of the judicial presumption that certain types of trait-based 
legislation, such as laws distinguishing on the basis of race or sex, are 
impermissible105 also contains its own vice.  Categorically imposing that 
negative presumption any time government relies on a suspect trait has two 
primary unfavorable consequences.  First, it requires application of the bias 
presumption even where the classification is aimed to remedy bias.  
Second, it has a distorting effect on rational basis review by discouraging 
designation of additional traits as suspect, even where the traits fit well 
within the Court’s indicia, out of concern that all classifications based on 
those traits, including those that are long established or have wide popular 
support, will be presumed invalid. 
 The first concern with the strict presumption of illegitimacy regarding 
use of a suspect classification surfaces most prominently in review of 
affirmative action programs designed to ameliorate the effects of race 
discrimination.  For example, the Court in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Peña, citing suspect classification analysis’s demand for strict scrutiny, 
treated the remedial context as irrelevant and required the lower court, on 
remand, to apply the same rigorous review as it would to a program 
designed to perpetuate race discrimination.106  Of course, it is possible that 
 
 105. Arguably, sex-based classifications suffer less from this lack of flexibility in review because 
the Court has recognized that they are sometimes relevant to government action; but such cases are 
relatively rare and their holdings arguably reflect traditional stereotypes about women.  See, e.g., 
Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 57, 73 (2001) (finding the difference between mothers and fathers to be 
sufficiently significant to uphold a law imposing greater restrictions on obtaining citizenship for the 
child of a U.S. citizen father than for the child of a U.S. citizen mother); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 
57, 83 (1981) (sustaining the categorical exemption for women from registration for military service 
based on the different roles of men and women in military service); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 
U.S. 464, 476 (1981) (upholding a statutory rape law penalizing men but not women because it 
“reasonably reflect[ed] the fact that the consequences of sexual intercourse and pregnancy fall more 
heavily on the female than the male”); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 799–800 (1977) (deferring to 
Congress’s power to regulate immigration and upholding an immigration law preference for children of 
American women but not American men); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 352–53 (1974) (citing distinct 
financial vulnerability of “lone” women as the basis for upholding a tax exemption provided to widows 
but not widowers). 
 106. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 204, 224, 229–31 (1995).  At first 
glance, the insistence in Grutter that “[c]ontext matters when reviewing race-based governmental action 
under the Equal Protection Clause” might suggest that the Court has backtracked from its flat refusal in 
Adarand to distinguish between classifications imposed to diminish the effects of racial discrimination 
and those imposed to enshrine it.  See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2338 (2003) (citation 
omitted).  On a careful reading, however, it appears to be the higher education admissions context and 
not the context of affirmative action more generally that inspired this flexibility.  Throughout its 
opinion, the Court emphasized its “deference to a university’s academic decisions” and the 
“fundamental role” of education in “maintaining the fabric of society” and “preparing students for work 
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this rigid and categorical review flows not just from the suspect 
classification analysis itself, but also from the majority’s belief in the 
perniciousness of any racial classification.107  Indeed, some have argued 
that the Court’s ideological commitments are entirely responsible for the 
disregard of context in evaluations of remedial measures.108 
The contention here, however, is that regardless of whether these 
ideological commitments would lead the Court to invalidate a remedial 
program under lesser scrutiny, suspect classification analysis’s insistence 
on consistent, tough review for every use of a suspect trait is independently 
detrimental to the analysis.  Even if strict scrutiny allows limited room for 
careful contextual review, “there is a danger that the fatal language of 
 
and citizenship” in reaching its conclusion.  Id. at 2339–40.  By framing the case through the lens of 
Justice Powell’s analysis in Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), rather 
than any of the more recent affirmative action decisions, the Court reinforced the notion that, while 
university admissions policies may escape the usual rigidity of suspect classification analysis, no other 
category of decisionmaking is likely to receive that same benefit of the doubt.  See also Grutter, 123 S. 
Ct. at 2374 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (declaring that the university admissions process is a “special 
context,” and the “one context” that could warrant giving “appropriate consideration to race”). 
Further, the Court’s application of strict scrutiny to reject the University of Michigan’s 
undergraduate admissions plan for according a point value to racial identities demonstrates that even 
within the educational environment, the presumption that consideration of race is illegitimate remains 
strong and not as context sensitive as Grutter might imply.  Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2417, 
2419–20 (2003).  Although the undergraduate admissions office argued that its volume of applications 
rendered a more individualized approach “impractical,” the Court dismissed that argument in light of 
“the limits imposed by [its] strict scrutiny analysis.”  Id. at 2430.  Justice Souter’s contention, in dissent, 
that the undergraduate and law school admissions programs are not fundamentally dissimilar, also 
reinforces the perception that Grutter’s commitment to a less categorical analysis may not have wide-
ranging effect.  See id. at 2441 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The very nature of a college’s permissible 
practice of awarding value to racial diversity means that race must be considered in a way that increases 
some applicants’ chances for admission . . . . The college simply does by a numbered scale what the law 
school accomplishes in its ‘holistic review . . . .’”). 
 107. In Adarand, the Court explained that “‘[r]acial classifications are simply too pernicious to 
permit any but the most exact connection between justification and classification.’”  Adarand, 515 U.S. 
at 220 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 537 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).  Justice 
Thomas went further to spell out his view of the across-the-board danger of race-based classifications: 
[T]here can be no doubt that racial paternalism and its unintended consequences can be as 
poisonous and pernicious as any other form of discrimination.  So-called “benign” 
discrimination teaches many that because of chronic and apparently immutable handicaps, 
minorities cannot compete with them without their patronizing indulgence.  Inevitably, such 
programs engender attitudes of superiority or, alternatively, provoke resentment among those 
who believe that they have been wronged by the government’s use of race.  These programs 
stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop dependencies or 
to adopt an attitude that they are “entitled” to preferences. . . . In my mind, government-
sponsored racial discrimination based on benign prejudice is just as noxious as discrimination 
inspired by malicious prejudice.  In each instance, it is racial discrimination, plain and simple. 
Id. at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
 108. See Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, supra note 12, at 1175–77 (criticizing 
the Court’s manipulation of cases and doctrine); Spann, supra note 13, at 92 (accusing the majority of 
the Court of racism). 
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‘strict scrutiny’ will skew the analysis and place well-crafted benign 
programs at unnecessary risk.”109  Further, to the extent that the tiered 
framework requires identical treatment of every use of a suspect 
classification, its rigidity runs contrary to the Equal Protection Clause’s 
core values.110 
There is no moral or constitutional equivalence between a policy that is 
designed to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate 
racial subordination.  Invidious discrimination is an engine of 
oppression, subjugating a disfavored group to enhance or maintain the 
power of the majority.  Remedial race-based preferences reflect the 
opposite impulse: a desire to foster equality in society.  No sensible 
conception of the Government’s constitutional obligation to “govern 
impartially” should ignore this distinction . . . .111 
As Justice Stevens added, “The consistency that the Court espouses would 
disregard the difference between a ‘No Trespassing’ sign and a welcome 
mat.”112 
Although a majority of the Court has promised that strict scrutiny will 
not always be “‘fatal in fact,’”113 the Court’s categorical application of 
strict scrutiny to suspect classifications inescapably sends the message to 
governments that developing a race-conscious effort to ensure equality is a 
high-risk proposition that stands only a limited chance of surviving legal 
challenge.114 
 
 109. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 243 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 110. See infra Part III.A (discussing the equal protection guarantee’s concern with eradicating 
class legislation through careful contextual assessment of all types of laws). 
 111. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote and citation omitted). 
 112. Id. at 245.  Similarly, Justice Ginsburg has commented that 
[t]his insistence on consistency would be fitting were our Nation free of the vestiges of rank 
discrimination long reinforced by law.  But we are not far distant from an overtly 
discriminatory past. . . . Actions designed to burden groups long denied full citizenship stature 
are not sensibly ranked with measures taken to hasten the day when entrenched discrimination 
and its after effects have been extirpated. 
Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2443–44 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 113. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2338 (2003) (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237). 
 114. Indeed, moments after the Court issued its ruling upholding the University of Michigan Law 
School’s affirmative action plan, opponents of affirmative action vowed to force careful scrutiny of the 
admissions process of every institution of higher education to ensure that none oversteps the narrow 
bounds set by the Court.  See Greg Winter, The Supreme Court: Other Campuses; Ruling Provides 
Relief, but Less than Hoped, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at A26.  The recent group of redistricting cases 
also reinforces the vulnerability of plans that take race into account for remedial purposes.  See, e.g., 
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958, 985–86 (1996) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (holding that Texas’s 
redistricting plan constituted impermissible racial gerrymandering); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 902, 
905 (1996) (using strict scrutiny to invalidate North Carolina’s congressional redistricting scheme 
because race was used as a “dominant and controlling” factor) (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 
900, 909 (1995)); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 910, 927–28 (1995) (holding that Georgia’s 
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In addition, the all-or-nothing application of heightened scrutiny to 
classifications designated as suspect functions as a disincentive to 
broadening the existing set of suspect classifications.  Because most 
classifications do not give effect to bias all the time, courts have been 
reluctant to impose an analytic framework that would always require extra-
rigorous review of classifications that can sometimes have a benign use.  
As a result, when the Court has found that a nonsuspect classification 
embodies prejudice, it has engaged in a careful type of rational basis review 
that contrasts sharply with its typical emphasis on legislative deference. 
For example, as the Court effectively acknowledged in City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., the risk of designating 
classifications based on mental retardation as suspect is that all legislation 
regarding people with mental retardation—including positive, supportive 
legislation—would have to be strictly scrutinized.115  However, the refusal 
to designate a classification as suspect raises the risk that even where bias 
has motivated the classification, it will not be caught by an application of 
lenient rational basis review.116  Although Cleburne’s zoning provision 
ultimately was invalidated because of its impermissible fear-based purpose, 
the problem with this all-or-nothing approach to equal protection is that the 
next invidiously motivated governmental classification to burden people 
with mental retardation may not be caught in rational basis review’s loosely 
knit web.117 
 
congressional redistricting plan, which gave consideration to race in drawing district lines, violated the 
Equal Protection Clause).  Only very recently has the Court expressed a specific willingness to sustain 
government action that is motivated in part by a concern with race.  See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2325.  
This new development, however, does not appear to presage a future expansion of context-sensitive 
assessments of racial classifications.  Cf. Karlan, supra note 25 (exploring the differences between 
applications of strict scrutiny in affirmative action and redistricting cases); Rubin, supra note 25 
(analyzing the restrictive, formalistic use of strict scrutiny). 
 115. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442–45 (1985).  As just 
noted, the Court could have made this same observation regarding the imposition of heightened scrutiny 
on race- and sex-based classifications. 
 116. See infra notes 123–25, 131 and accompanying text for a discussion of lenient application of 
rational basis review. 
 117. In Lawrence v. Texas, Justice O’Connor’s formulation of rational basis review suggested that 
this type of error was not likely to occur because “[w]hen a law exhibits . . . a desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group, we have applied a more searching form of rational basis review.”  
Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2485 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  However, as no other 
justice joined her opinion, it is not clear whether a majority of the Court shares her perspective.  See 
supra note 8 (discussing Justice Scalia’s critique of this position). 
As a separate matter, the issue of strict scrutiny as an all-or-nothing proposition may similarly 
influence some courts against designating sexual orientation as suspect or quasi-suspect, even though 
these same courts might agree that sexual orientation fits the heightened scrutiny criteria.  These courts 
may fear that holding the use of sexual orientation to be suspect would require rigorous review and, 
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Thus, although the underlying commitment of suspect classification 
analysis—that the Court’s review should capture classifications that likely 
reflect impermissible prejudice—is a sensible one, the current set of indicia 
for determining which classifications are suspect, coupled with the rigid 
application of strict scrutiny to all suspect classifications, may fail to 
achieve that aim.  As shown in the next section, rational basis review shares 
with suspect classification analysis the same essential concern of ensuring 
equality.  A single standard of review that embraces these common 
concerns, which is proposed in Part IV, aims to provide the necessary rigor 
to identify invidious classifications while avoiding the weaknesses of 
suspect classification analysis as it is currently formulated and applied. 
D.  THE UNEVENNESS OF RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW 
To the extent that strict and intermediate scrutiny serve a 
homogenizing purpose, in some broad sense, by creating the appearance of 
consistent analysis and results, the Court’s rational basis cases present a 
sharp counterpoint.  Although most classifying laws and policies withstand 
equal protection challenge, the Court also consistently invalidates 
classifications under rational basis review.  Against a backdrop of more 
than one hundred cases subjected by the Court to equal protection rational 
basis review since 1973118—the year after Gerald Gunther published his 
 
ultimately, invalidation of all sexual orientation-based classifications, including those restricting service 
by gay people in the military that, to date, no appellate court has been willing to invalidate.  See, e.g., 
Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 635–36 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding the “don’t ask, don’t tell” 
prohibition against openly lesbian and gay military personnel); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 260–
62 (8th Cir. 1996) (same); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 928–29 (4th Cir. 1996) (same); Ben-
Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding the separation of a lesbian service 
member from the military under an earlier policy); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (sustaining a gay man’s separation from military service). 
 118. See Farrell, supra note 32, at 416–19.  Of course, some laws challenged prior to 1973 were 
also invalidated on rational basis grounds.  See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310–11 (1966) 
(striking down a New Jersey law requiring imprisoned indigents to reimburse the county for the costs of 
an unsuccessful appeal, but not imposing the same burden on those receiving suspended sentences).  
See also Gunther, supra note 17, at 25–37 (reviewing the 1971 Term’s relatively high concentration of 
these cases).  In addition, prior to 1937, the Court invalidated myriad government classifications.  See, 
e.g., Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 35, 38–39 (1928) (invaliding a state disparate 
taxing scheme that benefited building and loan associations); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 
U.S. 412, 417 (1920) (striking down a scheme taxing an in-state business for its out-of-state revenues); 
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 43 (1915) (voiding Arizona’s Anti-Alien Labor Law); Atchison, Topeka & 
Santa Fé Ry. v. Vosburg, 238 U.S. 56, 61–62 (1915) (rejecting a rule that imposed an attorney’s fee 
obligation only on railroads); Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 564 (1902) (rejecting 
an Illinois exemption of agriculturists and livestock dealers from criminal penalties imposed on others); 
Cotting v. Kan. City Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79, 110 (1901) (invalidating a state law imposing 
regulations on stock yards operating above, but not below, a certain volume).  However, the number of 
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landmark article offering a new model for equal protection analysis119—the 
Court has invalidated nearly a dozen classifications.120  This periodic 
exercise of judicial authority under the lowest scrutiny level raises a serious 
 
equal protection invalidations during the Lochner era is disproportionately high, owing to the Court’s 
inclination to strike down much of the government regulation that restricted business.  See Michael Les 
Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire 
Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 293, 293–95 (1985); Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, supra note 
55, at 877–81. 
 119. See Gunther, supra note 17, at 20–24.  For a discussion of this model, see infra notes 311–16 
and accompanying text. 
 120. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–36 (1996) (invalidating a measure barring 
antidiscrimination protections for lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals); Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 109 
(1989) (striking down a Missouri property ownership requirement for service on a government board); 
Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm’n, 488 U.S. 336, 344–46 (1989) (sustaining a 
challenge to Virginia’s systematic undervaluation of some, but not all, real property); City of Cleburne 
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 447–50 (1985) (invalidating a town’s different treatment of 
individuals with mental retardation for zoning purposes); Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 
U.S. 612, 618–23 (1985) (rejecting a New Mexico tax preference distinguishing between long-term and 
short-term resident Vietnam veterans); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 27 (1985) (striking down a 
use tax that burdened out-of-state car buyers); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 883 (1985) 
(rejecting an Alabama law that provided tax relief to in-state but not foreign businesses); Plyler v. Doe, 
457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (sustaining a challenge to a Texas law that denied education to undocumented 
children); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982) (invalidating Alaska’s dividend distribution 
system that favored long-term residents); O’Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 530–31 (1974) (striking 
down a New York statute that permitted county jail detainees to register to vote, or vote as absentees, if 
they were detained outside, but not within, their county of residence); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 
413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973) (invalidating a legislative restriction aimed at preventing hippies from 
obtaining food stamps). 
In addition, the Supreme Court analyzed numerous classifications based on sex and illegitimacy 
during this period by using the language of rational basis review.  However, because these 
classifications are now deemed quasi-suspect, cases applying rational basis review to them are not 
discussed here on the theory that the Court might have been applying heightened review in practice but 
not in name.  See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75–77 (1971) (articulating a “strong” version of 
rational basis review and rejecting a mandatory preference for men in estate administration).  See also 
Gunther, supra note 17, at 34 (“It is difficult to understand [the Reed] result without an assumption that 
some special sensitivity to sex as a classifying factor entered into the analysis. . . . Only by importing 
some special suspicion of sex-related means . . . can the result be made entirely persuasive.”); supra 
note 88 (discussing the transition to heightened scrutiny for classifications based on sex and nonmarital 
parental status).  Nonetheless, precisely because these cases can be seen as bridging the purported gap 
between lower and higher levels of scrutiny, they are useful as illustrations of the core concerns shared 
by all levels of equal protection review.  See infra Part IV. 
One additional case held that an individual had stated an equal protection claim by alleging that 
government acts targeted at him lacked a rational basis.  Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 
564–65 (2000) (challenging an onerous easement condition as an arbitrary violation of the equal 
protection guarantee).  Because this case had been decided by the district court on a motion to dismiss, 
the Supreme Court did not determine finally whether the disparate treatment amounted to a 
constitutional violation.  Id. 
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question about how, exactly, the Court settles on the degree of deference it 
will give to legislative acts at this bottom tier.121 
To illustrate this inconsistency and demonstrate how its consequences 
support reconsideration of the tiered framework and a shift to a single 
review standard,122 this section will sketch the Court’s “weak” and “strong” 
approaches to rational basis review.  It will then offer some hypotheses 
regarding the tension between them and the doctrinal wavering that 
complicates and undermines contemporary rational basis review. 
The familiar refrain that courts should stay out of the business of 
judging most legislative distinctions characterizes the weak rational basis 
cases and dominates the doctrine in this area.  As the Court has explained, 
“equal protection is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, 
or logic of legislative choices.”123  Instead, nonsuspect classifications must 
be sustained “if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could 
 
 121. Although the actual number of rational basis invalidations by the Supreme Court since 
Gunther introduced the concept of rational basis with “bite” is small, these cases, with their tension 
between deference and meaningful review, guide lower court review along with their highly deferential 
counterparts.  See Gunther, supra note 17, at 20–24.  One could render an alternative reading of these 
cases that would bring the numbers even lower by taking several of them out of equal protection 
altogether and others out of the realm of rational basis review, leaving only a random few that fall 
outside the typical deferential guideposts.  For example, the invalidation of distinctions based on 
residence or length of residence might more accurately be explained by reference to the dormant 
Commerce Clause or the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  See Erika K. Nelson, Unanswered 
Questions: The Implications of Saenz v. Roe for Durational Residency Requirements, 49 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 193, 217–18 (2000) (reanalyzing the Zobel and Hooper decisions under the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause).  Cf. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Poverty, Residency, and Federalism: States’ Duty of 
Impartiality Toward Newcomers, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 277, 310 (discussing the residency requirements 
in Zobel and Hooper in connection with state citizenship rights and states’ ability to foster 
communities).  Similarly, the Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer trilogy could be read as applying covert 
heightened scrutiny, see TRIBE, supra note 10, §§ 16-3, 16-31, as illustrating the operation of the 
“pariah principle,” see Farber & Sherry, supra note 40, at 264, or as illustrating the generalized animus 
principle.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 63 
(1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided] (“Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer reflect an 
understanding that other groups, not only African-Americans, may be subject to unreasoning hatred and 
suspicion.”).  Cf. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634–35 (“[L]aws of [this] kind . . . raise the inevitable inference 
that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected. . . . [This law] 
offends conventional and venerable [principles]; a law must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate 
governmental purpose.”).  However, because the Court frames its analysis as falling within its equal 
protection jurisprudence, these cases are appropriately considered here as well. 
 122. While doctrinal inconsistency is a charge that could be levied against the jurisprudence in 
most areas of constitutional law, this section, coupled with Part V’s application of the proposed single 
standard, shows that the inconsistency, at times, results in inadequate review of certain classifications.  
See infra Part V.A (discussing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)).  This consequence, in 
turn, supports reconsideration of the framework designed to guide that review. 
 123. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). 
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provide a rational basis for the classification.”124  In other words, 
legislatures act with a strong presumption of legitimacy “despite the fact 
that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality.”125 
Yet alongside these deferential pledges, a separate cluster of strong 
rational basis cases adds additional weight to the minimal requirements just 
mentioned by emphasizing that a meaningful relationship must exist 
between the group singled out and the government’s legitimate goals.126  
As the Court has stated, “the classification must be reasonable, not 
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and 
substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons 
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.”127  In other words, 
deference does not translate into an absence of genuine scrutiny: “even in 
the ordinary equal protection case calling for the most deferential of 
 
 124. Id. (citation omitted).  In United States v. Morrison, the Court’s rejection of facts found by 
Congress regarding the interstate impact of domestic violence suggests that if legislation is to be 
sustained, the facts at issue must be reasonable to the Court as well as to the legislature.  See United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000); id. at 666 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 125. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425–26 (1961).  See also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 
U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (“If the classification has some ‘reasonable basis,’ it does not offend the 
Constitution simply because the classification ‘is not made with mathematical nicety or because in 
practice it results in some inequality.’”) (quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 
(1911)); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955) (“But the law need not be 
in every respect logically consistent with its aims.”). 
 126. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 416 (1920).  Although F.S. Royster Guano 
is a relatively early case, it is cited so frequently that it remains a mainstay of this “strong” 
characterization of equal protection review.  See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 63 (2001).  For 
additional examples of strong rational basis cases, see infra notes 206, 213–21 and accompanying text. 
 127. F.S. Royster Guano, 253 U.S. at 415.  Recognizing the great deference accorded to tax 
classifications, the Court underscored that even “a discriminatory tax law cannot be sustained against 
the complaint of a party aggrieved if the classification appear [sic] to be altogether illusory.”  Id.  
Although tax classifications received regular equal protection review during the Lochner era, see, e.g., 
Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494, 516 (1926) (holding that tax provisions favoring in-
state businesses violated the Equal Protection Clause); S. Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400, 418 (1910) 
(finding a tax preference for in-state railway companies to be invalid under the Equal Protection 
Clause), the Court’s deferential orientation was so powerful that some precedent suggested that 
discriminatory tax statutes were entirely immune from compliance with the Equal Protection Clause.  
See Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U.S. 673, 676–78 (1945) (holding that “privilege” taxes 
paid by an out-of-state corporation were not subject to equal protection).  Ultimately, the Court rejected 
Lincoln’s categorical hands-off approach.  See W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 
U.S. 648, 665–68 (1981) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause applied to states’ treatment of a 
foreign corporation).  In Western & Southern Life Insurance Co., the Court held that 
whatever the extent of a State’s authority to exclude foreign corporations from doing business 
within its boundaries, that authority does not justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other 
burdens on foreign corporations than those imposed on domestic corporations, unless the 
discrimination between foreign and domestic corporations bears a rational relation to a 
legitimate state purpose. 
Id. at 667–68. 
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standards, we insist on knowing the relation between the classification 
adopted and the object to be attained.”128 
Grounding this insistence in the Constitution’s equality mandate, the 
Court has commented that “[t]he search for the link between classification 
and objective gives substance to the Equal Protection Clause; it provides 
guidance and discipline for the legislature, which is entitled to know what 
sorts of laws it can pass; and it marks the limits of our own authority.”129  
Referring to the underlying purpose of equal protection review, the Court 
explained that “[b]y requiring that the classification bear a rational 
relationship to an independent and legitimate legislative end, we ensure that 
classifications are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group 
burdened by the law.”130 
As the preceding discussion illustrates, two distinct emphases emerge 
in cases using essentially the same rational basis language.  One, 
characterized here as the weak version of rational basis, focuses on the 
presumption of constitutionality given to government action and the 
reluctance of courts to second-guess the acts of their sibling branches.131  
The strong cases, in contrast, underscore that even with this presumption of 
constitutionality, the rationality requirement for government line drawing 
remains meaningful.  These strong cases might also be described as having 
a contextual focus in that the link between government line drawing and 
asserted state interests must be grounded in the context in which the 
classification operates before judicial approval will be granted.132 
 
 128. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 633 (citation omitted).  See also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 227 (1982) (“The State 
must do more than justify its classification with a concise expression of an intention to discriminate.”) 
(citation omitted). 
 131. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (“[A] classification neither involving 
fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines is accorded a strong presumption of 
legitimacy.”); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam) (“[T]he judiciary 
may not sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations 
made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines . . . .”); Dandridge 
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970) (“[F]ederal courts [have] no power to impose upon the States 
their views of what constitutes wise economic or social policy.”) (footnote omitted); McGowan v. 
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425–26 (1961) (“State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their 
constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality.”); Williamson 
v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955) (“The Oklahoma law may exact a needless, 
wasteful requirement in many cases.  But it is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the 
advantages and disadvantages of the new requirement.”). 
 132. See W. & S. Life Ins., 451 U.S. at 668 (“In determining whether a challenged classification is 
rationally related to achievement of a legitimate state purpose, we must answer two questions: (1) Does 
the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to 
believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?”). 
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art2
GOLD14.DOC 4/2/2004  6:20 PM 
2004] EQUALITY WITHOUT TIERS 517 
 
A cold look at these characterizations of the rational basis inquiry 
could suggest that the distinction drawn out above is semantic at best, but 
that would miss the significant, if subtle, shifts in emphasis.  These shifts 
lead to predictable results, at least in the limited sense that opinions 
invoking the test’s weak version almost invariably reject equal protection 
challenges while the strong language generally appears in the cases striking 
down classifications.133  Not all the cases emphasizing “linkage” result in 
judicial intervention,134 however; thus, the predictive value of this 
distinction is admittedly minor.  The distinction’s value may be minimized 
further if the Court’s use of the weak or strong articulation is viewed as 
nothing more than self-serving phraseology or a reflection of unresolved 
ideological differences on the Court about the role of judicial review.  For 
our purposes, though, whether or not the contrast between the weak and 
strong cases illustrates a deeper jurisprudential struggle, the divergent 
emphases reflect a persistent tension about the nature of rational basis 
review, which has left the doctrine with a somewhat unpredictable feel and, 
at times, without sufficient focus on whether a meaningful connection 
exists between government action and the purported justifications for that 
action. 
In sum, although there is general agreement that rational basis review 
requires the greatest deference and the least rigorous scrutiny of any test 
seeking to enforce the Equal Protection Clause, differences in emphasis and 
application remain plentiful.  The wide gaps between the expressions and 
applications of rational basis review in the weak and strong cases and the 
 
 133. However, the weak language dominates discussion in a few of the cases that ultimately strike 
down government action.  For example, in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, the Court stressed 
that “it is not difficult to establish a rational relationship between a classification and a government 
purpose.”  Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 881 (1985).  The Court was closely split, 
however, regarding both the articulation of the equal protection analysis and the outcome here, with 
four justices maintaining that the majority had misapplied the equal protection test and had failed to 
defer sufficiently to the state’s freedom to classify.  Id. at 884–86 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
More recently, the Court in Quinn v. Millsap similarly stressed the ease of satisfying rational 
basis review, stating that “[w]e need apply no more than the rationality review articulated in Turner” to 
strike down the property ownership requirement at issue.  Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 107 (1989) 
(referring to Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362 (1970)).  In Turner, the Court had described the 
rational basis inquiry as asking “whether the challenged classification rests on grounds wholly 
irrelevant to the achievement of a valid state objective.”  Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362 (1970) 
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 134. In Nordlinger v. Hahn, for example, the plaintiff relied on Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. 
County Commission to challenge California’s acquisition value taxation scheme, which resulted in new 
homeowners paying substantially higher taxes than long-term homeowners for similar properties.  
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 14 (1992).  Although the Court sustained the California approach, it 
carefully assessed the relationship between the state’s interests and the classification in a manner typical 
of the strong set of cases.  Id. at 11–17. 
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resulting periodic invalidations of government line drawing suggest that the 
doctrine needs a stabilizing force. 
These tensions in rational basis review, coupled with the difficulties in 
suspect classification analysis addressed above, encourage this Article’s 
next turn toward rethinking the framework that supports these review 
standards.  With the theoretical and doctrinal weaknesses in mind, the 
remainder of this Article will take steps toward laying a firmer foundation 
for future judicial application of the Constitution’s equality guarantee. 
III.  QUESTIONING THE THREE TIERS 
In light of the serious flaws plaguing the theory and application of 
heightened scrutiny and rational basis review, it is not entirely surprising 
that the three-tiered framework has periodically come under fire by 
members of the Court.  What is more puzzling, however, is that no judicial 
or scholarly consensus has developed in favor of abandoning the tiers and 
adopting a single standard.  This part will approach this puzzle initially by 
setting out the views of those justices who have questioned the Court’s 
current approach to equal protection review.  After a brief tour of these 
divergent positions, I will then posit several theories as to why, despite 
doctrinal problems and scholarly critique, the Court’s approach to equal 
protection has remained relatively static.  In doing so, I will consider three 
of the leading theories that have been advanced to provide some coherence 
to rational basis review and assess their incorporation by the Court.135 
A.  JUDICIAL DISCOMFORT WITH TIERED REVIEW 
Even as the Court was first growing comfortable with an approach to 
assessing governmental classifications that required determinations of 
suspectness and imposing different levels of judicial review, a few 
consistent voices on the Court cautioned against the entry into new and 
complicated terrain.  Rather than dividing the analytic field into 
classifications, these jurists, representing a broad philosophical spectrum, 
 
 135. Much scholarship examines strict scrutiny and suspect classification in the context of race-
based affirmative action and redistricting classifications.  See generally Karlan, supra note 25 
(criticizing the application of strict scrutiny to affirmative action programs); Rubenfeld, Affirmative 
Action, supra note 13 (same); Rubin, supra note 25 (same).  Because this scholarship focuses largely on 
correcting perceived problems within the confines of a heightened scrutiny approach, it is not as 
pertinent to this Article’s project of collapsing the three-tiered structure back into its original unitary 
analytic mechanism.  Thus, it will not be addressed in depth here.  It does, however, reinforce the 
timeliness of reconsidering the tiered framework. 
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suggested that the multiple tiers might be more trouble than help and might 
distort the fair application of equal protection values.136 
From among the members of the Court, Justice Marshall engaged in 
the most detailed effort to flesh out a unitary standard.  Instead of 
proposing adjustments to the criteria forming the Court’s test, Justice 
Marshall explained in Cleburne that the Court’s overall approach was in 
error: 
The Court’s opinion approaches the task of principled equal protection 
adjudication in what I view as precisely the wrong way.  The formal 
label under which an equal protection claim is reviewed is less important 
than careful identification of the interest at stake and the extent to which 
society recognizes the classification as an invidious one.  Yet in focusing 
obsessively on the appropriate label to give its standard of review, the 
Court fails to identify the interests at stake or to articulate the principle 
that classifications based on mental retardation must be carefully 
examined to assure they do not rest on impermissible assumptions or 
false stereotypes regarding individual ability and need.  No guidance is 
thereby given as to when the Court’s freewheeling, and potentially 
dangerous, “rational-basis standard” is to be employed, nor is attention 
directed to the invidiousness of grouping all retarded individuals 
together.137 
Moreover, Justice Marshall observed that these formal distinctions in 
review were not as neat as they purported to be.  Condemning the Court’s 
effort to shore up differences between rational basis review and heightened 
scrutiny, he wrote, “this Court’s decisions in the field of equal protection 
defy such easy categorization.”138 
Justice Marshall also took specific issue with the framework that the 
Court had developed to identify suspect classifications, with the 
immutability and political power inquiries receiving his particular 
condemnation: “No single talisman can define those groups likely to be the 
target of [constitutionally offensive] classifications . . . . [E]xperience, not 
abstract logic, must be the primary guide.”139  He observed, for example, 
 
 136. See infra notes 137–62 and accompanying text. 
 137. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 478 (1985) (Marshall, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).  The following year, in dissent from the 
Court’s approval of a restrictive food stamp provision, Justice Marshall reiterated his concern with “the 
lack of vitality in this Court’s recent equal protection jurisprudence.”  Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 
643 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 138. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 139. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 472 n.24 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part). 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
GOLD14.DOC 4/2/2004  6:20 PM 
520 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:481 
 
that “[t]he ‘political powerlessness’ of a group may be relevant, but that 
factor is neither necessary . . . nor sufficient.”140  Likewise, he 
acknowledged that immutability “may be relevant, but many immutable 
characteristics, such as height or blindness, are valid bases of governmental 
action and classifications under a variety of circumstances.”141 
With his criticism of the formalistic distinctions in suspect 
classification analysis, Justice Marshall offered a balancing test as an 
alternative, seeking to focus the Court’s attention on the relationship 
between the government interest at issue and the level of societal 
condemnation of the classification.  His proposal maintained that 
“concentration must be placed upon the character of the classification in 
question, the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated 
against of the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the 
asserted state interests in support of the classification.”142  Justice Marshall 
also maintained that the Court was already engaged in this flexible 
approach, notwithstanding its creation of multiple tiers for review.  
Critiquing the Court’s approach, he commented, “A principled reading of 
what this Court has done reveals that it has applied a spectrum of standards 
in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the Equal Protection 
Clause.”143 
Justice Stevens also strongly opposed the Court’s foray into multiple 
tiers.  Agreeing with Justice Marshall that only a single standard should be 
applied, Justice Stevens proposed a somewhat different formulation for 
equal protection review.  As he famously observed in Craig v. Boren, 
 
 140. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted). 
 141. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted). 
 142. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520–21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).  In Cleburne, 
Justice Marshall described the balancing proposal this way: “I have long believed the level of scrutiny 
employed in an equal protection case should vary with ‘the constitutional and societal importance of the 
interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular 
classification is drawn.’”  Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 460 (Marshall, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 99 (Marshall, J., dissenting)) 
(citation omitted).  In Richardson v. Belcher, a due process case, Justice Marshall added that 
it is necessary to consider more than the character of the classification and the governmental 
interests in support of the classification.  Judges should not ignore what everyone knows, 
namely that legislation regulating business cannot be equated with legislation dealing with 
destitute, disabled, or elderly individuals. . . . [T]he Court should consider the individual 
interests at stake. 
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 90–91 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 143. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 98–99 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  Justice Marshall continued, “This 
spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the degree of care with which the Court will scrutinize 
particular classifications, depending, I believe, on the constitutional and societal importance of the 
interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular 
classification is drawn.”  Id. at 99 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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“There is only one Equal Protection Clause.  It requires every State to 
govern impartially.  It does not direct the courts to apply one standard of 
review in some cases and a different standard in other cases.”144  Like 
Justice Marshall, Justice Stevens contended that the tiers did not actually 
guide the Court’s analysis, though he identified a single standard rather 
than a sliding scale as the underlying key to the Court’s approach: 
I am inclined to believe that what has become known as the two-tiered 
analysis of equal protection claims does not describe a completely 
logical method of deciding cases, but rather is a method the Court has 
employed to explain decisions that actually apply a single standard in a 
reasonably consistent fashion.145 
Proposing an alternative method of assessing equal protection 
challenges, Justice Stevens explained that “[i]n my own approach to these 
cases, I have always asked myself whether I could find a ‘rational basis’ for 
the classification at issue.”146  He then explicated how the rationality 
inquiry could proceed, emphasizing the importance of an unbiased 
legislature and a legitimate public purpose for a classification: 
The term “rational,” of course, includes a requirement that an impartial 
lawmaker could logically believe that the classification would serve a 
legitimate public purpose that transcends the harm to the members of the 
disadvantaged class.  Thus, the word “rational”—for me at least—
includes elements of legitimacy and neutrality that must always 
characterize the performance of the sovereign’s duty to govern 
impartially.147 
To reinforce that no need for multiple standards of review exists, 
Stevens observed, 
It would be utterly irrational to limit the franchise on the basis of height 
or weight; it is equally invalid to limit it on the basis of skin color.  None 
of these attributes has any bearing at all on the citizen’s willingness or 
ability to exercise that civil right.  We do not need to apply a special 
standard, or to apply “strict scrutiny,” or even “heightened scrutiny,” to 
decide such cases.148 
 
 144. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211–12 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 145. Id. at 212 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 146. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 452 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 147. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted). 
 148. Id. at 452–53 (Stevens, J., concurring).  For a detailed discussion of Justice Stevens’s 
approach to equal protection review, see generally, Note, Justice Stevens’ Equal Protection 
Jurisprudence, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1146 (1987) [hereinafter Justice Stevens]. 
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 Then-Justice Rehnquist also proffered a generalized critique of multi-
tiered review couched within his objection to the Court’s creation of the 
quasi-suspect tier in Craig: 
I would think we have had enough difficulty with the two standards of 
review which our cases have recognized—the norm of “rational basis,” 
and the “compelling state interest” required where a “suspect 
classification” is involved—so as to counsel weightily against the 
insertion of still another “standard” between those two.149 
 Later, in Rostker v. Goldberg, Justice Rehnquist reiterated his 
concerns about the tiers, observing that “levels of ‘scrutiny’ which this 
Court announces that it applies to particular classifications made by a 
legislative body, may all too readily become facile abstractions used to 
justify a result.”150 
Justice Powell also spoke out in Craig against the “further subdividing 
of equal protection analysis.”151  Pointing to the Court’s equal protection 
jurisprudence, Justice Powell suggested that the tiered system might have 
emerged from the Court’s inability to agree on a universally applicable 
standard for equal protection analysis.152  Conceding that “substantial 
precedent” supported the use of an upper tier, Justice Powell then 
highlighted a “valid” criticism of strict scrutiny “as a result-oriented 
substitute for more critical analysis,”153 suggesting his preference for a 
standard that would apply across the full range of possible 
classifications.154 
 
 149. Craig, 429 U.S. at 220–21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 150. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 69–70 (1981). 
 151. Craig, 429 U.S. at 210 n.* (Powell, J., concurring). 
 152. Id.  See also Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 
1090–92 (1982) (cautioning that the Court’s discussion in Carolene Products of classifications 
warranting close judicial review does not offer a “neat formula for constitutional adjudication”). 
 153. Craig, 429 U.S. at 211 n.* (Powell, J., concurring).  During the Court’s conference regarding 
Cleburne, Justice Powell has been quoted as saying that “‘I hesitate to go to heightened scrutiny, which 
I’ve never favored.  I’m not sure even race or gender needs more than rational [basis review].’” 
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE ASCENT OF PRAGMATISM: THE BURGER COURT IN ACTION 251 (1990). 
 154. Several states have also avoided embracing the tiered framework in reviewing equal 
protection challenges based on state constitutional guarantees.  The New Jersey Supreme Court, for 
example, takes an approach similar to that advocated by Justice Marshall above.  See McCann v. Clerk 
of Jersey City, 771 A.2d 1123, 1131 (N.J. 2001) (“We have rejected the federal multi-tiered approach in 
favor of a less rigid balancing approach in which we consider ‘the nature of the affected right, the extent 
to which the governmental restriction intrudes upon it, and the public need for the restriction.’”) 
(quoting Greenberg v. Kimmelman,  494 A.2d 294, 302 (N.J. 1985)).  Likewise, in Alaska, the state 
supreme court applies “a sliding scale under which ‘[t]he applicable standard of review for a given case 
is to be determined by the importance of the individual rights asserted and by the degree of suspicion 
with which we view the resulting classification scheme.’”  Dep’t of Revenue v. Cosio, 858 P.2d 621, 
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However, although each proposal contains interesting elements, none 
provides a comprehensive solution to the problems inherent in all levels of 
the tiered framework.  For example, while Justice Marshall’s proposal 
offers the appeal of a flexible, context-sensitive approach, his balancing 
test provides little guidance to lower courts regarding how to assess the 
importance of the interest infringed and then strike the balance between 
interests and equality.  Further, because relatively minor deprivations can 
cause significant harm to the status, if not the actual access to resources of 
trait bearers, consideration of the infringed interest’s importance may not 
be useful and could possibly be detrimental to enforcement of the equal 
protection guarantee.155 
Justice Stevens’s single standard, while likewise desirable in theory, 
also gives rise to difficulties in application.  By insisting that the 
government’s interest in classifying be legitimate, which is a concern at all 
levels of review, implementation of this standard could largely follow 
existing law.156  However, the additional requirement that government 
make decisions impartially and with neutrality presents greater challenges.  
The impartiality approach, like Cass Sunstein’s proposal that decisions 
must be made based on public values rather than “naked preferences,”157 
does not account for the pluralist nature of the American political process, 
which responds to constituent and other politically relevant pressures and 
can be characterized as anything but neutral.158  Further, to the extent that 
Justice Stevens’s neutrality requirement mirrors in the legislative context 
Herbert Wechsler’s proposal that courts decide cases according to neutral 
principles, it, like Wechsler’s, contains few substantive limitations on the 
types of principles that may be the basis for line drawing.159  Thus, it would 
 
629 (Alaska 1993) (quoting State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1192–93 (Alaska 1983)).  A 
comprehensive critical comparison of state approaches to equality analysis, although beyond the scope 
of this Article, could usefully illuminate the utility of these and other analytic frameworks. 
 155. For this reason, the proposed single standard differs from Justice Marshall’s test by requiring 
the same intensity of review regardless of context.  See infra Part IV. 
 156. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 211–12.  See also supra notes 118–25 and accompanying text 
(demonstrating that both low and high levels of review have fundamental concerns with the legitimacy 
of government action); infra notes 398–401 and accompanying text (same).  For a discussion of Justice 
Stevens’s methodology, see generally Justice Stevens, supra note 148. 
 157. See Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 40, at 1713. 
 158. See infra notes 294–97 and accompanying text. 
 159. Compare City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 452 (1985) (Stevens, 
J., concurring) (explaining that equal protection review should ensure government’s impartiality), and 
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (1959) 
(arguing that judicial review of legislation must be concerned with neutrality), with Michael Wells, 
Busting the Hart & Wechsler Paradigm, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 557, 576–79 (1994–95) (critiquing 
Wechsler’s neutral principles arguments). 
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allow arbitrary lines to be drawn, so long as the arbitrariness was applied 
neutrally.  On the other hand, if non-neutrality and partiality are treated 
simply as stand-ins for the legitimacy requirement, Justice Stevens’s theory 
would do little more than restate, as a single standard, the contours of 
current rational basis review. 
Justice Rehnquist’s suggestion to abandon the middle tier has, relative 
to the others, the appeal of simplicity—the bare minimum scrutiny applies 
to every classification that is not suspect.160  However, it does not allow for 
context-sensitive evaluations of race-based distinctions.161  Nor, in Justice 
Rehnquist’s conception of rational basis, would judicial skepticism toward 
nonsuspect classifications ever be appropriate.162 
Still, notwithstanding the differences and possible deficiencies of the 
suggested standards, together they illustrate a strong collective interest in 
steering the Court away from its current tack. 
B.  RELUCTANCE TO RETHINK THE TIERED APPROACH 
Despite these justices’ advocacy, a single review standard has not 
emerged as the consensus view of the Court.  Nor have equal protection 
scholars or advocates taken up the charge for a unitary review.  Instead, the 
widely acknowledged problems with rational basis review have led many 
scholars to offer undergirding theories for the Court’s rational basis cases, 
but only a few to argue that the tiered framework might be partly 
responsible for those problems.163  Likewise, litigators of equal protection 
cases before the Court have not generally pressed for anything other than 
standard application of the three tiers.164  Even those whose clients suffer 
discrimination based on a trait falling outside the current parameters of 
 
 160. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 220–21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 161. See id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 162. See id. at 221–22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 163. See infra notes 296–97, 308, 315 and accompanying text.  Even scholarship raising questions 
about the tiers has largely refrained from developing an alternative approach.  See generally, e.g., 
Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951 (2002) (critiquing the indicia of 
suspectness and advocating that the Constitution’s text supports heightened review of classifications 
based on certain traits); Stephen E. Gottlieb, Tears for Tiers on the Rehnquist Court, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 350, 371 (2002) (criticizing the tiered framework’s results, but arguing that “[t]he problem . . . is not 
with the [three-tiered] theory”). 
 164. Although the application of strict scrutiny to all race-based classifications has generally 
worked against the interests of communities of color seeking to sustain affirmative action programs, a 
political assessment may have been made that losing close review of other types of racial classifications 
presents an unacceptable risk.  However, that risk may be overrated in light of the regular invalidation 
of invidious racial classifications under rational basis review prior to McLaughlin.  See supra note 67 
and accompanying text. 
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heightened judicial review have sought to satisfy the test for suspect 
classification rather than urging a new construct that might create more 
room for the invalidation of discriminatory classifications.165  This section 
will consider the Court’s reluctance to revisit the multi-tiered framework, 
which has remained largely unchanged for more than a quarter century. 
Although any explanation is conjectural, because a majority of the 
Court has never addressed the anti-tier arguments, several reasons might 
account for the Court’s inaction.  First, the lingering effects of Lochner’s 
substantive due process regime and its spillover into equal protection 
jurisprudence166 almost certainly play a role in inhibiting contemplation of 
any test that would allow rigorous judicial review to reach a broader range 
of government action.167  The severe criticism aimed at the Court’s practice 
of replacing the state’s “reasonableness” assessment with its own, as in 
Lochner’s invalidation of New York’s restriction on bakery employees’ 
hours,168 helps explain the Court’s tentative approach to equal protection 
review after that era ended.169  When the Court reversed course in the mid-
1930s in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, it handed back power over 
determinations of rationality to the legislatures: “Even if the wisdom of [a] 
policy be regarded as debatable and its effects uncertain, still the 
Legislature is entitled to its judgment.”170  By imposing rigorous judicial 
 
 165. See, e.g., Brief of the Human Rights Campaign Fund et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), available at 1995 WL 782809 (advocating strict 
scrutiny based on sexual orientation); Brief of the American Association on Mental Deficiency et al., as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 
(1985), available at 1985 WL 669784 (arguing for heightened scrutiny of legal distinctions based on 
mental retardation). 
 166. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 52, at 248–52 (analyzing the danger of “reinvent[ing] Lochner 
under the Equal Protection Clause”); Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981, 991–93 (1979) (stating that the Warren Court’s equal protection 
decisions “never quite escaped the charge that [they were] Lochnerism reincarnated”); Sunstein, Naked 
Preferences, supra note 40, at 1692, 1697, 1700–03, 1717–19, 1728–32 (comparing modern equal 
protection with the Lochner era).  See generally Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, supra note 55. 
 167. For example, in accusing the Court of not exercising sufficient deference with respect to a 
legislative classification of nonmarital children, Justice Rehnquist reminded the Court of its historical, 
but since condemned, overreaching via the Fourteenth Amendment during the Lochner era.  See Weber 
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 179–85 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  Justice Rehnquist 
stated that “the Court’s opinion . . . is an extraordinary departure from what I conceive to be the intent 
of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment and the import of the traditional presumption of 
constitutionality accorded to legislative enactments.”  Id. at 181 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 168. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64–65 (1905). 
 169. Cf. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, supra note 55, at 875 (suggesting that Lochner-like review 
continues to operate today). 
 170. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399–400 (1937) (upholding a Washington State 
minimum wage law).  In Nebbia v. New York, the Court similarly articulated its chastened approach to 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
GOLD14.DOC 4/2/2004  6:20 PM 
526 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:481 
 
review only under limited conditions that are narrowly circumscribed by 
the heightened scrutiny criteria, the three-tiered system neatly complements 
the deferential review of most governmental discrimination post-
Lochner.171 
Second, the suspect classification tier gained its early foothold at a 
time when a majority of the Court and significant sectors of society at large 
had begun to accept as a matter of course that racial classifications 
typically lacked legitimacy.172  As a streamlined process facilitating the 
invalidation of race-based distinctions, presumptive strict scrutiny of 
suspect classifications could have appeared to be, and perhaps actually was, 
a sensible approach.173  The automatic rigorous review sent a clear message 
to errant legislatures that race-based lawmaking would receive skeptical 
examination.174  Similar social recognition of the problems inherent in sex-
role stereotyping, while not universal,175 likewise laid the groundwork for a 
 
judicial review in a statement regarding due process that characterized its newly restrained equal 
protection review as well: 
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned . . . a state is free to adopt whatever 
economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that 
policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. . . . If the laws passed are seen to have a 
reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor 
discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied. . . . [I]f the legislative policy be 
to curb unrestrained and harmful competition by measures which are not arbitrary or 
discriminatory it does not lie with the courts to determine that the rule is unwise. 
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934). 
 171. As Gerald Gunther observed about equal protection review at least up to the early 1960s, 
“judicial intervention under the banner of equal protection was virtually unknown outside racial 
discrimination cases.”  Gunther, supra note 17, at 8. 
 172. See Perry, supra note 62, at 1065–67.  The passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, for example, can be seen as a societal commitment, albeit a contested one, to the irrelevance of 
race in the workplace.  See Klarman, supra note 52, at 297. 
 173. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432, 434 (1984) (striking down race-based 
legislation after applying “the most exacting scrutiny”); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392–93 
(1969) (invalidating race-based legislation by applying “‘the most rigid scrutiny’”) (quoting Korematsu 
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967) (same); 
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (same).  Gunther’s formulation of strict scrutiny for 
suspect classifications as “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact” well captures the predictable nature of this 
review.  See Gunther, supra note 17, at 8.  But see Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2338 (2003) 
(“Although all governmental uses of race are subject to strict scrutiny, not all are invalidated by it.”).  
See also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (“[W]e wish to dispel the notion 
that strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.’ . . . When race-based action is necessary to 
further a compelling interest, such action is within constitutional constraints if it satisfies the ‘narrow 
tailoring’ test this Court has set out in previous cases.”) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 
519 (Marshall, J., concurring)). 
 174. The relatively formulaic method for striking down racially discriminatory classifications also 
served institutional interests in judicial economy. 
 175. Unlike racial discrimination, Title VII’s legislative history does not reflect societal 
condemnation of sex discrimination comparable to its opposition to race discrimination.  See Price 
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tougher, more streamlined process for invalidating sex-based 
classifications. 
Still another reason for the Court’s reluctance to embrace a single 
standard approach might be the difficulty in conceiving a standard that 
could operate efficiently, incorporate the values reflected in the multi-tiered 
approach, and avoid an equal protection free-for-all in which deference to 
legislative decisionmaking and relative predictability of analysis and 
outcome would be lost entirely.  Even the descriptions offered by 
individual justices of their proposed single standards, although useful in 
spirit, do not provide much in the way of specific guidance for 
implementation.176  As illustrated above, the conceptual and practical 
challenges to a unitary standard, especially one that could maintain 
heightened scrutiny’s commitment to filtering out prejudice and not result 
in undue judicial oversight of government action, are significant.  Taking 
lessons from the tests of the individual justices, the existing literature, and 
the concerns raised above regarding the extant framework, the following 
part offers an alternative version of a unitary standard in an effort to 
uncomplicate and facilitate enforcement of the equal protection guarantee. 
IV.  ENVISIONING A SINGLE STANDARD 
As the justices’ individual standards suggest, any standard of equal 
protection review—including the single standard I propose—must occupy 
 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243 n.9 (1989) (noting that sex was included as a protected class 
in the Title VII bill “in an attempt to defeat the bill”).  See also CHARLES & BARBARA WHALEN, THE 
LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 115–17 (1985).  But see 
Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from 
Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 14–25 (1995) (presenting context for the inclusion of sex in Title VII that 
demonstrates the existence of legislative intent to provide meaningful protection against sex 
discrimination). 
But by 1963, the Equal Pay Act and other legislation prohibiting sex discrimination had been 
enacted, reinforcing the legislative and, by inference, popular view that sex was not typically a 
legitimate basis for government action.  See, e.g., Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994).  
See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (invalidating a statute that prohibited vendors from 
selling low-alcohol beer to young men but permitted sales to young women); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 
U.S. 7, 14, 17 (1975) (striking down a statute that provided different ages of majority for girls and 
boys); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 534–35, 538 (1975) (finding the systematic exclusion of 
women from juries unconstitutional); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971) (voiding a preference 
for men over women in appointments as administrators of estates).  Similarly, in Frontiero, a plurality 
of the Court recognized that through “romantic paternalism” toward women, “our statute books 
gradually became laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes” that gave rise to 
“pervasive” discrimination.  See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–86 (1973) (Brennan, J., 
plurality opinion). 
 176. See supra notes 155–62 and accompanying text. 
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itself fundamentally with the central concern of the Equal Protection 
Clause.  Therefore, this part will first isolate and examine that central 
concern, which equal protection jurisprudence expresses as a commitment 
to prohibiting class legislation.  Against that background, I will propose, 
apply, and critique a three-part test that incorporates the class legislation 
concern together with the subsidiary concerns that are common to high and 
low levels of scrutiny within the current framework. 
A.  CLASS LEGISLATION AS EQUAL PROTECTION’S BASELINE CONCERN 
In contrast to the variable way in which the Court has conducted its 
equal protection analysis,177 statements of the clause’s baseline concern 
have been surprisingly consistent.178  Regardless of the level of scrutiny 
applied, this first principle is invariably identified as preventing 
enforcement of class legislation.179  As the Court recently reaffirmed, 
opposition to legislation creating “classes among citizens” for non-neutral 
reasons lies at the heart of the equal protection guarantee: 
One century ago, the first Justice Harlan admonished this Court that the 
Constitution “neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”  
Unheeded then, those words now are understood to state a commitment 
 
 177. See supra Part II. 
 178. The Court’s comments in Plyler v. Doe about the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause are 
illustrative: 
Classifications treated as suspect tend to be irrelevant to any proper legislative goal. . . . The 
experience of our Nation has shown that prejudice may manifest itself in the treatment of 
some groups.  Our response to that experience is reflected in the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Legislation imposing special disabilities upon groups disfavored 
by virtue of circumstances beyond their control suggests the kind of “class or caste” treatment 
that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to abolish. 
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.14 (1982) (citation omitted). 
 179. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 48 
(1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  The term “class legislation” first became widely used in the antebellum 
era, not to refer generally to classifying laws as in the Lochner era, but to condemn what were known as 
“partial or special laws” that “singled out certain persons or classes of persons for special benefits or 
burdens.”  See Saunders, supra note 48, at 252–53.  Not until later did class legislation take on the 
meaning commonly associated with the Court’s Lochner era interventions, when it provided a 
foundation for invalidating laws, including nonclassifying laws, that were thought to serve the interests 
of a particular class rather than the general public.  See id. at 252, 301; Benedict, supra note 118, at 
305–14 (discussing workplace regulations and protective tariffs, inter alia, as class legislation).  The 
term is used here in the mid-19th-century sense described above, which most accurately reflects the 
original concern with “partial or special laws.”  See Saunders, supra note 48, at 292–93.  
Notwithstanding its complex history, class legislation remains the term of choice here because it, and 
not reference to partial or special laws, is the Court’s most commonly invoked shorthand to explain the 
purpose of the Equal Protection Clause.  Further, the Court’s recent invocation of the class legislation 
concept in Romer affirms its continuing importance to the Court.  See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635. 
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to the law’s neutrality where the rights of persons are at stake.  The 
Equal Protection Clause enforces this principle . . . .180 
This commitment to screening out and invalidating class legislation runs 
through much of the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence. 
Indeed, Justice John Marshall Harlan’s concern with class legislation 
was well founded in the history of the Equal Protection Clause’s 
enactment.181  As one of the clause’s leading advocates proclaimed in a 
Senate debate, the equality guarantee “abolishes all class legislation in the 
States and does away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons 
to a code not applicable to another.”182  The late 19th-century Court on 
which Justice Harlan sat was steeped in the contemporary debates.183  
Consequently, as the justices decided early equal protection cases, they 
were familiar with the process of drawing distinctions “between class 
legislation and legislation enacted for the purpose of benefitting the polity 
as a whole.”184 
 The Court was highly focused on the threat that class legislation posed 
to liberty and equality.185  Exploring the scope of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s equality guarantee shortly after its passage, Justice Harlan 
first condemned class legislation while dissenting from the Court’s 
 
 180. Romer, 517 U.S. at 623 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting)) (citation omitted). 
 181. See generally Saunders, supra note 48, at 268–92 (reviewing the legislative history of the 
Equal Protection Clause). 
 182. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (Sen. Howard).  Senator Jacob M. Howard 
of Michigan, who served on the Joint Committee on Reconstruction and as the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s floor manager in the Senate, was instrumental in identifying and codifying the principle 
of equality from popular debates that focused on higher law and citizens’ rights.  See NELSON, supra 
note 62, at 48, 73, 117.  In presenting the Fourteenth Amendment to the Senate, Howard advocated that 
it “‘establishes equality before the law, and it gives to the humblest, the poorest, the most despised of 
the race the same rights and the same protection before the law as it gives to the most powerful, the 
most wealthy, or the most haughty.’”  Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766). 
 183. See Saunders, supra note 48, at 293–301. 
 184. NELSON, supra note 62, at 176–77.  Senator Howard’s statement remains vital today; the 
Court regularly invokes it as confirmation of the Equal Protection Clause’s commitment to preventing 
arbitrary or hostile class legislation.  See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 214–15 (1982) (quoting 
Senator Howard’s statement regarding class legislation); Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 424 n.23 (1981) 
(same); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 600–02 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (same). 
 185. Disapproval of class legislation also has long been a part of American political sentiment.  
See Benedict, supra note 118, at 314 (“[T]he widespread acceptance [in the late 19th century] of 
laissez-faire notions of liberty must be attributed, at least in part, to the fact that its major thrust, 
hostility to ‘special’ and ‘class’ legislation, was already ingrained in American law and political 
theory.”).  The related concern of unequal enforcement—another form of class legislation—was 
similarly deeply rooted and also important to some of the drafters of the Reconstruction Amendments.  
Id. at 330–31. 
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invalidation of an 1875 antidiscrimination prohibition.186  Just a few years 
later in Barbier v. Connolly, the Court initiated a more extensive discussion 
of class legislation as it upheld, under the police power doctrine, a San 
Francisco ordinance limiting washing and ironing hours for public 
laundries.187  Explaining that legislation may often “press with more or less 
weight upon one than upon another,”188 the Court emphasized that these 
sorts of laws “are designed, not to impose unequal or unnecessary 
restrictions upon any one, but to promote, with as little individual 
inconvenience as possible, the general good.”189  In contrast, the Court 
wrote, “[c]lass legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others, 
is prohibited.”190 
For the next quarter century and beyond, the Court repeatedly invoked 
Barbier’s prohibition of class legislation, enshrining it as the central tenet 
of equal protection.191  Allegations that particular laws constituted 
impermissible class legislation surfaced regularly in plaintiffs’ lawsuits,192 
 
 186. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 48 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 187. See Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 32 (1884). 
 188. Id. at 31. 
 189. Id. at 31–32. 
 190. Id. at 32. 
 191. See, e.g., Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 72 (1887) (upholding a Missouri peremptory 
challenge rule that allowed a different number of challenges in capital cases depending on the size of 
the city where the indictment took place); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886) 
(invalidating a San Francisco laundry ordinance because of discriminatory enforcement).  As noted 
above, supra note 179, the term “class legislation” was also used increasingly to describe burdens 
imposed by economic regulation.  See, e.g., Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332–34 (1921) (striking 
down a statute distinguishing between former employees and other tortfeasors for the purposes of 
remedies); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 238–39, 243–44, 246 (1917) (upholding 
a Workmen’s Compensation Act provision requiring periodic contributions from employers in 
extrahazardous industries); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fé R.R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96, 104, 106 
(1899) (upholding a Kansas statute requiring that a reasonable attorney’s fee be made part of the 
judgment against a railroad company for damages caused by its trains); Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fé Ry. Co. 
v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 165–66 (1897) (sustaining a railroad’s challenge to a law mandating attorney’s 
fee payments by railroads but not other defendants under specified circumstances); Marchant v. Penn. 
R.R. Co., 153 U.S. 380, 390 (1894) (rejecting an appeal by property owners seeking damages from a 
nearby railroad); Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 30, 35–36 (1889) 
(upholding an Iowa statute that imposed liability on a railroad company whose failure to fence its tracks 
resulted in livestock deaths).  Again, however, these references to class legislation extend beyond the 
use intended here. 
 192. See, e.g., U.S. Mortgage Co. v. Matthews, 293 U.S. 232, 235 (1934); Herbring v. Lee, 280 
U.S. 111, 115–17 (1929); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 366, 369–70 (1927); S. Ry. Co. v. Clift, 
260 U.S. 316, 320–21 (1922); Payne v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 112, 113 (1918); Farmers Irrigation Dist. v. 
Nebraska, 244 U.S. 325, 330–31 (1917); Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U.S. 260, 267 (1912); Muller v. 
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 417–18 (1908); Armour Packing Co. v. Lacy, 200 U.S. 226, 233 (1906); 
Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487, 489 (1902); Cotting v. Kan. City Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79, 
112 (1901); Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U.S. 13, 21 (1901); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 
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and the Court expressed its intent to ensure that no class legislation would 
survive its review.193 
The Court’s contemporary cases continue this focus on class 
legislation.  For example, in rejecting an Alaska provision awarding 
residents dividends from a pipeline project based on duration of residence, 
then-Chief Justice Burger reiterated that legislation “permit[ting] the states 
to divide citizens into expanding numbers of permanent classes. . . . would 
be clearly impermissible.”194  Likewise, in Plyler v. Doe, the Court found 
Texas’s ban on undocumented children attending public schools to be 
objectionable in part because it would create a permanent “subclass of 
illiterates.”195  Justice Brennan also explained that “[l]egislation imposing 
special disabilities upon groups disfavored by virtue of circumstances 
beyond their control suggests the kind of ‘class or caste’ treatment that the 
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to abolish.”196 
But how does one discern what is class legislation and what is merely 
permissible and appropriate classifying by government?  The Court has 
defined class legislation as “a classification of persons undertaken for its 
own sake,”197 “a status-based enactment divorced from any factual context 
from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate state interests,”198 
and a subjection of “one caste of persons to a code not applicable to 
another.”199  Although useful as further elaborations of the class legislation 
concept, these descriptions do not chart an analytic path for lower courts.  
Further complicating the effort to develop a test for class legislation are the 
Court’s repeated reminders that “[a] law which affects the activities of 
some groups differently from the way in which it affects the activities of 
 
274 (1900); Petit v. Minnesota, 177 U.S. 164, 165–66 (1900); Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fé Ry., 165 U.S. at 
152–53. 
 193. See, e.g., Interstate Consol. St. Ry. Co. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79, 86 (1907) (describing 
a Massachusetts statute as falling between the “Scylla of unjustifiable class legislation” and “the 
Charybdis of impairing the obligation of a contract”). 
 194. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 64 (1982) (footnote omitted).  See also supra notes 179–80 
and accompanying text for a discussion of how the Court began the analysis in Romer by invoking 
Justice Harlan’s condemnation of class legislation. 
 195. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982).  See also id. at 213 (“The Equal Protection Clause 
was intended to work nothing less than the abolition of all caste-based and invidious class-based 
legislation.”). 
 196. Id. at 217 n.14. 
 197. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996). 
 198. Id. 
 199. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 215 (quoting Sen. Howard, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2766 
(1866)). 
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other groups is not necessarily banned by the Fourteenth Amendment.”200  
Also adding to the challenge is the Court’s view, as expressed in 
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., that “it is for the legislature, 
not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages” of 
differentiating between classes.201 
B.  DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROPOSED SINGLE STANDARD 
Although plain reference to class legislation provides too little 
guidance to serve as a useful new equal protection test, the Court’s strong 
rational basis cases articulate helpful, specific concerns.  Their inquiries 
mesh neatly with some of those contained in the heightened scrutiny cases, 
which likewise concern themselves with screening out laws crossing the 
class legislation threshold.  In particular, as shown below, the set of cases 
addressing classifications en route to heightened scrutiny—for example, 
sex discrimination cases prior to Frontiero,202 race discrimination cases 
prior to Korematsu v. United States,203 and cases involving discrimination 
against nonmarital children prior to Clark v. Jeter204—offers concrete 
guidance for discerning class legislation, perhaps because they 
simultaneously embody both the deferential commitment of rational basis 
review and the protective inclination of heightened scrutiny.205 
The remainder of this section will develop the three central lines of 
inquiry that emerge from these cases.  Each of the proposed inquiries is 
geared toward capturing impermissible class legislation while leaving in 
place the bulk of legitimate, permissible government classifications.  These 
 
 200. Kotch v. Bd. of River Port Pilot Comm’rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947) (citation omitted).  The 
Court continued, 
Otherwise, effective regulation in the public interest could not be provided, however essential 
that regulation might be.  For it is axiomatic that the consequence of regulating by setting 
apart a classified group is that those in it will be subject to some restrictions or receive certain 
advantages that do not apply to other groups or to all the public. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 201. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955). 
 202. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
 203. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 204. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988). 
 205. As discussed, supra notes 61–69 and accompanying text, for nearly twenty years after 
Korematsu first referenced the concept of suspect classification, the Court arguably did not deploy 
vigorous heightened scrutiny in race discrimination cases; instead, it performed ordinary deferential 
rational basis review.  See also Klarman, supra note 52, at 232–36, 245–46, 255.  On the other hand, as 
discussed above, supra note 84, others maintain that heightened scrutiny was effectively imposed, in 
deed if not in name, by the Court in reviewing classifications based on traits that had not yet been 
declared suspect or quasi-suspect.  See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 17, at 33–36 (discussing, inter alia, 
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)). 
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interrelated and complementary questions, taken together, comprise a 
unitary standard that may surpass the three-tiered approach in uncovering 
invidious or otherwise improper line drawing between classes.  In addition, 
as the proposed standard draws from the batch of strong rational basis cases 
in which meaningful review was imposed, it also may serve as a theoretical 
tool for understanding the Court’s inconsistent balancing between 
deference and review.206 
Drawing from the extant jurisprudence, the discussion below will 
elaborate the following three inquiries to be made of any classification 
challenged on equal protection grounds, with the aim of preventing 
enforcement of impermissible class legislation as the backdrop: 
(1) whether a plausible, nonarbitrary explanation exists for why the 
burdened group has been selected to bear the challenged burden in 
the context at issue; 
(2) whether the justification offered for the line drawing has a specific 
relationship to the classification’s context; and 
(3) whether the classification reflects disapproval, dislike, or 
stereotyping of the class of persons burdened by the legislation. 
 Put another way, the first inquiry considers the reason for the 
classification’s use in the regulatory context, the second considers whether 
that reasoning rests on broad generalizations about the trait at issue that 
lack a specific connection to the regulatory context, and the third considers 
whether the classification gives effect to an illegitimate government 
purpose.207  For brevity’s sake, they will be referred to respectively as the 
“intracontextual inquiry,” the “extracontextual inquiry,” and the “bias 
inquiry.”208  As shown below, if any one of these is not met, a classification 
cannot be sustained.209 
 
 206. See U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 177 n.10 (1980) (recognizing a lack of 
consistency in the Court’s rational basis jurisprudence). 
 207. Although other shared interests no doubt exist between the rational basis and heightened 
scrutiny cases, these three inquiries surface as the dominant analytic concerns, as shown below. 
 208. The latter two inquiries are arguably subsets of the first, because the demand for a plausible, 
nonarbitrary explanation likely will screen out classifications based on unduly broad or impermissible 
justifications.  Indeed, the entire three-part inquiry could be collapsed into one, which would demand 
that a plausible, legitimate, and context-specific justification exist for all government distinctions 
between classes.  However, separation into three inquiries not only fairly tracks the case law, as shown 
in Part IV.C–E, but also, if followed faithfully, constrains courts to reveal their reasoning on each point 
and discourages decisions that address challenges in simple, broad, and conclusory strokes. 
 209. The proposed standard, with its insistence on equal application to all classifications, runs 
contrary to the movement in antidiscrimination law to specify traits entitled to protection against 
discrimination.  Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 628 (1996) (“These [antidiscrimination] statutes and 
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C.  INTRACONTEXTUAL INQUIRY 
The intracontextual inquiry demands that a plausible explanation exist 
for why a group has been singled out for burdensome treatment in a 
particular context.  It asks, in other words, whether anything about the 
burdened group’s relationship to the regulatory context would justify it 
being singled out from among others for the type of burden being imposed.  
This inquiry reflects the central concern of the strong rational basis cases 
and the heightened scrutiny cases with the classified trait’s effect on an 
individual’s ability to participate on the same basis as others in the 
regulated arena.  It also evinces concern for the reasonableness of the 
burden that is imposed on particular trait bearers.210 
Applied properly, this inquiry would also constrain courts from 
accepting descriptions of what legislation accomplishes in the place of 
plausible explanations.  For example, the argument that restricting the 
scope of civil rights enactments will save money may accurately describe 
the effect of a ban on sexual orientation-based antidiscrimination 
protections, but it does not explain why those in need of sexual orientation-
based protections were chosen from among others to shoulder the burden of 
conserving government funds.211 
 
ordinances . . . enumerat[e] the groups or persons within their ambit of protection.  Enumeration is the 
essential device used to make the duty not to discriminate concrete and to provide guidance for those 
who must comply.”).  In contrast, the tiered framework, with its specification of particular suspect 
classifications, appears to be more consistent with prevailing legislative protections, albeit in a less 
generous way than most. 
However, notwithstanding the important parallels between legislative drafting and legal analysis 
in this area, see William N. Eskridge & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1237–42 
(2001), different considerations cause the two approaches to diverge.  The enumeration of particular 
traits for protection serves symbolic, educational, and deterrent functions that are of heightened 
importance in the legislative arena, which must guide not only those paying close attention to legal 
categories, but also the public at large.  In contrast, the educational function of almost every 
constitutional test is much narrower, except in the rare instance where a test has a direct, widespread 
bearing on people’s lives.  See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154, 164–65 (1973) (providing 
constitutional protection for women to terminate a pregnancy).  See also Sullivan, supra note 91, at 
747–50 (comparing the advantages and disadvantages of generality and specificity in antidiscrimination 
protection). 
Although the proposed standard lacks the focused message of trait-specific legislation (or even 
the trait-specific tiers), it is not without symbolic power.  Instead, it conveys the message that the Court 
will give meaningful consideration to all allegations of differential treatment, including those based on 
characteristics falling outside the preferred set of suspect classifications. 
 210. See infra notes 212–28 and accompanying text. 
 211. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 (finding the goal of “conserving resources to fight discrimination 
against other groups” inadequate to justify a Colorado state constitutional amendment precluding 
antidiscrimination protections for lesbians and gay men in light of “the breadth of the amendment”).  
Cf. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971) (rejecting a cost-savings justification for a law favoring 
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This concern with the existence of a meaningful explanation for the 
classification of a particular group also corresponds directly to the Court’s 
overarching equal protection value.  Where no reasonable explanation 
exists for the government’s singling out of a trait in a given context, what 
remains “is a status-based enactment divorced from any factual context 
from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate state 
interests”212—in other words, class legislation. 
Several of the strong rational basis cases center their analyses on this 
intracontextual inquiry.  For example, in reviewing Texas’s ban on public 
school education for undocumented immigrants, the Court emphasized the 
need for a meaningful connection between the classified population and the 
context.213  Striking down the ban, the Court stated that “even if 
improvement in the quality of education were a likely result of barring 
some number of children from the schools of the State, the State must 
support its selection of this group as the appropriate target for 
exclusion.”214  In assessing West Virginia’s taxation scheme in Allegheny 
Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission, the Court similarly explained 
that “[a] State may divide different kinds of property into classes and 
assign to each class a different tax burden so long as those divisions and 
burdens are reasonable” in context.215 
 
men as estate administrators as “the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”).  But see Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 509–10, 
516 (1976) (upholding a distinction between marital and nonmarital children regarding an entitlement to 
child survivor benefits based, in part, on the savings achieved by avoiding case-by-case 
determinations); Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 300 (6th 
Cir. 1997) (upholding a city charter amendment banning “protected status” for gay people “[b]ecause 
the valid interests of the Cincinnati electorate in conserving public and private financial resources is 
[sic], standing alone, of sufficient weight to justify [the measure] under a rational basis analysis”). 
With respect to the argument that Alabama’s discrimination against out-of-state entities was 
justified by the state’s desire to favor domestic enterprises, the Court observed that favoritism describes 
but does not explain, as required, the singling out of one group for a particular burden.  Metro. Life Ins. 
Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 878, 882 & n.10 (1985). 
 212. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635. 
 213. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223–24 (1982). 
 214. Id. at 229.  Applying its inquiry to the case at bar, the Court concluded that “[i]n terms of 
educational cost and need, however, undocumented children are ‘basically indistinguishable’ from 
legally resident alien children.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).  See also 
Romer, 517 U.S. at 632–33 (explaining that classifications are sustained where laws are “grounded in a 
sufficient factual context for us to ascertain [the existence of] some relation between the classification 
and the purpose it served”). 
 215. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm’n, 488 U.S. 336, 344 (1989) (citation 
omitted).  Likewise, in Quinn v. Millsap, the Court firmly rejected Missouri’s real property requirement 
for service on a government board, finding that land ownership was unrelated to an individual’s ability 
to participate in decisionmaking affecting the local community.  Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 108–09 
(1989).  Similarly, in Williams v. Vermont, the Court invalidated Vermont’s use of a tax preference for 
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Likewise, in Cleburne, after noting that the city’s concerns with size 
and occupancy, which led to the denial of a special use permit for a group 
home for people with mental retardation, would not have been similarly 
imposed on other groups of people living together, the Court framed a 
context-focused inquiry: 
The question is whether it is rational to treat the mentally retarded 
differently.  It is true that they suffer disability not shared by others; but 
why this difference warrants a density regulation that others need not 
observe is not at all apparent.  At least this record does not clarify how, 
in this connection, the characteristics of the intended occupants of the 
Featherston home rationally justify denying to those occupants what 
would be permitted to groups occupying the same site for different 
purposes.216 
And in Romer v. Evans, the Court offered a strong version of the 
demand for a genuine, reasonable connection between the classification 
and the government’s goals.217  The Court first set the amendment’s 
classification in context, noting that “[t]he amendment withdraws from 
homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection from the injuries 
caused by discrimination, and it forbids reinstatement of these laws and 
policies.”218  The Court then characterized Colorado’s antigay Amendment 
2 as drawing a status-based distinction utterly unrelated to the legislative 
context regulated by the measure.219  Ultimately, this discontinuity led the 
Court to conclude that “Amendment 2 is [not] directed to any identifiable 
legitimate purpose or discrete objective.”220  As the Court wrote, “it is a 
 
in-state residents, holding that the plaintiffs “ha[d] not been ‘accorded equal treatment, and the 
inequality is not because of the slightest difference in [Vermont’s] relation to the decisive transaction.’”  
Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 24 (1985) (second alteration in original) (quoting Wheeling Steel 
Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 572 (1949)). 
 216. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 449–50 (1985).  The Court in 
O’Brien v. Skinner followed an approach similar to that in Cleburne, first reviewing all the groups of 
New York citizens entitled to absentee registration and voting privileges—including those who were ill 
or physically disabled, those required to be out of their residential counties on election day for business 
reasons, and those detained in a jail in their home county—and then finding “wholly arbitrary” the 
state’s singular denial of registration and voting privileges to those detained in county jails outside their 
home county.  O’Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 530 (1974). 
 217. Romer, 517 U.S. at 620. 
 218. Id. at 627. 
 219. See id. at 632 (describing the amendment’s “sheer breadth [as] discontinuous with the 
reasons offered for it”). 
 220. Id. at 635. 
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classification of persons undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal 
Protection Clause does not permit.”221 
 Within heightened scrutiny, the intracontextual inquiry emerges 
through one of the indicia used to identify suspect classifications: whether a 
trait that is the basis for a classification bears on a person’s “ability to 
perform or contribute to” society.222  That is, skeptical scrutiny will not 
follow if the trait plausibly can be the basis for differential treatment in a 
variety of contexts; but if the trait is so irrelevant to abilities that its use as 
the basis for differential treatment is likely to be arbitrary, regardless of the 
context, heightened scrutiny may be accorded.223  In a challenge to sex 
discrimination in the distribution of military benefits to service members’ 
spouses, for example, the Court commented that “what differentiates sex 
from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability . . . is 
that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform 
or contribute to society.”224  Similarly, the Court rejected a classification 
that burdened nonmarital children, partly because “illegitimacy, however 
defined, is like race or national origin, a characteristic . . . [that] bears no 
relation to the individual’s ability to participate in and contribute to 
society.”225  As a case decided well before classifications of nonmarital 
children were formally designated quasi-suspect,226 the focus in Mathews v. 
 
 221. Id.  This conclusion illustrates the close connection between the intracontextual inquiry and 
the bias inquiry.  Where no plausible link exists between the classified trait, the classification, and the 
context, the likely explanation for the line drawing at issue is impermissible bias regarding that trait.  
See, e.g., Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 450 (finding that, because no plausible explanation existed 
for denying a group home permit for the mentally retarded, the only possible explanation for the denial 
would have been the impermissible one of fear of, or discomfort with, people with mental retardation). 
 222. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).  See also 
supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 223. See Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 441 (quoting Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686 (Brennan, J., 
plurality opinion)). 
 224. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (footnote omitted).  The Court has 
since backed away from this unequivocal endorsement of the irrelevance of sex in most settings.  See, 
e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001) (“The difference between men and women in relation to 
the birth process is a real one, and the principle of equal protection does not forbid Congress to address 
the problem at hand in a manner specific to each gender.”).  See also Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 356 
n.10 (1974) (“Gender has never been rejected as an impermissible classification in all instances.”).  
However, the Court also seems to believe that, in most circumstances, nothing about the status of being 
male or female would justify different treatment because of sex.  See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 
518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (“Parties who seek to defend gender-based government action must 
demonstrate an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for that action.”). 
 225. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976).  See also Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 854 
n.5 (1986) (reiterating that nonmarital parentage has no connection to individual ability). 
 226. In Mathews, the Court specifically rejected the application of heightened scrutiny, holding 
that “the Act’s discrimination between individuals on the basis of their legitimacy does not ‘command 
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Lucas on the irrelevance of illegitimacy to most regulatory contexts 
reinforces the importance of the intracontextual inquiry across levels of 
review.227 
Likewise, at the most rigorous level of review of racial classifications, 
the Court’s focus has been on the implausibility of any nonarbitrary 
connection existing between race and most contexts.  As the Court has 
observed, racial classifications are “‘in most circumstances irrelevant’ to 
any constitutionally acceptable legislative purpose.”228 
 Yet notably, the Court has also been willing to temper heightened 
scrutiny’s acontextual insistence on rigorous review.  In particular, in cases 
evaluating classifications based on alienage, which ordinarily receive strict 
scrutiny, the Court has determined “‘that strict scrutiny is out of place when 
the restriction primarily serves a political function.’”229  In these cases, 
rather than taking a categorical approach to alienage-based distinctions, the 
Court has engaged directly with the question of the relationship between 
citizenship status and the regulatory context.  In Foley v. Connelie, for 
example, the Court held that rational basis review should apply to a 
citizenship requirement for police officers because of the nature of the 
position,230 which authorizes officers “to exercise an almost infinite variety 
of discretionary [governmental] powers.”231  In Bernal v. Fainter, on the 
other hand, the Court applied strict scrutiny to a citizenship requirement for 
notaries public,232 who are not “invested either with policymaking 
responsibility or broad discretion in the execution of public policy that 
requires the routine exercise of authority over individuals.”233  This 
 
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process,’ which our most exacting scrutiny 
would entail.”  Mathews, 427 U.S. at 506 (footnote and citations omitted).  However, just over a decade 
later, the Court explicitly subjected classifications based on illegitimacy to heightened scrutiny and 
acknowledged that prior cases decided on rational basis grounds actually had applied heightened review 
as well.  See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (emphasizing that it “‘is illogical’” to classify 
based on illegitimacy) (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)). 
 227. Mathews, 427 U.S. at 505. 
 228. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 
U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).  Cf. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (emphasizing 
that a race-based classification may be necessary to further a compelling governmental interest). 
 229. See, e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439 (1982) (citing Sugarman v. Dougall, 
413 U.S. 634, 648 (1973)). 
 230. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 300 (1978). 
 231. Id. at 297. 
 232. See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 228 (1984). 
 233. Id. at 226–27.  Although useful for illustrating the Court’s ability to shift away from 
categorical review of a traditionally suspect classification, the Court’s adjudication of the political 
function cases has been subject to criticism.  See Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal 
Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1, 65 (2000) (“Lest you think this organizing concept sorts the cases in a 
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context-dependent adjustment of the standard reinforces the value and 
viability of context-sensitive review as provided by the single standard 
proposed here. 
 Certainly, the way in which the Court typically reviews justifications 
for classifications subject to heightened scrutiny is not identical to its 
approach under rational basis review.234  For example, among the subrules 
of the tiered scrutiny framework is the mandate that a classification’s 
defender need not offer justifications for a classifying measure under 
rational basis review, unlike under heightened scrutiny, where the 
government must specify and defend, with evidence, its justifications for 
differential treatment.235  In addition, heightened scrutiny demands that a 
 
rational way, note also that the Court has held that a probation officer and a public school teacher fulfill 
important political functions fairly entrusted only to citizens, but a lawyer does not.”) (footnotes 
omitted); Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition 187, and the 
Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1438 (1995) (reviewing criticisms of 
the political function exception). 
 234. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 77 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (reviewing the 
distinctions between the tiers of review and noting that “[t]he most important difference between 
heightened scrutiny and rational basis review is . . . the required fit between the means employed and 
the ends served”). 
 235. Compare United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (stating that the “justification 
must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation”), with Heller v. Doe, 
509 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1993) (“A statute is presumed constitutional and ‘[t]he burden is on the one 
attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it,’ 
whether or not the basis has a foundation in the record.”) (citations omitted) (quoting Lehnhausen v. 
Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)) (alteration in original). 
Whether courts should engage in imagining justifications not proffered by a classification’s 
defender has been the subject of some debate on the Court and among scholars.  See, e.g., Schweiker v. 
Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 244–45 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court should receive with some 
skepticism post hoc hypotheses about legislative purpose . . . . [Otherwise] equal protection review [is 
no] more than ‘a mere tautological recognition of the fact that Congress did what it intended to do.’”) 
(quoting U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 180 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring)); U.S. R.R. Ret. 
Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 187 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]his Court has frequently 
recognized that the actual purposes of Congress, rather than the post hoc justifications offered by 
Government attorneys, must be the primary basis for analysis under the rational-basis test.”); Gunther, 
supra note 17, at 20–21, 44–48 (proffering a model for equal protection review that would foreclose 
judicial hypothesizing of justifications for classifications, and addressing potential difficulties with that 
prohibition).  But cf. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) (finding that legislation is 
constitutional “if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it”); ELY, supra note 13, at 
129 (“I’m skeptical that a method of forcing articulation of purposes can be developed that will be both 
workable and helpful.”); Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 222, 233–35 
(1976) (arguing that post hoc government justification should be permitted given the nature of the 
lawmaking process). 
However, the freedom to hypothesize may be more significant in theory than in fact.  Among the 
full set of cases analyzed in this Article in which the Court invalidated a classification under rational 
basis review, the Court never once invented its own justification, but looked only to those justifications 
proffered by the classification’s defenders.  See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632, 635 (1996); 
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justification be of greater significance and more closely related to the 
government’s classification than is required by rational basis review.236  
These distinctions are not insignificant.237  However, they also are not fatal 
to this part’s argument that the core concerns of rational basis and 
heightened review overlap in certain important respects, including their 
shared commitment to assessing the relationship between potential 
justifications for a classification and the classification itself.238 
One additional potential difficulty with this inquiry and with the 
extracontextual inquiry that follows is that “context” is not self-defining; 
courts have full discretion to determine the contours of the context in which 
the classification should be assessed.239  For example, if the argument is 
that the government’s preference for minority-owned subcontractors aims 
to redress past discrimination in the construction industry, the plaintiffs in 
Adarand could argue that it is the context of highway guardrail 
manufacture that is relevant, and not the context of the construction 
industry as a whole against which the remedial justification must be 
measured.  Issue would thus be joined on this question of the context’s 
scope, just as it would be on the question regarding the justification’s 
plausibility.  These struggles over the scope of review and the plausibility 
of a given justification, however, are no different from the struggles 
prompted by analysis under the three tiers, where, in each instance, the 
Court must determine the contextual parameters before assessing how the 
 
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448–50 (1985); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. 
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–38 (1973). 
 236. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 76–78.  See also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 
(1995) (noting that strict scrutiny requires a classification to be narrowly tailored to further a 
compelling government interest); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643–44 (1993) (“A racial classification, 
regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an 
extraordinary justification.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting Pers. Adm’r 
of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979)).  Mere “plausibility” and “legitimacy” are essential, as 
they are under rational basis review, but they are not sufficient to satisfy the standard. 
 237. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 77–78 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  See also supra note 235 and 
accompanying text. 
 238. Further, in adopting the rational basis presumption of constitutionality, which is applied to 
almost all equal protection classifications, the proposed standard keeps with this Article’s drawing 
from, rather than transforming of, extant doctrine to demonstrate the immediate need to change the 
tiered framework.  In addition, the presumption’s relative noninvasiveness minimizes the 
countermajoritarian difficulty and helps address the contention made in Part II.C: that heightened 
scrutiny’s inflexibility has resulted in some of the problems now associated with the tiers.  Moreover, as 
discussed below, infra text accompanying note 282, the common considerations of all levels of review 
would allow evidence to be introduced in response to the bias inquiry, so the value of an evidentiary 
analysis that comes with heightened scrutiny is not entirely lost in the proposed standard. 
 239. See generally Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1597 
(1990) (analyzing the meaning of context in legal and theoretical debates). 
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proffered justifications relate to those parameters.240  Thus, while the 
proposed test does not resolve these judgment calls, it also does not 
exacerbate the need for the courts to exercise discretion.  Further, by 
separating the intracontextual and extracontextual inquiries, the proposed 
standard actually may supply some guidance to constrain courts, which the 
current standard does not offer.241 
D.  EXTRACONTEXTUAL INQUIRY 
Although the intracontextual inquiry likely will screen out the bulk of 
impermissible classifications, an inquiry into a justification’s breadth also 
emerges as important to high and low levels of scrutiny.  Specifically, this 
proposed inquiry would seek to determine whether the government interest 
in maintaining the classification242 is specific to the relationship between 
the trait and the regulatory context at issue.  If the justification for official 
distinctions based on a trait is so general that it would support 
discrimination based on that trait in virtually any context, it risks being 
used to support sweeping, indiscriminate trait-based classifications that 
deny status and benefits to trait bearers across the board.243 
The Court developed this inquiry in some depth in Zobel v. Williams 
as it reviewed Alaska’s system for distributing dividends from the oil 
pipeline that particularly benefited long-term state residents.244  Alaska 
sought to justify its dividing line between long- and short-term residents “to 
reward citizens for past contributions,”245 a perfectly benign-sounding 
 
 240. Compare Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62, 73 (affirming the significance of physical differences 
between men and women in the context of a sex-based immigration law addressing the naturalization of 
a child born abroad), with United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531, 533–34 (1996) (finding that 
“[i]nherent differences between men and women” did not provide an “exceedingly persuasive 
justification” for discrimination based on sex in the school’s admissions policy).  Compare Heller, 509 
U.S. at 314–15 (upholding a rule requiring a lower standard of proof for the involuntary civil 
commitment of individuals with mental retardation than for individuals with mental illness), with 
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 450 (rejecting a decision to impose different zoning rules on people 
with mental retardation than on others). 
 241. See infra note 323 and accompanying text (explaining that the inquiries’ insistence on 
meaningful explanations for government action exposes courts’ analyses to scrutiny in a way that the 
extant standard’s emphasis on deference does not). 
 242. See supra note 235 and accompanying text (discussing judicial hypothesizing of 
justifications for classifications). 
 243. See Scott H. Bice, Rationality Analysis in Constitutional Law, 65 MINN. L. REV. 1, 33 (1980) 
(arguing that “abstract goals defeat evaluative rationality”); Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 20, at 
351–53 (analyzing overbroad classifications that burden individuals not associated with the “mischief” 
targeted by the law). 
 244. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 58–64 (1982). 
 245. Id. at 63. 
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government interest.  Rather than lauding Alaska’s fair spirit, however, the 
Court examined whether the proffered justification was sufficiently and 
specifically connected to the context of the government line drawing at 
issue.  If not, the Court explained, the reward-oriented justification could 
be used impermissibly to support different treatment of long- and short-
term residents in other areas as well. 
If the states can make the amount of a cash dividend depend on length of 
residence, what would preclude varying university tuition on a sliding 
scale based on years of residence—or even limiting access to finite 
public facilities, eligibility for student loans, for civil service jobs, or for 
government contracts by length of domicile?  Could states impose 
different taxes based on length of residence?  Alaska’s reasoning could 
open the door to state apportionment of other rights, benefits, and 
services according to length of residency.  It would permit the states to 
divide citizens into expanding numbers of permanent classes.  Such a 
result would be clearly impermissible.246 
Because the state’s justification provided a near-universal reason to treat 
long- and short-term residents differently instead of offering a specific 
connection to the dividend distribution plan, it was held invalid.247 
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, the Court similarly 
examined Alabama’s contention that its different tax treatment of in-state 
and out-of-state insurers was justified by its interest in the “promotion of 
domestic industry.”248  Like Zobel, this justification appeared at one level 
to be perfectly reasonable and, indeed, responsible on the part of the state’s 
government.  In applying rational basis review, however, the Court found 
that the goal of promoting domestic industry would support discrimination 
in instances far beyond the specific regulatory context at issue.249  
Affirming the use of a generalized domestic preference, the Court wrote, 
would give way to class legislation and “eviscerate the Equal Protection 
Clause in this context.”250  The Court added that “[a] State’s natural 
inclination frequently would be to prefer domestic business over foreign.  If 
we accept the State’s view here, then any discriminatory tax would be valid 
 
 246. Id. at 64 (footnotes omitted). 
 247. Id. at 64–65.  Likewise, in Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, the Court rejected New 
Mexico’s statute favoring a set of long-term resident Vietnam veterans who had settled in the state prior 
to a certain date, holding that the statute effectively “create[d] two tiers of resident Vietnam veterans” 
and that those who arrived after the May 1976 cut-off were deemed “in a sense ‘second-class citizens.’”  
Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 623 (1985). 
 248. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 882 (1985). 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
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if the State could show it reasonably was intended to benefit domestic 
business.”251  Thus, even in its most lenient category of review, the Court 
has screened for and rejected noncontext-specific explanations for different 
treatment that could justify sweeping trait-based distinctions. 
The rational basis inquiry into the potential breadth of a justification is 
reminiscent of the heightened scrutiny inquiry into how closely a 
classification is tailored to the achievement of proffered government 
interests.252  In reviewing suspect and quasi-suspect classifications, the 
Court has insisted that a classification must be, respectively, “narrowly 
tailored to further [a compelling government] interest,”253 or “substantially 
related to the achievement of [important government] objectives.”254  This 
insistence that the justification and classification be closely related is 
likewise addressed through the proposed standard’s inquiry into the 
existence of a context-specific connection between the classified trait and 
the regulatory context.  A generalized justification that would also support 
extracontextual distinctions would necessarily be inadequate, as it could 
not show sufficiently why the trait had to be singled out in the context at 
issue. 
Still, as discussed above, qualitative differences exist between the 
heightened scrutiny and rational review standards.255  However, within the 
differences is the shared concern that a justification for a trait-based 
distinction not be so general as to support wide-scale, acontextual 
burdening of a classified trait.  This overlapping commitment reinforces the 
extracontextual inquiry’s use in the proposed single standard, which aims 
to capture the shared concerns of each review level.  Moreover, under 
rational basis review, the Court applies the extracontextual inquiry with 
 
 251. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 252. Given that the strong rational basis cases insist on context-limited justifications, it may be 
that Justice O’Connor’s recent observation that “[t]he most important difference between heightened 
scrutiny and rational basis review . . . is the required fit between the means employed and the ends 
served” is somewhat overstated.  Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 77 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 253. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995).  See also Palmore v. Sidoti, 
466 U.S. 429, 432–33 (1984) (explaining that racial classifications “must be ‘necessary . . . to the 
accomplishment’ of” the government’s compelling interest) (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 
184, 196 (1964)) (alteration in original); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 306, 374–76 (1971) 
(articulating the same standard of review for classifications based on national origin). 
 254. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (quoting Wengler v. Druggists 
Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980))).  See also Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 8 (1983) (requiring 
that classifications of nonmarital children bear “‘an evident and substantial relation to the particular . . . 
interests [the] statute is designed to serve’”) (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Clark, 445 
U.S. 23, 27 (1980)). 
 255. See supra notes 234–38 and accompanying text. 
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sufficient force, such as in Zobel, to suggest that the tailoring distinction, 
although important, may not be as dispositive as has been suggested.256 
But, you might say, we want to treat certain groups in a distinct 
manner across several legislative contexts out of special solicitude for 
them.  Consider, for example, the singling out of the elderly in measures 
regarding healthcare, antidiscrimination policy, and transportation.  The 
extracontextual inquiry would not, as a general rule, forbid this sort of 
favorable treatment in different arenas.  Instead, it would ask, with respect 
to the classification in each arena, whether some connection exists between 
the group classified, the type of treatment imposed, and the context for the 
group’s different treatment.  This is no different from what equal protection 
review, at all levels of review, already demands.  An argument can be made 
that the elderly have unique needs in each of the areas specified, to which 
legislation may respond. 
The extracontextual problem would arise with a measure unrelated to 
the group’s particular needs in that context.  So, for example, a measure 
that restricted voting rights of the elderly would lack the sort of context-
specific justification that a measure providing transportation assistance to 
the polls might have.  Or, to take the case of classifications imposing 
burdens, the extracontextual inquiry would allow government to classify 
based on a disability in a way that would limit the rights of individuals with 
that disability in a variety of arenas, so long as the disability bore a specific 
relationship to the context being regulated. 
In sum, at all levels of review, there is a consistent, significant concern 
with screening out justifications for classifications that are so general and 
noncontext-specific that they could be invoked to justify burdening a trait 
in all settings, effectively allowing for the creation of superior and inferior 
classes.  Thus, this concern belongs within any single standard. 
E.  BIAS INQUIRY 
In addition to the means-focused intracontextual and extracontextual 
inquiries,257 a third inquiry that delves into the nature of the government 
interests is deliberately ends-focused in its demand that government not 
give legal effect to bias based on outmoded stereotypes about a particular 
 
 256. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 61–64 (1982) (emphasizing the lack of a sufficiently 
tailored connection between Alaska’s stated interest and its pipeline dividend classification). 
 257. The two are means-focused through their emphasis on the quality of the connection between 
legislative means and government ends. 
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class.258  As the Court recently reiterated in the context of rational basis 
review, “[I]f the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ 
means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to 
harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate 
governmental interest.”259  Whether characterized as “animosity,”260  “mere 
negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly 
cognizable [in the relevant context],”261 or “irrational prejudice,”262 the 
Court has firmly singled out a set of government interests that are 
illegitimate and, thus, impermissible, even under the most lenient review. 
Not surprisingly, this condemnation under the rational basis standard 
of government ends that give effect to bias and stereotyping reappears in 
the heightened scrutiny context.  As the Court put it in overturning a state 
court determination altering child custody based on the race of the mother’s 
new spouse,263 “[c]lassifying persons according to their race is more likely 
to reflect racial prejudice than legitimate public concerns.”264  And, in 
addressing a sex-based classification, the Court reviewed and condemned 
the “gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes” embodied in the 
statute’s differential treatment of women and men.265 
As with the intracontextual and extracontextual inquiries, the bias 
inquiry does not mechanically direct or otherwise eliminate the exercise of 
judgment regarding which aims reflect bias or illegitimate stereotyping and 
which do not.  Indeed, the three strong rational basis cases that rest in part 
on the condemnation of bias offer only a minimalist roadmap for discerning 
improper purposes.266  In Romer, for example, the Court discerned the 
 
 258. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634–35 (1996) (stating that imposing a 
“disadvantage . . . born of animosity toward the class of persons affected” offends the concept of equal 
protection of the law); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 138 (1994) (“We shall not accept as a defense 
to gender-based [differential treatment] the very stereotype the law condemns.”) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted) (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991)); Palmore, 466 U.S. at 
433 (“The Constitution cannot control [private] prejudices but neither can it tolerate them.  Private 
biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”). 
 259. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)) 
(emphasis added) (brackets in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 260. Id. 
 261. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985). 
 262. Id. at 450. 
 263. Palmore, 466 U.S. at 434. 
 264. Id. at 432. 
 265. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). 
 266. See Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, supra note 121, at 59–64 (discussing the Court’s 
analysis of animus in Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer).  Once an improper purpose is discerned, 
however, the Court will not engage in a process of conceiving justifications for a measure beyond those 
proffered by the government.  See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632–36 (1996) (considering only the 
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presence of impermissible animus not from the social history surrounding 
the passage of Colorado’s antigay amendment,267 but from the utter lack of 
connection between the sweeping restriction on antidiscrimination 
measures protecting gay people and the justifications proffered for it.268  In 
Cleburne, explicit evidence demonstrated consideration of improper 
purposes—unjustified negative attitudes toward or fear of those with 
mental retardation—but the Court’s finding of “irrational prejudice” came 
only after its determination that none of the proffered rationales explained 
the permit denial.269  The Court also had explicit evidence that the food 
stamp provision at issue in U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture v. Moreno was aimed 
to keep “hippies” from participating in the food stamp program, which led 
it to condemn as impermissible the purpose “to harm a politically 
unpopular group”; however, it did not offer additional explanatory analysis 
for future cases.270  The sole practical instruction to be drawn from these 
cases, then, is that although improper purposes are sometimes found 
because the classification lacks any meaningful connection to the 
justifications proffered, in some instances, as in Moreno, improper 
purposes may also be discerned from the legislative history or the context 
of a measure’s passage. 
The Court’s heightened scrutiny decisions generally do not provide 
much additional guidance to distinguish impermissible stereotyping from 
permissible generalization, in part because the presence of bias is presumed 
or suspected whenever a suspect classification is made.271  Some of the 
 
justifications that were actually proffered by the government defending the classification); Cleburne 
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 448–50 (same); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–38 (1973) 
(same).  Cf. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–66 (1977) 
(“When there is a proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision, this 
judicial deference [ordinarily accorded government action] is no longer justified.”) (footnote omitted); 
McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 277 (1973) (considering the stated justifications for the legislative 
classification and noting that the Court itself had “supplied no imaginary basis or purpose for this 
statutory scheme”). 
 267. See generally KEEN & GOLDBERG, supra note 102 (detailing the social and cultural context 
in which antigay amendments passed in Colorado and elsewhere); Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil 
Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283 
(1994) (analyzing the rhetoric used to promote antigay measures). 
 268. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. 
 269. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 448–56. 
 270. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534 (“The legislative history . . . indicates that [the] amendment was 
intended to prevent so-called ‘hippies’ and ‘hippie communes’ from participating in the food stamp 
program.”) (citation omitted). 
 271. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) 
(“[W]hat differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability, and 
aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to 
ability to perform or contribute to society.”).  See also Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 441 
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cases, however, at least amplify the concern with stereotyping in ways that 
may provide guidance for the single standard’s inquiry.  For example, the 
Court has offered a variety of definitions of “stereotype” ranging from “a 
frame of mind resulting from irrational or uncritical analysis,”272 to 
“mistaken beliefs” and manifestations of “society’s accumulated myths and 
fears,”273 to “generalizations about groups of people.”274  The case law also 
explains that some empirical support for a stereotype about a group does 
not necessarily justify the use of that generalization.275  Beyond that, little 
is available to guide the assessment of a challenge to governmental 
stereotyping. 
Instead, the Court’s most extensive explanation of the improper 
purpose inquiry appears not in the rational basis or heightened scrutiny 
cases, but in the cases that screen facially neutral classifications for the 
element of improper motive required to make out an equal protection 
claim.276  In explicating this discriminatory purpose requirement, the Court 
 
(“[S]tatutes distributing benefits and burdens between the sexes in different ways very likely reflect 
outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of men and women.”).  Cf. id. at 440 (“[Classifications] by 
race, alienage, or national origin. . . . are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state 
interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy . . . .”). 
 272. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 68 (2001). 
 273. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999) (quoting Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 
U.S. 273, 284 (1987)).  The Court also acknowledged that “misperceptions often ‘resul[t] from 
stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of . . . individual ability.’”  Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C.               
§ 12101(a)(7) (1994)) (alteration and omission in original). 
 274. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 452 (1998) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  For additional 
discussion of stereotypes, see J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 142 n.14 (1994) (“intuitive and 
frequently erroneous biases”), City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 516 (1989) (Stevens, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (presumptions that are not “facts” or based in 
“reason”), Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 441 (“outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of [a 
population]”), Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) (perceptions 
lack “careful consideration of modern social conditions”), Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) 
(“Legislative classifications which distribute benefits and burdens on the basis of gender carry the 
inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the ‘proper place’ of women and their need for special 
protection.”) (citation omitted); City of Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 
707 (1978) (“[m]yths and purely habitual assumptions”), and Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 
(1977) (per curiam) (noting that the legislation in question did not embody stereotypes as an 
“‘accidental byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about females’”) (quoting Califano v. Goldfarb, 
430 U.S. 199, 223 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
 275. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 89 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“This Court has long recognized, 
however, that an impermissible stereotype may enjoy empirical support and thus be in a sense 
‘rational.’”) (citations omitted); J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140 n.11 (“We have made abundantly clear in past 
cases that gender classifications . . . violate the Equal Protection Clause, even when some statistical 
support can be conjured up for the generalization.”). 
 276. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–68 (1977) 
(elaborating on the test for discriminatory motive); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240–42 (1976) 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
GOLD14.DOC 4/2/2004  6:20 PM 
548 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:481 
 
in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development 
Corp. identified the following considerations, all of which emphasize the 
context in which the government decision is made and enforced: the effect 
of the official action,277 the “historical background of the decision,”278 
“[t]he specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision,”279 
and “[t]he legislative or administrative history.”280 
These considerations allow not only inquiry into the presence of 
overtly hostile purposes, such as the anti-hippie statement in Moreno,281 but 
also examination of the way in which the government reached its decision 
to classify.  Thus, it is through the bias inquiry that a challenging party can 
introduce, for example, evidence demonstrating serious defects in the 
process that led to the classification’s adoption, or evidence showing that a 
legislature could not reasonably have thought that a classification would 
serve its stated purpose.282 
As with the intracontextual and extracontextual inquiries, the shared 
emphasis among all levels of scrutiny on rejecting classifications that serve 
hostile or bias-laden motives illustrates the centrality of this concern and, 
consequently, its importance to a unitary standard of review.  Further, this 
focus on ferreting out illegitimate state interests complements the 
intracontextual plausibility inquiry and the extracontextual examination of 
a justification’s breadth by allowing for assessment not only of the fit 
between the means and ends, but also of the ends themselves.  In doing so, 
the three inquiries capture the multifaceted concerns with means and ends 
expressed at all points in the extant spectrum of equal protection review. 
 
(setting forth the discriminatory motive requirement).  See supra note 10 for critiques of the 
discriminatory motive requirement. 
 277. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266. 
 278. Id. at 267. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. at 268.  See also Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373 (1967) (affirming that 
considerations of a measure’s “‘immediate objective,’ its ‘ultimate effect’ and its ‘historical context and 
the conditions existing prior to its enactment’” were appropriate in determining the presence of an 
improper purpose). 
 281. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (referencing the condemnation of 
hippies in the statute’s legislative history). 
 282. As the Court has pointed out on numerous occasions, if a party demonstrates that the state’s 
asserted justification is not credible, then that justification may be rejected.  See Weinberger v. 
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n.16 (1975) (“This Court need not in equal protection cases accept at 
face value assertions of legislative purposes, when an examination of the legislative scheme and its 
history demonstrates that the asserted purpose could not have been a goal of the legislation.”) (citations 
omitted). 
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F.  THEORETICAL COMMITMENTS OF THE PROPOSED SINGLE STANDARD 
A critical question remains regarding the type of equality that the 
proposed standard purports to deliver in the name of equal protection.283  
With this question in mind, this section will consider the standard’s 
theoretical underpinnings.  It will look first at the broader context of 
equality theory and then at several major theories regarding the purpose of 
rational basis review. 
As an initial matter, the proposed standard embodies a view of the 
Equal Protection Clause as a principled constraint on a government’s 
ability to differentiate between those within its jurisdiction.284  For 
example, the intracontextual inquiry is fundamentally concerned with the 
comparative right of equality—that one should be subject only to 
restrictions also imposed on similarly situated counterparts.285  Likewise, 
the bias inquiry forecloses a set of grounds for government action (i.e., the 
state may not give legal effect to popular dislike of a class of people). 
This commitment to ensuring comparative equality, however, does not 
necessarily locate the test in any particular place along the formal 
equality/antisubordination axis.  Its inquiries share with formal equality 
theorists286 the concern that explicit differential treatment of similarly 
 
 283. See Sunstein, Sexual Orientation, supra note 45, at 1174 (referring to different principles of 
equality).  Cf. Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-Century Race 
Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1923, 1928–29 (2000) (commenting on the uncertain meaning of equality in 
history). 
 284. This premise implicitly rejects an argument advanced most prominently by Peter Westen, 
that equality “is an empty form having no substantive content.”  Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of 
Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 596 (1982). 
 285. See Kenneth W. Simons, Equality as a Comparative Right, 65 B.U. L. REV. 387, 389 (1985) 
(“A right to equal treatment is a comparative claim to receive a particular treatment just because another 
person or class receives it.”).  Given the standard’s insistence on nonarbitrary, nonbiased 
differentiations between classes, equality of respect would likely result from its application as well, 
although that is not the standard’s central aim.  Cf. C. Edwin Baker, Outcome Equality or Equality of 
Respect: The Substantive Content of Equal Protection, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1983) (urging that the 
equality-of-respect model reflects the best substantive understanding of the equal protection guarantee); 
Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245, 280–81 (1983) (maintaining that equality 
rhetoric has a substantive effect on legal rights and political culture). 
 286. For a general discussion of formal equality and other equality theories, see Hutchinson, supra 
note 13, at 619–27.  For discussions of formal equality, see, for example, William Van Alstyne, Rites of 
Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 809–10 (1979) 
(criticizing affirmative action initiatives as infringing the right to formal, equal treatment), Barbara A. 
Brown, Thomas I. Emerson, Gail Falk & Ann E. Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A 
Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 889–93 (1971) (making a formal 
equality argument in the context of support for the Equal Rights Amendment), Mary Anne Case, “The 
Very Stereotype the Law Condemns”: Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect 
Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1442–47 (2000) (defending the focus on formal equality violations 
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situated individuals, standing alone, may violate equality rights.  Under the 
proposed standard, however, such a formal distinction could survive an 
equal protection challenge if plausibly explained by a context-specific and 
legitimate justification.  This deliberate emphasis on contextualizing 
differential treatment has an affinity to antisubordination theory’s concern 
with providing redress for substantive inequalities, even absent formal 
distinctions.287  The bias inquiry, too, could be construed to find 
government action impermissible when it results in subordination of a 
socially vulnerable class.  However, in keeping with this Article’s aim to 
draw from, rather than transform, current doctrine,288 the proposed test, like 
the Court’s current test, does not take a position on a key question for 
antisubordination theorists: whether substantive inequalities give rise to 
actionable equal protection claims absent formal distinctions between 
classes.289 
 
in equal protection review of sex-based classifications), Robin L. West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, 
and the Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 45, 53–60 (1990) (discussing the 
rationality model of equality), and Wendy W. Williams, Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal 
Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325, 328 (1984–85) 
(addressing formal equality arguments while defending the “equal treatment model,” which would 
permit special treatment in response to unique needs to fulfill the equal protection guarantee). 
 287. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND 
LAW 32–45 (1987) (addressing the sameness/difference and dominance theories for analyzing 
discrimination).  See generally Becker, supra note 69 (discussing the evolution of feminist thought 
regarding legal rights); Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 
61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986) (advocating an antisubordination analysis); Fiss, supra note 13, at 123 
(arguing for a “group-disadvantaging principle,” which would reconcile doctrinal conflicts in the 
affirmative action debate); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 
YALE L.J. 1281 (1991) (examining the legal implications of women’s systematic subordination).  Cf. 
Mary Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards a Substantive Feminism, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 21, 
22 (criticizing liberal feminism and dominance feminism as “empty at their core”). 
 288. See supra text accompanying note 13. 
 289. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 237–39 (1976).  Davis currently controls this 
question by requiring an equal protection claimant to prove discriminatory intent absent formal 
discrimination.  Id. at 237–40.  The tiered framework, however, neither requires nor forbids this 
approach, which has been broadly criticized.  See supra notes 10, 276–80 and accompanying text.  For 
purposes of evaluating the proposed single standard, I do not enter this debate, but simply work within 
the governing doctrine.  With respect to the related issue of the level of government involvement 
required for an equal protection claim to be made, I similarly accept, for purposes of discussion here, 
the Court’s current narrow construction of the state action requirement.  See United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000) (“Foremost among these limitations is the time-honored principle that the 
Fourteenth Amendment, by its very terms, prohibits only state action.”).  Extensive transformative 
critiques have been well advanced by others.  See, e.g., William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution 
in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165, 171–74, 217–22 (2001) (advancing a broader interpretation of the state 
action requirement than is endorsed by the Court).  Cf. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 46 (1883) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting).  According to Justice Harlan, 
The citizenship thus acquired, by that race, in virtue of an affirmative grant from the nation, 
may be protected, not alone by the judicial branch of the government, but by congressional 
legislation of a primary direct character; this, because the power of congress is not restricted 
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In addition to the formalist and antisubordination perspectives on 
equality, other significant equality theories have identified conditions to be 
considered in determining whether a particular classification violates the 
Equal Protection Clause.  Suggestions have been made that equal 
protection violations should be found when nonpublic values are served,290 
where political representation of the burdened group is compromised,291 or 
when government cannot plausibly explain the distinctions it has drawn.292  
The remainder of this section will consider whether the proposed standard 
does, or should, take these equality theories into account.293 
The public-regarding values argument maintains that legislators can 
and should act in ways to serve general public goals, but may not, 
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause, act in an effort to reward or 
satisfy demands of an “interest group.”294  In other words, the argument is 
that the scope of permissible trait-based distinctions is limited to public-
regarding values only.  Conversely, naked preferences in lawmaking for the 
agendas of influential interest groups are impermissible, Cass Sunstein has 
argued, because action based on these preferences, without more, suggests 
the legislature’s disregard for the need to be nonarbitrary and to consider 
the reasonableness of its acts in context.295  While not specifically 
embracing the three tiers, Sunstein’s argument also appears to accept the 
rationality/heightened scrutiny distinction as fitting “nicely with the 
requirement that a litigant show that the government decisionmaker acted 
out of an impermissible motivation.”296  Rather than objecting to the 
 
to the enforcement of prohibitions upon State laws or State action. . . . It is, therefore, a grave 
misconception to suppose that the fifth section of the amendment has reference exclusively to 
express prohibitions upon State laws or State action. 
Id. 
 290. See, e.g., Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 40, at 1713. 
 291. See ELY, supra note 13, at 86–87, 160–70. 
 292. See Gunther, supra note 17, at 20–24. 
 293. As Tracy Higgins points out, these theories, including particularly those of Ely and Sunstein, 
presume that equality exists among individuals except in unusual circumstances, which the theories 
then seek to correct.  See Tracy E. Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1657, 1697–
1702 (1997).  As Higgins argues, this assumption of preexisting equality fails to recognize the negative 
effects of nonstate actors on access to power, individual autonomy, and the possibility of equality itself.  
Id.  As this part discusses below, the proposed standard refuses to assume either that a particular class 
of individuals is uniquely at risk for equality injuries or that a preference for a particular interest group 
necessarily poses a danger to securing constitutional equality.  Indeed, in attempting to ensure a 
contextualized inquiry for differential treatment, the proposed standard may be responsive to some of 
Higgins’s concerns by leaving room for considering the setting in which the governmental distinction 
between classes occurs.  Id. 
 294. See Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 40, at 1691. 
 295. See id. at 1690–91, 1712–13. 
 296. Id. at 1714 (footnote omitted). 
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differences in scrutiny, Sunstein sees in the three tiers a reflection of his 
core view that equal protection, like other constitutional doctrines, is 
fundamentally concerned with ensuring that government “classifications 
rest on something other than a naked preference for one person or group 
over another.”297  In contrast, while the proposed standard demands a 
plausible, context-specific, and nonbiased reason for a classification, 
nothing in the proposed test precludes legislators from enacting laws in 
response to interest group requests.  All that is required is that the line 
relate in some legitimate, limited way to the trait that is the basis for the 
classification. 
Consider the river pilots who challenged New Orleans’s licensing 
system, which effectively disabled nonrelatives of current license holders 
from obtaining pilotage licenses.298  The naked preferences theory suggests 
that the pilots should prevail in their challenge if they persuade a court that 
the nepotism system resulted from a legislative effort to preserve the rights 
of a small group of people.299  Under the proposed single standard, the fact 
that the license distribution scheme might have been the product of a 
political favor would not play into a court’s equal protection analysis.  So 
long as no showing of bias toward the nonrelatives could be advanced, the 
critical questions would be whether the distinction between relatives and 
nonrelatives plausibly related to the safe operation of boats on the 
Mississippi River, and whether the justification for the distinction was 
context-specific.  Similarly, a restriction forbidding opticians but not 
optometrists from replacing lenses in glasses would not fail because it 
lacked a “public” purpose; if a plausible connection could be found 
between the restriction and an optician’s training, the restriction could 
stand.300 
Although the proposed test does not embrace Sunstein’s insistence on 
public-regarding values, it does share “the central constitutional concern of 
ensuring against capture of government power by faction”301 in its 
 
 297. Id. at 1713. 
 298. See Kotch v. Bd. of River Port Pilot Comm’rs, 330 U.S. 552, 555 (1947). 
 299. See Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 40, at 1713–17. 
 300. Richard Klarman has suggested that Lee Optical illustrates the Court’s rejection of a theory 
that public-regarding values must exist to support classifying legislation.  See Klarman, supra note 52, 
at 249–50.  Whether a relevant and nonoverbroad justification exists in either case is debatable, even 
under the single standard, which suggests that the unitary standard might not be of great predictive 
value in deciding borderline cases, even while it clarifies the inquiry.  Questions regarding the proposed 
standard’s utility will be addressed in greater depth in Part V. 
 301. See Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 40, at 1690 (footnote omitted).  See also THE 
FEDERALIST NOS. 10, 51 (James Madison). 
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insistence on meaningful review of the link between the classification and 
its context.302  Indeed, class legislation is the perfect legislative 
embodiment of factional control of government, with differential treatment 
imposed simply and freely at the will of the ruling class without the need 
for justification.  Rather than serving as a rubber stamp for faction-led class 
legislation, the proposed single standard takes seriously the requirement 
that a legitimate government interest actually explain why a group has been 
singled out from among all others for the classification’s burden, even 
while deferring, as a general matter, to the government’s need to classify. 
The representation-regarding theory, most prominently advanced by 
John Hart Ely, shifts focus away from the legislature’s specific actions on 
behalf of particular interest groups to the legislative process itself.303  This 
argument contends that inequalities result when a group’s opportunity to 
participate in the political process is improperly barred or impeded in some 
fashion.304  In such cases, legislation hostile toward the marginalized class 
can be promoted and passed without significant, effective opposition.305  
Ely has contended that where this type of process “failure” occurs, close 
scrutiny of legislative classifications affecting that class is necessary to 
ensure that the failure does not result in biased lawmaking.306  In other 
words, the equal protection guarantee requires that “courts should protect 
those who can’t protect themselves politically.”307 
This argument also embraces the concept that certain classifications be 
treated as suspect and others not; its critical focus aims instead at refining 
the jurisprudence related to each category.  With respect to suspect 
classification, for example, Ely commented that “one set of classifications 
we should treat as suspicious are those that disadvantage groups we know 
to be the object of widespread vilification, groups we know others 
(specifically those who control the legislative process) might wish to 
injure.”308 
 
 302. Like Sunstein’s anticaste equality theory, which is concerned with legislatures systematically 
disadvantaging groups of individuals who share “highly visible and morally irrelevant differences” 
from the dominant class, the proposed standard shares a significant commitment to eradicating class-
based prejudice.  See Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2411 (1994).  
Yet the proposed theory diverges from the anticaste principle in expressing concern not just with actual 
caste-like treatment of groups, but also with more limited distinctions between groups for generalized, 
noncontext-specific reasons. 
 303. See ELY, supra note 13, at 157–58. 
 304. See id. at 152–53. 
 305. See id. 
 306. See id. at 152–53, 157. 
 307. Id. at 152. 
 308. Id. at 153. 
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As discussed at length above, the proposed test, unlike the 
representation-regarding theory, does not treat distinct levels of heightened 
scrutiny as essential to check against the importation of bias or arbitrariness 
into law.  Nor does it look to inequities in representation as clues to 
violations.  Yet the two are, in many ways, interrelated.  Legislative 
burdens are far more likely to be imposed on classes that are marginalized 
in the political process simply because well-represented classes, and classes 
able to gain allies, can advocate successfully against being unduly 
burdened.  Politically vulnerable classes, on the other hand, become 
saddled with burdens not related to their common trait’s relevance to the 
legislative context, but to their lack of political power.  Indeed, it is 
inequities in representation that lay the groundwork for class legislation in 
the first place.309  Put another way, an improper process is unlikely to 
produce legislation that can satisfy the proposed standard’s dual insistence 
on nonarbitrariness and absence of bias.310 
Gunther’s advocacy for consistent “bite” in rational basis review 
follows yet a different approach, pressing for more serious, less deferential 
review even at the lowest level of the three tiers.311  His “intensified means 
scrutiny,”312 for example, proposes that “the Court take seriously a 
constitutional requirement that has never been formally abandoned: that 
legislative means must substantially further legislative ends.”313  While 
pressing the Court to narrow the “wide gap” between minimal and strict 
scrutiny,314 Gunther did not, however, support “abandoning the strict,” and 
specifically reinforced that his “expanded reasonable means inquiry would 
not mean the end of strict scrutiny.”315  To realize this goal of regular, 
meaningful rationality review, Gunther proposed that the Court should no 
longer hypothesize government interests for classifications; instead, it 
 
 309. For a discussion of class legislation, see supra notes 193–96 and accompanying text. 
 310. As the Court itself has recognized, only absent “some reason to infer antipathy” can we 
assume that “improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process.”  Vance v. 
Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (footnote omitted).  In other words, a malfunctioning democratic 
process of the sort Ely feared would tend to produce classifying legislation benefiting the dominant 
class without regard to whether a meaningful, legitimate basis existed on which to burden that class’s 
socially vulnerable counterparts.  See ELY, supra note 13, at 152–79. 
 311. See Gunther, supra note 17, at 20–24. 
 312. Id. at 24. 
 313. Id. at 20. 
 314. Id. at 24.  Under Gunther’s model, “the Court would continue to demand that the means be 
more than reasonable,” although Gunther suggested that strict scrutiny had likely reached the limits of 
its applicability.  Id. (“The Burger Court is not likely to expand the list of such interests and 
classifications significantly.”). 
 315. Id. 
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should leave it to government to identify interests that classifying 
legislation might serve.316 
The standard proposed here similarly seeks to achieve meaningful 
review of all classifications, including those traditionally assigned the 
weakest version of scrutiny, while encouraging appropriate legislative 
deference.317  The proposed test, however, does not adopt Gunther’s 
suggested ban on judicial hypothesizing of justifications for classifying 
legislation.  This is not because the concept of the bar on judges conceiving 
justifications for challenged laws lacks merit.  To the contrary, the bar 
could reinforce separation-of-powers ideals given the awkwardness of the 
judiciary conceiving justifications for legislation it is asked to invalidate.  
But the very nature of our political process, with legislative enactments 
frequently bearing little relation to input from constituents received by 
elected representatives, makes the entire process unsusceptible to accurate 
discernment of genuine legislative interests.318  Further still, the political 
trading and compromise at the center of the political process make it 
unlikely at best that legislators themselves could regularly and honestly 
articulate their specific interests in enacting classifying legislation.319 
Beyond these points of coherence and difference with existing 
theories, the basic question remains whether the proposed standard 
provides for any meaningful limits on the power of an unelected judiciary 
to review popularly approved legislation.320  The standard, after all, does 
 
 316. Id. at 46–47.  Gunther’s “relatively vigorous scrutiny” would contrast with the “extreme 
deference” of the Warren era by having “the Court assess the means in terms of legislative purposes that 
have substantial basis in actuality, not merely in conjecture.”  Id. at 21. 
The model asks that the Court assess the rationality of the means in terms of the state’s 
purposes, rather than hypothesizing conceivable justifications on its own initiative. . . . If the 
Court were to require an articulation of purpose from an authoritative state source, rather than 
hypothesizing one on its own, there would at least be indirect pressure on the legislature to 
state its own reasons for selecting particular means and classifications. 
Id. at 46–47. 
 317. See id. at 24.  Gunther, however, specifically accepted the inevitability of multiple review 
standards.  See id. (“[R]easonable means inquiry would not mean the end of strict scrutiny.  In the 
context of fundamental interests or suspect classifications, the Court would continue to demand that the 
means be more than reasonable—e.g., that they be ‘necessary,’ or the ‘least restrictive’ ones.”). 
 318. See supra note 235 and accompanying text (discussing the debate regarding post hoc 
justifications).  See also Archibald Cox, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review, 94 
HARV. L. REV. 700, 712–13 (1981) (book review) (same). 
 319. Further, Ely’s concern with judicial hypothesizing may present a greater worry in theory than 
in practice.  In applying rational basis review, the Court generally has not been willing to conceive 
additional justifications or otherwise sustain a classification after finding that any of the justifications 
offered were either too attenuated or illegitimate.  See supra note 235 (discussing the Court’s reasoning 
in three such cases). 
 320. Regardless of the underlying theory, the Court historically has had little difficulty reviewing 
and invalidating both legislative and popularly initiated enactments, notwithstanding the 
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not constrain the unelected judiciary to a mechanistic, predictable review.  
Instead, it calls for judgments about the plausibility and specificity of, and 
incorporation of bias or stereotyping into, proposed explanations for a 
classification. 
The single standard’s acceptance of the exercise of 
countermajoritarian judicial power can be defended in two ways: as 
necessary to popular sovereignty, and as providing a stronger constraint on 
judges’ passion choices than the current tiered structure.  With respect to 
popular sovereignty, judicial intervention ensures at least the rudimentary 
equal treatment of similarly situated classes that is necessary whether one 
believes that equal citizenship is an essential precondition to healthy 
governance321 or that a political system must offer equal treatment and 
opportunity for the mercenary purpose of maintaining legitimacy with its 
constituency.322 
The single standard’s demand for a context-specific justification 
would serve this legitimizing function both by invalidating broad 
exclusions of social groups that would directly cast doubt on a 
government’s integrity and by striking down classifications that could be 
the seedbed for generalized trait-based differential treatment, such as the 
noncontext-specific justification for distinguishing between long- and 
short-term residents in Zobel.  Similarly, the standard’s insistence on a 
plausible, nonarbitrary and nonbiased justification for government action 
would protect against unwarranted exclusions of vulnerable groups from 
full civic and economic participation in a way that could negatively affect a 
 
countermajoritarian difficulty.  See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601–02 (2000) 
(striking down portions of the Violence Against Women Act, which was enacted by Congress); Romer 
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623–24, 635 (1996) (finding a statewide voter referendum unconstitutional 
because it classified lesbians and gay men so as to “make them unequal to everyone else”); Washington 
v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 483, 487 (1982) (voiding an initiative that sought to 
circumvent school desegregation); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 718–
19, 739 (1964) (striking down a statewide voter referendum regarding a congressional reapportionment 
scheme that resulted in certain populations having unequal political representation).  See generally 
BICKEL, supra note 12 (discussing the role and propriety of judicial review). 
 321. As used here, citizenship refers to the opportunity to participate fully in a society’s political 
and social life; it does not refer to legal citizenship.  The proposed theory, at a minimum, would require 
the absence of a fixed group of “secondary citizens.”  See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 (“A State 
cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws.”); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.14 (1982) 
(“Legislation imposing special disabilities upon groups disfavored by virtue of circumstances beyond 
their control suggests the kind of ‘class or caste’ treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment was 
designed to abolish.”). 
 322. See Abner S. Greene, The Irreducible Constitution, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 293, 295 
(1996) (elaborating on the different views of “rights-foundationalists” and Democrats with respect to 
the legitimacy of the American constitutional order). 
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government’s credibility.  In this regard, the proposed standard’s scope of 
judicial oversight simply ensures the minimal protection necessary for a 
legitimate, functional popular sovereignty. 
Indeed, the proposed standard’s disinterest in the politics behind 
legislative action, absent a showing of bias, guards against undue 
invasiveness by the judiciary.323  For example, although political 
preferences for particular groups might have prompted the residency-based 
restrictions in Zobel and the optician’s restrictions in Lee Optical, the two 
cases have fundamentally different equal protection implications with 
respect to the countermajoritarian exercise of judicial power.  It is not 
difficult to imagine the power of the optometrists’ lobby in Lee Optical.  It 
is also possible that in Zobel, even short-term Alaska residents might have 
favored the length-of-residency distribution system in a strictly political 
effort to curry favor for some other purpose.  Yet, under the proposed 
standard, the Alaska restriction would warrant judicial intervention while 
the Lee Optical restriction might not—not because Alaska put into law the 
runaway private preferences of long-term residents, but because it had the 
underlying potential to support pervasive residency-based distinctions that 
could, in turn, either incapacitate the democratic process or at least 
undermine its legitimacy. 
Beyond limiting incursions into government action to those 
implicating popular sovereignty theories, the proposed standard also 
imposes significant limits on the passion choices typically involved in 
judicial review.  Although no test can completely remove the possibility of 
judges’ personal preferences shaping their evaluations of challenged 
measures, the proposed standard seeks to force those preferences into the 
open by requiring that specific explanations for a classification be 
discussed explicitly.  The preferences and passion choices, formerly 
cloaked in the garb of “deference to the legislature,” must be disclosed and 
explained.  To the extent that this increased exposure encourages more 
careful contextual reasoning, the single standard presents a potentially 
powerful constraint or, at a minimum, a sharply focused lens through which 
others can evaluate and critique a court’s analysis. 
 
 323. The proposed standard could be said to allow intervention in spite of, rather than because of, 
popular support for a measure.  Cf. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 267, 279–81 (1979) 
(upholding a veterans’ preference on the rationale that the law was enacted in spite of, rather than 
because of, its negative effect on women’s employment opportunities). 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
GOLD14.DOC 4/2/2004  6:20 PM 
558 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:481 
 
V.  APPLYING AND ASSESSING THE PROPOSED SINGLE 
STANDARD 
Building on the groundwork laid above, this part will apply the 
proposed standard to equal protection case law to assess the standard’s 
viability.  One obvious question for this assessment is whether applying the 
single standard would so enhance the rigor of review as to require 
sweeping invalidations of rational basis classifications traditionally deemed 
to be constitutional.  Another question is whether the standard would so 
weaken judicial review of traditionally suspect and quasi-suspect 
classifications as to allow historically invalid classifications to stand.  And 
finally, assuming that the outcome, if not the precise analysis, of most 
equal protection cases would remain static, what value does the test bring 
as a new analytic tool? 
To address these questions, this part will examine existing equal 
protection jurisprudence, applying the standard first to a selection of 
rational basis cases and then to a set of intermediate and strict scrutiny 
decisions.  As the applications will demonstrate, the proposed test does not 
dramatically alter the outcomes of many cases, although it would revamp 
the analyses used and cause shifts where the Court, in the name of 
deference, did not carefully review classifications that, on closer look, 
would be impermissible.  This result should not be surprising because the 
test encompasses elements already contained in rational basis review and 
heightened scrutiny.  However, the proposed test’s context sensitivity 
would have an effect on a particular subset of equal protection cases: those 
dealing with classifications created for remedial purposes. 
The test would have the additional effect, identified above in Part IV, 
of forcing into the open, and possibly thereby constraining, judicial passion 
choices that are now easily masked by reference either to the deferential 
demands of rational basis review or the rigorous demands of strict 
scrutiny.324  With its emphasis on a context-sensitive evaluation of all 
classifications, the proposed standard’s attempt to cut a path between the 
heavy deference and close oversight currently practiced in the name of 
equal protection review offers some hope of escaping the extant 
mechanistic traps.  Through its unified application to all classifications, the 
proposed standard also may realize equal protection’s aim to screen out not 
 
 324. Again, of course, the effectiveness of any doctrinal test in constraining judicial passion 
choices depends on the willingness and ability of decisionmakers to work with the test instead of 
against it.  No approach allowing any room for judgment can absolutely prevent a judge from 
disregarding the constraint and following his or her ideological agenda. 
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only those classifications that impose wholesale disadvantage on a group, 
but also those less shocking measures, like Alaska’s in Zobel, that quietly 
disadvantage a class of people in a way that has the potential to give rise to 
secondary citizenship categories. 
A.  THE RATIONAL BASIS CASES REVISITED UNDER THE SINGLE 
STANDARD 
Because the vast majority of rational basis cases sustain the 
classification that is challenged, the pool of cases against which to test 
whether the proposed standard will lead to increased judicial intervention is 
large.  Although this Article will not attempt to reconsider all of these 
cases, a few of the most deferential will be reviewed here.  The single 
standard’s application to the classifications at issue demonstrates that the 
proposal contains sufficient checks to allow for meaningful review, yet 
remains in balance with the Court’s deferential stance regarding legislative 
action. 
The most frequently cited of the weak rational basis cases, Lee 
Optical, provides a good starting point for the proposed standard’s 
evaluation.325  In Lee Optical, the Court upheld against equal protection 
and due process challenges an Oklahoma statute that effectively prohibited 
opticians from fitting and adjusting eyeglass lenses without a prescription 
from a licensed ophthalmologist or optometrist.326  The opinion contains no 
references to articulated state interests; the Court simply hypothesized that 
the occasional need for prescriptions related to fittings of glasses or lens 
duplication “was sufficient to justify” the distinction between opticians and 
other eye care specialists.327 
How would this differential treatment of opticians fare under the 
proposed single standard?  The initial inquiry would be intracontextual: 
 
 325. See Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 40, at 1713 (describing Lee Optical as “the 
most familiar example” of rational basis review). 
 326. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 484–85, 491 (1955).  Lee Optical is 
perhaps not the ideal example of a deferential case because its deferential posture grew explicitly out of 
the shadow of Lochner.  See id. at 488 (“The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial 
conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of 
thought.”) (citation to numerous post-Lochner decisions omitted).  Still, the case merits consideration 
here because the Court regularly relies on Lee Optical’s deferential formulation.  See, e.g., Romer, 517 
U.S. at 632; FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 316 (1993); Vance v. Bradley, 440 
U.S. 93, 111 (1979); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 
U.S. 471, 484 (1970). 
 327. See Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. at 487. 
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whether the government interest can, with sufficient specificity, explain 
why opticians are singled out for the limitations imposed from among the 
set of professionals who work with eye wear.328  The explanation accepted 
by the Court—that the expertise of an ophthalmologist or optometrist is 
required sufficiently often to ensure proper preparation and adjustment of 
eyeglasses—does explain the singling out of opticians in this context, as 
opticians have different and relatively less relevant specialized training 
than the other eyesight professionals identified in the statute.329  Further, 
the training-related justification is not overly broad in a manner that would 
justify a generalized or across-the-board burdensome classification of 
opticians per the extracontextual inquiry.  Absent an indication that bias, 
archaic stereotypes, or hostility motivated the classification,330 the result 
under the new analysis, consistent with the result of the actual case, would 
be to uphold Oklahoma’s classification no matter how “unwise, 
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.”331  
Thus, the single standard’s insistence on meaningful review would not 
require the invalidation of a legislative distinction that did not amount to 
class legislation, even if the distinction largely served economic interests 
advanced by a particular influential sector of a community. 
Dandridge v. Williams presents a more challenging case from 
humanitarian and theoretical standpoints.332  The regulation at issue capped 
welfare benefits provided through the Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children program so that families with many children received the same 
grant as families with few children, leaving children in large families 
foreclosed from resources even though they fell below the “standard of 
need” established by the state.333  With respect to government goals, the 
Court found that the state’s “interest in encouraging employment and in 
avoiding discrimination between welfare families and the families of the 
 
 328. Although the statute formally distinguished ophthalmologists and optometrists from all 
others, in operation, the classification imposed its burden on opticians, who were the only other 
professional group licensed to deal with eye wear. 
 329. See Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. at 487. 
 330. It is possible that through the bias inquiry the plaintiffs in Lee Optical could have 
demonstrated that although the rationale was plausible as a formal, logical matter, the gross 
overinclusiveness of the classification strained the rationale’s credibility and suggested that the 
legislature had acted with an improper purpose.  However, the Supreme Court did not identify as 
significant any record evidence on this point.  See id. at 489 (“For all this record shows, the ready-to-
wear branch of this business may not loom large in Oklahoma or may present problems of regulation 
distinct from the other branch.”). 
 331. See id. at 488 (citation omitted). 
 332. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). 
 333. Id. at 473–75. 
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working poor” justified the cap on grants.334  Elaborating, the Court 
explained that 
[b]y combining a limit on the recipient’s grant with permission to retain 
money earned, without reduction in the amount of the grant, Maryland 
provides an incentive to seek gainful employment.  And by keying the 
maximum family AFDC grants to the minimum wage a steadily 
employed head of a household receives, the State maintains some 
semblance of an equitable balance between families on welfare and those 
supported by an employed breadwinner.335 
Although the Court upheld the regulation, it explicitly reserved 
judgment regarding the law’s wisdom and humanity.336  Stressing that the 
legislature rather than the judiciary is best suited to resolve challenging 
societal problems,337 the Court appeared to distance itself from the 
consequences of its ruling.  Over a vigorous dissent by Justice Marshall, 
the classification was permitted to stand.338 
As with Lee Optical, the analysis under the proposed standard would 
turn on whether a plausible, context-specific, and nonbiased explanation 
existed for Maryland’s distinction in treatment of small families, which 
would receive funding to the full extent of their “standard of need,” and 
large families, which would not.  Instead of considering whether the grant 
limitation provided an incentive to seek gainful employment, the critical 
question would be whether the goal of encouraging employment could 
explain the different funding for small and large families.  And with respect 
to the equitable balance argument, the proposed standard would again seek 
to determine whether that goal could plausibly explain the statutory 
distinction. 
Viewed in this light, the state’s justifications would face greater 
difficulty.  As Justice Marshall focused the question, 
Persons who are concededly similarly situated (dependent children and 
their families), are not afforded equal, or even approximately equal, 
treatment under the maximum grant regulation.  Subsistence benefits are 
 
 334. Id. at 486.  The Court appeared to accept Maryland’s contention that neither bias nor animus 
motivated the classification.  See id. at 483 (“Maryland says that its maximum grant regulation is 
wholly free of any invidiously discriminatory purpose or effect . . . .”). 
 335. Id. at 486 (footnote omitted). 
 336. Id. at 487 (“We do not decide today that the Maryland regulation is wise, that it best fulfills 
the relevant social and economic objectives that Maryland might ideally espouse, or that a more just and 
humane system could not be devised.”). 
 337. See id. (“But the intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems presented by 
public welfare assistance programs are not the business of this Court.”). 
 338. See id.; id. at 508–30 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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paid with respect to some needy dependent children; nothing is paid with 
respect to others.  Some needy families receive full subsistence 
assistance as calculated by the State; the assistance paid to other families 
is grossly below their similarly calculated needs.339 
Notwithstanding Justice Marshall’s sharp picture of the classification, 
a majority of the Court accepted two nonresponsive justifications.340  The 
first of the accepted regulatory rationales—providing welfare recipients 
with an incentive to seek gainful employment—may well be an important 
government interest.341  However, it does not explain why families with 
several children would be so encouraged but families with fewer children 
would not.  Without a rational basis test insistent on identification of a 
government interest that could explain why one group is being treated 
differently from another, the Court failed to see, or at least to be troubled 
by, the lack of connection between the justifications and the classification 
itself.342  After all, the general goals of encouraging employment among 
unemployed heads of household and maintaining balance between the 
income of those receiving public assistance and those in the workforce do 
not explain why some families receive funds below their standard of need 
and others do not.  Regardless of how laudable, this interest does not 
explain the line drawn by the state, as equal protection requires. 
The state’s other justification—creating some parity between those 
employed and those receiving public assistance—may be similarly flawed, 
though the analysis is somewhat more complex.  Parity describes what the 
 
 339. Id. at 518 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 340. See id. at 486–87. 
 341. Id. at 486. 
 342. Perhaps if the case were relitigated, the state might identify distinctions between large and 
small families that would be meaningful in the context of public assistance and related legitimate state 
interests.  One of the difficulties for the state is that the regulation was apparently conceived in an effort 
to save funds.  See id. at 529 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[I]n the early stages of this litigation the State 
virtually conceded that it set out to limit the total cost of the program along the path of least 
resistance.”).  Although governments can certainly engage in line drawing in an effort to save funds, 
conservation of resources is rarely sufficient, on its own, to explain why government may burden one 
group rather than another.  See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 506 (1999) (recognizing cost savings 
as a legitimate government interest, but not as a sufficient explanation for the infringement of rights); 
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375 (1971) (“The saving of welfare costs cannot justify an 
otherwise invidious classification.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 
394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969) (recognizing a valid state interest in fiscal integrity, but specifying that a state 
cannot preserve resources “by invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens”)). 
Alternatively, a distinction between large and small families in a government-sponsored program 
to provide support for dependent children simply may be the sort of class legislation that the Equal 
Protection Clause cannot tolerate, because no sufficiently specific and plausible justification can explain 
the different treatment. 
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benefits cap achieved; it is not a statement of a government goal.  In other 
words, the government achieved parity by roughly equalizing minimum 
wage earnings with the public assistance cap.  The relevant equal 
protection question, however, concerns not what the government achieved, 
but the reason why the government chose to achieve parity in a way that 
burdened large families.  An answer might be that the purpose of limiting 
benefits to the point of parity with minimum wage earnings is to discourage 
families from relying on benefits and encourage them to find employment.  
(If paid employment provides a greater level of support than public 
assistance, benefits recipients will presumably attempt to find work.)  
When the actual justification is disentangled from the parity description, it 
brings the analysis back to the flaw already identified: that the 
encouragement of employment does not explain why large families are 
singled out.  Although traditional rational basis analysis, properly applied, 
should recognize the inadequacy of this justification, the tendency toward 
deferential embrace of government interests sometimes results in this type 
of imprecise analysis. 
Returning from Dandridge to a more recent, and more typical, 
business classification, the Court’s decision in FCC v. Beach 
Communications, Inc. illustrates that in the ordinary business regulation 
case subjected to rational basis review,343 the proposed standard would not 
likely alter the outcome, even if it reshaped the analysis.344  At issue in 
Beach Communications was the constitutionality of a regulation 
distinguishing between cable television systems that serve buildings under 
separate ownership and management, and those that serve buildings under 
common ownership and management.345 
Here, the Court’s analysis actually paralleled the analysis that would 
be required under the single standard.346  In evaluating the classification, 
the Court considered potential explanations for the difference in treatment 
that had been developed from a regulatory efficiency model.  The model 
maintained that commonly owned and managed buildings would likely be 
more limited in size, and that their residents would be more likely to 
negotiate effectively through the common management than residents of 
separately owned buildings, thereby avoiding situations in which operators 
monopolize control over access to cable television.347  In this case, unlike 
 
 343. See FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993). 
 344. Cf. id. 
 345. Id. at 309. 
 346. See id. at 313–20. 
 347. Id. at 318–20. 
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Dandridge, the Court’s inquiry focused on the potential legitimate 
explanations for the classification that related directly to the differences 
between commonly and separately owned buildings.348  By ensuring that 
the Federal Communications Commission could distinguish meaningfully 
between different types of cable operations to serve a plausible, context-
specific goal, the Court applied essentially the same analysis that the single 
standard would require.349  Moreover, analysis under the single standard 
similarly would proceed noninvasively, respectful of the deference value 
touted so highly by the Court in that case.350 
These applications help make apparent that in the majority of equal 
protection cases involving distinctions that affect business operations, 
courts are already engaged in exploring whether the challenged differential 
treatment can be explained plausibly in context.  Even where the discussion 
is less than precise and the decision is awash in the language of deference, 
the core equal protection analysis remains focused on the classification, 
which is likewise the focus of the proposed standard. 
Still, the structure of the proposed standard helps ensure that courts 
consider whether a meaningful connection exists between governments’ 
interests and actions, which the extant standard—with its prioritization of 
deference—sometimes elides.  At the same time, in reinforcing judicial 
focus on the actual distinction being challenged, the single standard avoids 
taking on the trappings of heightened scrutiny that would render it unduly 
invasive and nearly impossible to satisfy. 
At the same time, the test cannot provide sure answers to how courts 
will resolve the often fierce debate regarding whether a trait bears a 
sufficiently plausible relationship to a regulatory context to justify the 
differential treatment at issue.  So, for example, this test will not magically 
bring unanimity to a court seeking to decide whether a state may maintain 
separate civil commitment rules for people with mental retardation and 
people with mental illness,351 or even whether a health-related concern 
plausibly explains banning opticians from replacing lenses without a 
prescription.352 
 
 348. Compare Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 518 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting 
that similarly situated people were being treated differently), with Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 
312, 316–20 (sustaining different rules because of differences between the regulated entities). 
 349. See Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 316–20. 
 350. See id. at 313–16. 
 351. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 333–34 (1993). 
 352. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955). 
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art2
GOLD14.DOC 4/2/2004  6:20 PM 
2004] EQUALITY WITHOUT TIERS 565 
 
This inability to provide a high level of predictability to courts 
engaged in review of legislative classifications need not be considered a 
fatal flaw.  To the extent that courts exercise judgment about the 
reasonableness of legislative distinctions, no test could lead judges in 
lockstep to the same conclusion.353  What distinguishes the proposed test 
from the current approach to rational basis review, as discussed above, is 
not an ability to remove all differences in judgment.  Instead, it is the 
pressure that the proposed test places on courts to reveal their reasoning, 
rather than hiding these judgment calls behind the language of deference. 
B.  THE SINGLE STANDARD AND THE HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY CASES 
Application of the single standard to the heightened scrutiny cases 
presents somewhat different risks than application in the rational basis 
context.  Because the test shifts away from the demanding requirement that 
compelling and important government interests be narrowly tailored or 
substantially related to a classification, its application might be expected to 
result in increased doctrinal turmoil.  As the discussion below reveals, 
however, the test’s incorporation of core concerns from the most rigorous 
levels of review leaves the doctrine largely where it began, with most, but 
not all, traditionally suspect and quasi-suspect classifications being 
invalidated.  Still, the new test provides sharper focus to some of the 
analyses by facing directly the bottom-line equal protection question: 
whether plausible, context-specific, and nonbiased justifications ever exist 
for these distinctions. 
As with the rational basis cases, far too many heightened review cases 
exist to test the single standard against all of them.  The discussion below, 
therefore, engages with a select set of significant cases involving 
classifications based on race, alienage, sex, and nonmarital parentage in an 
effort to examine the proposed standard in context.  After reviewing this 
central group of cases, the section will close with consideration of cases 
assessing programs involving the remedial use of race-based 
classifications.  As the discussion will illustrate, the proposed single 
standard may provide a way out of the thorny analytic arena the Court has 
created in its efforts to consider these programs through its suspect 
classification framework.354 
 
 353. See generally Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, 
Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1274–75, 1279 
(2001) (observing the trend toward regular dissent on the Court). 
 354. Of course, strict scrutiny of affirmative action plans is not necessarily required by the equal 
protection framework, as demonstrated by the Court’s own evolution in thinking about the appropriate 
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One of the first race discrimination cases to engage in an extended 
discussion of the differences between strict scrutiny and ordinary rational 
basis review is McLaughlin v. Florida, which invalidated a statute 
providing criminal penalties for interracial couples who “habitually live in 
and occupy in the nighttime the same room.”355  Emphasizing that racial 
classifications “bear a far heavier burden of justification”356 than other 
classifications and must be “necessary, and not merely rationally related, to 
the accomplishment of a permissible state policy,”357 the Court found that 
the state had failed to show that the statutory classification was necessary 
for any purpose, including as an “adjunct to the State’s ban on interracial 
marriage.”358 
Review of the McLaughlin classification under the single standard 
would require a substantial shift in focus away from necessity and toward 
the simpler question of whether a plausible, context-specific, and nonbiased 
government interest could explain the different punitive treatment of 
interracial couples.  According to the state, the statute aimed “to prevent 
breaches of the basic concepts of sexual decency . . . [such as] illicit 
extramarital and premarital promiscuity.”359  The analysis, then, would turn 
on whether this goal can meaningfully explain why one set of cohabitants 
is subject to this rule and another is not based solely on race.  Because the 
goals of ensuring sexual decency and prohibiting promiscuity do not 
explain why the statute subjected interracial couples to punishment not 
imposed on intraracial couples engaged in the same activity,360 the statute 
 
standard of review.  See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 218–26 (1995) (reviewing 
the history of the Court’s varied approaches to race-based remedial classifications).  Instead, some have 
argued that the insistence on the highest level of review for remedial uses of characteristics such as race 
may reflect the Court’s manipulation of the existing tiered structure to serve ideological opposition to 
affirmative action.  See Rubenfeld, Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, supra note 12, at 1177 (“[T]he 
current Court’s constitutional case law has to be understood less in terms of its ostensible doctrinal 
reasoning, and more in terms of an underlying agenda . . . .”); Spann, supra note 13, at 92 (“Benign 
accounts of the Supreme Court’s motivation in adopting its Adarand opposition to affirmative action 
seem either disingenuous or unrealistic.”).  The unitary standard would not, by definition, share this 
susceptibility to misuse in the service of passion choices as the same inquiries are to be applied to any 
type of classification. 
 355. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 184 (1964) (quoting FLA. STAT. ch. 798.05 (repealed 
1969)). 
 356. Id. at 194. 
 357. Id. at 196 (citation omitted).  See also id. at 197 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“I agree with the 
Court that . . . necessity, not mere reasonable relationship, is the proper test.”). 
 358. Id. at 196.  The Court specified that it was not taking a position on the constitutionality of 
Florida’s miscegenation ban.  See id. 
 359. Id. at 193. 
 360. Id. at 196.  The demand for basic reasonableness, rather than necessity, is not unknown to 
strict scrutiny cases.  For example, in McLaughlin, even while highlighting strict scrutiny’s 
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would fall under the single standard just as it had under more rigorous 
review.361 
In Loving v. Virginia, the Court elaborated further the distinction 
between rational basis review and strict scrutiny,362 making Loving another 
solid test of whether the proposed standard would wreak doctrinal havoc.  
In Loving, the Court emphasized that unlike cases in which “the Court has 
merely asked whether there is any rational foundation for the 
discriminations, and has deferred to the wisdom of the state legislatures,”363 
in cases involving racial classification the Court imposes a “very heavy 
burden of justification.”364  Yet in considering the government’s “burden of 
justification,”365 the Court did not rely on the extra rigor of strict scrutiny 
and concluded, instead, that “[t]here is patently no legitimate overriding 
purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this 
classification.”366 
Under the proposed single standard, just as under the extant one, the 
core inquiry would be whether any legitimate government interest could 
explain why a state punished individuals who married interracially but not 
those who married intraracially.  The state had argued that “scientific 
evidence” supported the distinction.367  Under the single standard, the mere 
 
significance, the Court characterized its inquiry in terms used by both the proposed single standard and 
that of traditional rational basis review: “The courts must reach and determine the question whether the 
classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable in light of its purpose—in this case, whether there is an 
arbitrary or invidious discrimination between those classes covered by Florida’s cohabitation law and 
those excluded.”  Id. at 191. 
 361. See id. at 198 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I cannot conceive of a valid legislative purpose 
under our Constitution . . . which makes the color of a person’s skin the test of whether his conduct is a 
criminal offense.”).  The state separately argued that the statute was justified “because it is ancillary to 
and serves the same purpose as the miscegenation law itself.”  Id. at 195.  Because the Court did not 
address the purpose of the miscegenation law, it is not possible, based on the Court’s opinion, to 
analyze whether the set of reasons offered might justify the singling out of interracial cohabitants for 
punishment.  As the discussion below of Loving illustrates, however, the standard reasons that might be 
offered for such a law likewise do not survive review under the proposed standard.  See Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967). 
 362. Loving, 388 U.S. at 8, 11. 
 363. Id. at 9. 
 364. Id.  Virginia had attempted to defend the statutory classification by arguing that its equal 
application to white and African American spouses presented no equal protection problem—an 
argument that the Court soundly rejected.  Id. at 8. 
 365. Id. at 9. 
 366. Id. at 11. 
 367. See id. at 8.  With respect to the scientific evidence, the Virginia Supreme Court referenced 
social science texts provided by challengers of the law, not its defenders.  See also Loving v. 
Commonwealth, 147 S.E.2d 78, 82 (Va. 1966), rev’d sub nom. Loving, 388 U.S. at 1.  Therefore, the 
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offering of evidence would not translate to approval of the classification; 
instead, the question would be whether the evidence could plausibly, 
specifically, and legitimately explain the state’s line drawing based on race.  
Because, as was actually the case in Loving, both the evidence and the 
classification itself would easily be found to embody bias, the single 
standard would require invalidation of the Virginia law based on the bias 
inquiry alone.  As the Court concluded, Virginia’s targeted prohibition of 
“interracial marriages involving white persons demonstrate[d] that the 
racial classifications must stand on their own justification, as measures 
designed to maintain White Supremacy.”368 
In addition, however, the extracontextual inquiry would have doomed 
the classification, as the purported “proof” of African American inferiority 
used to justify the miscegenation ban could be invoked to support exactly 
the sort of class legislation that the Equal Protection Clause aimed to 
prevent.369  After all, a broad statement of a racial group’s inferiority would 
support official burdening of that group in contexts far beyond marriage. 
The single standard similarly reshapes the reasoning although not the 
outcome of a case challenging a classification based on alienage that, like 
the race-based cases above, emphasized the distinction between rational 
basis review and “close judicial scrutiny.”370  Applying strict scrutiny in 
Graham v. Richardson, the Court rejected statutes that imposed durational 
residency requirements on noncitizens, but not on U.S. citizens, for the 
receipt of public benefits.371  The Court held, in part, that concerns with 
fiscal integrity did not constitute a compelling government interest 
sufficient to justify the statutory discrimination at issue.372 
Because the single standard does not distinguish between intensities of 
government interest, the inquiry would be reframed to ask whether 
concerns with cost savings can explain the burdening of benefits recipients 
according to citizenship status.  Here, as in Zobel, Hooper,373 and other 
cases that addressed overly broad justifications,374 the fiscal integrity 
 
discussion contained in the text regarding evidence is based on supposition about the nature of evidence 
likely to have been submitted by Virginia in defense of its discriminatory statute. 
 368. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (footnote omitted). 
 369. Id. 
 370. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). 
 371. Id. at 376. 
 372. Id. at 374–75 (“The saving of welfare costs cannot justify an otherwise invidious 
classification.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 
(1969)). 
 373. Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 623 (1985). 
 374. See supra notes 244–54 and accompanying text. 
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defense would fail; not only is it not compelling under traditional strict 
scrutiny, but it is also too general and, therefore, insufficiently explanatory 
for purposes of the single standard. 
Specifically, the government interest in saving money does not 
explain why noncitizens are singled out from those in need of benefits.  
Further, cost savings, if permitted to stand here, lacks any limiting 
principle.  It easily could be relied on to justify across-the-board 
discrimination against noncitizens in a wide range of contexts far beyond 
the specific welfare programs at issue in Graham, effectively relegating 
noncitizens to permanent second-class status.375 
Applying the proposed standard to intermediate scrutiny cases gives 
rise to a pattern similar to the one that emerges in reanalyzing the strict 
scrutiny cases.  Some analytic shifts occur, but minimal destabilization of 
outcomes takes place.  Particularly because sex-based and illegitimacy-
based classifications were, for many years, assessed under rational basis 
review prior to being deemed quasi-suspect,376 this stasis is not surprising. 
Consider, for example, United States v. Virginia, in which the Court 
struck down the ban on matriculation of women students to the Virginia 
Military Institute (“VMI”).377  The Court framed its review as requiring an 
“exceedingly persuasive justification” for government distinctions based on 
sex.378  While recognizing that “[t]he heightened review standard . . . does 
 
 375. Much has been written on the range of ways in which noncitizens are consistently the subject 
of discriminatory and unequal treatment, notwithstanding the promises of equal protection.  See 
generally Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference That Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1047 (1994) (surveying and analyzing a wide range of exclusionary measures targeted at 
immigrants); Kevin R. Johnson, The End of “Civil Rights” as We Know It?: Immigration and Civil 
Rights in the New Millennium, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1481 (2002) (addressing the historical and current 
manifestations of bias toward immigrants).  The question here, in the context of the single standard’s 
application to Graham, is whether an interest in cost savings can ever provide a permissible basis for 
this differential treatment. 
 376. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 763, 766, 776 (1977) (striking down the Illinois 
Probate Act as lacking a rational purpose for an inheritance benefits scheme that differentiated based on 
parents’ marital status); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175–76 (1972) (using rational 
basis review to invalidate a workmen’s compensation statute that denied the same recovery rights to 
unacknowledged nonmarital children as were provided to other children); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 
76–77 (1971) (voiding a fixed preference for men as estate administrators because no “rational 
relationship to a state objective” existed); Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75–76 
(1968), reh’g denied, 393 U.S. 898 (1967) (finding no rational justification for the restriction of a 
parent’s right to bring a wrongful death action for the death of a child if the child’s parents were 
unmarried); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71–72 (1968) (identifying no rational justification for the 
restriction of a child’s right to bring a wrongful death action if the child’s parents were unmarried). 
 377. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 558 (1996). 
 378. Id. at 531 (internal quotation marks omitted).  In Nguyen, the Court stressed that the use of 
the exceedingly persuasive justification requirement in Virginia had not altered the traditional 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
GOLD14.DOC 4/2/2004  6:20 PM 
570 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:481 
 
not make sex a proscribed classification,”379 the Court added that 
recognition of differences between the sexes may not be treated as cause 
“for denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial constraints on 
an individual’s opportunity.”380 
Virginia had advanced two justifications for its policy: first, “single-
sex education provides important educational benefits, and the option of 
single-sex education contributes to diversity in educational approaches,” 
and second, VMI’s “adversative approach [to education] would have to be 
modified were VMI to admit women.”381  The Court rejected each 
justification, finding that “[n]either recent nor distant history bears out 
Virginia’s alleged pursuit of diversity through single-sex educational 
options,”382 and that the concern about changing the adversative training 
program rested on overbroad generalizations about women’s physical 
abilities and learning styles.383 
Under the proposed standard, the analysis would proceed differently 
because the standard does not share the Court’s near presumption that sex-
based classifications are invalid.384  Instead, review would focus on the 
connection between the sex-based distinction and the government’s alleged 
goals.  Taking first the concern with diversity in educational approaches, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence tracks the way analysis under the 
single standard would assess the connection between the classification and 
 
intermediate review standard.  See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 70–72 (2001).  See also Virginia, 518 
U.S. at 531, 533, 535, 545–46, 556.  In fact, that characterization of the standard had been invoked in 
several earlier cases addressing sex-based classifications.  See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 136, 
141 n.12 (1994); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724, 731 (1982); Kirchberg v. 
Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981); Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979). 
 379. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533. 
 380. Id.  The Court added, 
Sex classifications may be used to compensate women for particular economic disabilities 
[they have] suffered, to promot[e] equal employment opportunity, to advance full 
development of the talent and capacities of our Nation’s people.  But such classifications may 
not be used, as they once were, to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic 
inferiority of women. 
Id. at 533–34 (citations, footnote, and internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original) 
(quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977) (per curiam) and Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n 
v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987)). 
 381. Id. at 535 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the Brief for Cross-
Petitioners). 
 382. Id. at 536.  See also id. at 539 (“[W]e find no persuasive evidence in this record that VMI’s 
male-only admission policy is in furtherance of a state policy of diversity.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting the court of appeals decision, United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 899 (4th Cir. 
1992)). 
 383. See id. at 541–45. 
 384. See id. at 531. 
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the government’s goals in context.385  As Chief Justice Rehnquist 
explained, “The difficulty with [Virginia’s] position is that the diversity 
benefited only one sex; there was single-sex public education available for 
men at VMI, but no corresponding single-sex public education available for 
women.”386  In other words, regardless of the type of review applied, the 
diversity goal could not meaningfully explain why the state had accorded 
greater educational opportunities to men than to women. 
The state’s second justification presents a more interesting challenge.  
Here, Virginia argued that the adversative training program was unsuitable 
for women because women and men have “important differences . . . in 
learning and developmental needs, [as well as] psychological and 
sociological differences [that are] real and not stereotypes.”387  Virginia 
maintained that accommodating these differences would require so 
dramatic a transformation of VMI’s educational approach that the 
adversative training method would be destroyed.388  Under the single 
standard, the intracontextual inquiry would ask whether these justifications 
plausibly explained VMI’s categorical exclusion of women.  The 
extracontextual inquiry would assess whether the developmental, 
psychological, and sociological justifications had any specific connection 
to the admission bar, or whether they reflected mere generalizations that 
could be used to support widespread classification of women beyond that 
regulatory context.  And the bias inquiry would seek to determine whether 
the developmental differences proffered to support the sex-based 
admissions ban reflected hostility toward, or impermissible stereotyping of, 
women. 
In this case, the extracontextual inquiry proves most helpful in 
revealing the policy’s core flaws.  The generic developmental differences 
between men and women relied on here, even if plausible, do not support 
an absolute bar on women’s admission.  Further, they would, if accepted, 
support women’s exclusion not only from an institution like VMI, but also 
from a wide range of opportunities, both inside and outside educational 
environments.389  This is the sort of noncontext-specific justification that 
 
 385. See id. at 558–66 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 386. Id. at 562 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 387. Id. at 549 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the Brief for Respondents). 
 388. Id. at 540. 
 389. It was these sorts of general convictions regarding women’s demeanor and development that, 
in an earlier era, led the Supreme Court to uphold exclusions of women from full societal and economic 
participation.  See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 465–67 (1948) (upholding the denial of a 
bartender license to a female tavern owner and her daughter), disapproved by Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 
190, 210 (1976); Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) 
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could support broad legislation subjecting women to unfavorable sex-based 
rules, which would be precisely the sort of class legislation the Equal 
Protection Clause forbids.  Thus, even under a less ostensibly rigorous 
single standard, the exclusionary policy would fall.390 
In the context of distinctions based on parental marital status, the 
Court likewise has emphasized that intermediate scrutiny is critical to its 
analysis.  As close attention to the cases shows, however, the Court is 
fundamentally concerned with whether a legitimate connection exists 
between the classification and its context, consistent with the terms of the 
rational basis standard. 
In Clark v. Jeter, for example, the Court invalidated Pennsylvania’s 
six-year limitations period for paternity actions by nonmarital children who 
had not previously received support.391  Nonmarital children who had 
received support and marital children, whose paternity was presumed, were 
not similarly limited.392  The Court performed a two-step analysis, 
considering first whether the six-year period provided a “reasonable 
 
(approving the Court’s decision to uphold a sex-based denial of a license to practice law on the ground 
that “[t]he paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife 
and mother”). 
 390. If the intracontextual and extracontextual inquiries were satisfied, the single standard would 
also require examination of whether these justifications reflected bias or archaic stereotyping, contrary 
to Virginia’s contentions.  See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 549.  Here, the analysis would depend on the 
showings made by both parties.  In its opinion, the Court found that VMI’s admissions policy rested on 
unacceptable “generalizations about ‘the way women are,’ [and] estimates of what is appropriate for 
most women, [that] no longer justify denying opportunity to women whose talent and capacity place 
them outside the average description.”  Id. at 550 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Whether VMI’s policy would amount to undue stereotyping would be subject to debate under a 
single standard, just as it was between the majority and dissent under the stricter standard in place.  
Compare id. at 565–66 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“[T]he State should avoid assuming demand 
based on stereotypes; it must not assume a priori, without evidence, that there would be no interest in a 
women’s school of civil engineering, or in a men’s school of nursing.”), with id. at 566–67 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (criticizing the “smug assurances” the majority offered when “explicitly reject[ing] the 
finding that there existe[d] ‘gender-based developmental differences’ supporting Virginia’s restriction 
of the ‘adversative’ method to only a men’s institution”).  This same debate emerged under the tiered 
framework in Nguyen.  There, the majority urged that “[m]echanistic classification of all our differences 
as stereotypes would . . . obscure those misconceptions and prejudices that are real.”  Nguyen v. INS, 
533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001).  The dissent, in turn, maintained that even if empirically true, the 
generalizations regarding women and their relationship to childbirth could not support a sex-based 
distinction “when more accurate and impartial functional lines can be drawn.”  Id. at 73, 90 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted) (quoting Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 460 (1998) (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting)). 
 391. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 464–65 (1988).  Although Clark is the first case addressing 
discrimination against nonmarital children explicitly to apply intermediate scrutiny, the Court 
recharacterized its prior cases reviewing classifications burdening nonmarital children as having applied 
intermediate scrutiny as well.  See id. at 461.  See also supra note 226 and accompanying text. 
 392. Clark, 486 U.S. at 464–65. 
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opportunity” for seeking support, and then whether the “time limitation 
placed on that opportunity [was] substantially related to the State’s interest 
in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims.”393  Through this 
analysis, the Court found that “six years does not necessarily provide a 
reasonable opportunity to assert a claim on behalf of an illegitimate 
child.”394  The Court rested its ruling on the conclusion that the six-year 
limitations period was not “substantially related to Pennsylvania’s interest 
in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims.”395 
Proceeding under the single standard, the inquiry would shift to 
whether the asserted interest in preventing fraudulent and stale claims 
plausibly explained why nonmarital children seeking child support for the 
first time faced a six-years-from-date-of-birth limitations period not 
imposed on other children.  On the one hand, the distinction seems 
implausible because proof of paternity could be at issue in any support 
case, raising for all cases the same issues of fraudulent and stale claims.  
On the other hand, Pennsylvania could argue that a greater incentive might 
exist to file fraudulent claims in cases where parents were not married and 
no paternity presumption existed. 
If the Court found the distinction plausible, a further question would 
remain before judicial approval could be given under the single standard.  
Not only must the government’s goals plausibly relate to singling out 
nonmarital children for a different, more burdensome procedure, but they 
must also explain the selection of the particular burden imposed.  So, for 
example, a government might plausibly have different rules regarding 
driving for those who are sighted and those who are blind, because vision is 
important to driving.  But the government could not regulate based on that 
difference by tripling the price of a driver’s license for people who are 
blind.  Instead, the burden itself must be plausibly connected to the 
classification.  Here, though some limitations period might be reasonable to 
prevent fraudulent actions, a reviewing court could find the six-year 
statutory period implausible, especially in light of the parenting challenges 
associated with young children that would raise an unduly and 
impermissibly high barrier to a support suit.  That question, too, would 
 
 393. Id. at 462 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99–
100 (1982)). 
 394. Id. at 463. 
 395. Id. at 464. 
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remain a topic for debate, just as it was under a nominally higher 
standard.396 
As the discussion above illustrates, the shifts required by the proposed 
standard would have relatively little impact on outcomes, although the 
analysis might be more straightforward and consistent than under the tiers.  
There is one set of equal protection cases, however, that has troubled the 
Court for nearly a quarter century and that continues to plague suspect 
classification analysis: the affirmative action cases.  It is primarily with 
these cases that a shift not only in analysis but also in outcome would most 
likely occur.397 
Before testing the proposed standard by applying it to extant case law, 
we must consider the possibility that the risk of abandoning strict scrutiny 
in favor of a single standard is simply too great.  After all, the Court has 
suggested that the analytic shift would be devastating, pointing to the 
shame of Korematsu and insisting that “[a]ny retreat from the most 
searching judicial inquiry can only increase the risk of another such error 
occurring in the future.”398 
In committing to the most rigorous review standard for all racial 
classifications, regardless of whether the distinction burdened members of 
a majority or minority race, the Court characterized imposition of the most 
rigorous scrutiny as essential to screening out potentially illegitimate 
classifications: 
Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-
based measures, there is simply no way of determining what 
classifications are “benign” or “remedial” and what classifications are in 
fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial 
politics.  Indeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is to “smoke out” 
 
 396. Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the unanimous Court suggested that members of the Court 
had serious reservations about the reasonableness of that limited period given the myriad difficulties 
that might interfere with a parent’s pursuit of support on a child’s behalf.  See id. (“Not all . . . 
difficulties are likely to abate in six years.  A mother might realize only belatedly ‘a loss of income 
attributable to the need to care for the child.’  Furthermore, financial difficulties are likely to increase as 
the child matures and incurs expenses for clothing, school, and medical care.”) (citations omitted) 
(quoting Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 12 (1983)). 
 397. The redistricting cases would also present an opportunity for the Court to take a more 
contextualized view of race that would allow racial minorities to benefit from redistricting efforts.  For 
a discussion of redistricting cases, see supra note 114. 
 398. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995) (discussing the Court’s failure 
in Korematsu to reject the bias-infected classification at issue).  The Court also supported the need for 
strict scrutiny by highlighting its view that all racial classifications, including remedial measures, have 
potentially grave consequences for society.  See id. 
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illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing 
a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.399 
The majority’s embrace of this perspective resolved the question 
debated in a series of splintered opinions400 regarding whether remedial 
classifications might deserve more flexible consideration than strict 
scrutiny offered.401 
Under the single standard, as noted above, no requirement that racial 
classifications “serve a compelling governmental interest, and . . . be 
narrowly tailored to further that interest”402 would be imposed.  Instead, the 
central question would be whether a plausible, context-specific, and 
nonbiased explanation exists for distinguishing based on race in the context 
at issue.  If the reason for the line drawing were so general as to justify 
race-based distinctions outside the regulatory context, or if racial animus or 
stereotyping prompted the classification, the single standard would require 
the classification’s rejection. 
As shown above, however, the Court’s concern with the damage 
caused by racial classifications does not itself compel the use of extra-
rigorous review, as racial classifications were struck down for many years 
prior to the application of strict scrutiny.403  Indeed, the Court’s own 
language undermines its insistence that only strict scrutiny can capture 
invidious racial discrimination.  In Adarand, for example, the Court’s 
observation that “racial characteristics so seldom provide a relevant basis 
 
 399. Id. at 226 (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (O’Connor, J., 
plurality opinion)); Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2338 (2003) (same); Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 
S. Ct. 2411, 2427 (2003) (quoting J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 494).  Cf. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2445 
(Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (“Close review is needed ‘to ferret out classifications in reality malign, but 
masquerading as benign’ . . . .”) (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 275 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)). 
 400. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 218–21. 
 401. Id. at 223–26.  The Court also resolved that it would conduct equal protection review in this 
context in the same manner under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  Id. at 224.  Reflecting 
ongoing disagreement with respect to this standard, Justice Ginsburg commented that Grutter did “not 
require the Court to revisit whether all governmental classifications by race, whether designed to benefit 
or burden a historically disadvantaged group, should be subject to the same standard of judicial review.”  
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2348 n.* (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
 402. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 235. 
 403. See, e.g., Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 536–40 (1963) (using rational basis 
review to order the desegregation of city-owned or operated parks and recreational facilities); Brown v. 
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding, without reference to heightened review, that 
segregated public schools violated the equal protection guarantee).  Cf. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 
426 U.S. 88, 116–17 (1976) (striking down a civil service regulation that foreclosed resident aliens 
from civil service positions because no “acceptable rationalization” supported the law); Truax v. Raich, 
239 U.S. 33, 39 (1915) (invalidating Arizona’s Anti-Alien Labor Law as “repugnant” to the Equal 
Protection Clause). 
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for disparate treatment”404 embraces the basic rationality standard rather 
than the narrowly tailored requirement of strict scrutiny.  Further, the 
Court’s stated reason for requiring categorical application of strict scrutiny 
in every context was “to make sure that a governmental classification based 
on race . . . is legitimate,”405 which is, again, the language of rational basis 
review406 and not the “compelling interest” demand of strict scrutiny.407 
By grounding its analysis in the core concerns of rational basis review, 
the Court acknowledged, perhaps unintentionally, that the task of 
distinguishing between benign and illegitimate racial classifications is not 
so difficult as to require a separate type of scrutiny.  Against this 
background, the decision to require strict scrutiny of remedial race-based 
classifications must flow from the Court’s intention to deploy strict 
scrutiny’s rhetorical power or to enshrine in doctrine its substantive 
judgment that even well-intentioned racial classifications cause harm.  
Either way, it is difficult to conclude that the adoption of strict scrutiny 
grew out of a genuine fear that an impermissible use of race might actually 
survive a less rigorous form of review. 
Viewed in this light, the single standard would not present a terrible 
risk of creating a hole through which pernicious racial classifications might 
slip.  Again, as the Court has recognized on many occasions, race is not 
relevant to ability.408  Even a test screening only for the plausibility, rather 
than the necessity, of race-based distinctions should have no problem 
capturing instances where the use of race reflects racial bias, stereotypes, or 
hostility.  Further, the counterpoint concern—that race-based remedial 
 
 404. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 236 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 533–35 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).  Cf. Dandridge v. 
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (upholding legislation under rational basis review after evaluating 
the state’s “relevant social and economic objectives” for the legislation) (emphasis added). 
 405. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 228 (emphasis added). 
 406. See, e.g., Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 486 (applying rational basis review to inquire into the 
state’s “legitimate interest” in its regulation) (emphasis added). 
 407. The Court’s opinions in Grutter and Gratz adhere more closely than Adarand to the language 
of strict scrutiny.  See supra note 399 and accompanying text.  However, in Grutter—the only decision 
to uphold the affirmative action plan at issue—the dissenters accused the five-justice majority of taking 
a deferential “approach inconsistent with the very concept of ‘strict scrutiny.’”  Grutter v. Bollinger, 
123 S. Ct. 2325, 2350 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  See also id. at 2366 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“Although the Court recites the language of our strict scrutiny analysis, its 
application of that review is unprecedented in its deference.”); id. at 2370 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(“The Court . . . does not apply strict scrutiny.  By trying to say otherwise, it undermines both the test 
and its own controlling precedents.”). 
 408. See, e.g., Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 854 n.5 (1986); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976); 
Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966). 
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programs would be sanctioned to such an extent under the single standard 
as to injure the legitimate equal protection rights of whites—is likewise 
addressed by the single standard’s prohibition against generalized 
justifications for line drawing.  This intolerance toward nonspecific 
justifications for discriminatory class legislation, rooted in the Equal 
Protection Clause, extends to all individuals, regardless of race.  Thus, for 
example, an affirmative action program intended to remedy generalized 
harms to people of color could not survive under the proposed standard 
because that nonspecific justification could support broad differential 
treatment based on race outside the regulatory context.409  However, if a 
justification were tied sufficiently to the context at issue and not so broad 
as to support burdening the nonbeneficiary class in other contexts, it would 
withstand single standard review. 
The plan at issue in Adarand provides a good scenario against which 
to evaluate how the proposed standard might reshape evaluation of 
remedial measures.410  The Small Business Administration offered a 
program that provided favorable treatment to contractors who 
subcontracted with “disadvantaged business enterprises,” including those 
owned by people of color.411 
The question under single standard review would be whether the state 
can explain that the use of race in the subcontractor statute is plausible, 
context-specific (so as not to justify race-based distinctions in unrelated 
contexts), and free of bias or hostility toward the burdened class.  In 
Adarand, the United States sought to justify the program by arguing that it 
“provid[ed] remedies for the continuing effects of past discrimination,”412 
and, in particular, “that discrimination in the construction industry had been 
subject to government acquiescence, with effects that remain.”413  This 
justification, specific to the construction context in which the program 
 
 409. Cf. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 295 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment) (“Nor is it necessary, in my view, to resolve the troubling 
questions whether any [raced-based] layoff provision could survive strict scrutiny or whether [such] 
layoff provision could, when considered without reference to the hiring goal it was intended to further, 
pass the onerous ‘narrowly tailored’ requirement.”). 
 410. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 206–10 (describing Small Business Administration programs).  The 
Court’s recent opinions in Grutter and Gratz are somewhat less useful for evaluating the proposed test, 
in part because a majority of justices acknowledge their treatment of higher education admissions as 
distinct, suggesting that their acceptance of diversity as a compelling government interest may not 
extend outside the educational arena.  See supra note 106.  However, they will be addressed briefly 
below.  See infra note 420. 
 411. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 206–10 (describing Small Business Administration programs). 
 412. Id. at 265–66 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 413. Id. at 266 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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operated,414 would sufficiently explain the government’s use of a racial 
classification while not supplying a justification so broad as to support 
second-class status for the white-owned firms that contended they were 
burdened by the program’s consideration of race. 
The majority opinion in Adarand raises an additional concern for the 
single standard.  The Court maintained that, without strict scrutiny, judicial 
review would not recognize the harm flowing from the perception that 
affirmative action measures benefit those “less qualified in some respect 
[who are] identified purely by their race,” and, further, that “that 
perception . . . can only exacerbate rather than reduce racial prejudice.”415  
The Court failed to explain, however, why strict scrutiny would be the only 
analytic approach sensitive to the potential backlash resulting from a race-
based classification created for remedial purposes.  As Justice Stevens 
pointed out in dissent, firms qualifying as disadvantaged business 
enterprises had not challenged the program, “perhaps because they [did] 
not find the preferences stigmatizing, or perhaps because their ability to opt 
out of the program provides them all the relief they would need.”416 
Moreover, if a minority-owned firm were to challenge the program at 
issue in Adarand and allege stigmatic harm, the analysis under both strict 
scrutiny and the single standard would not necessarily, or even likely, result 
in different outcomes.  Preliminarily, under either standard, the Court 
would first have to be persuaded that the stigma creates an actionable 
classification, which would be difficult in the typical instance where the 
stigmatic effect would be the secondary and unintended consequence of an 
effort to remedy specific race-based discrimination.417 
 
 414. Issue would be joined over the scope of the context, as noted in Part IV.  Because the 
government could point specifically to discrimination within the construction industry, this particular 
program should survive charges that the justification would support extracontextual distinctions based 
on race.  On the other hand, the Court in Adarand might argue that the context at issue was a far more 
specific one (i.e., the particular type of work being subcontracted).  The reviewing court would then 
have to determine the context’s contours before making its judgment.  In most cases, the legislative 
framework provides the context, and the classification can be assessed against that framework’s scope.  
A party seeking to call the framework into question would need to show why that framework warranted 
narrowing or broadening before the single standard’s inquiries are applied. 
 415. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 229 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 
448 U.S. 448, 545 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).  These concerns, the Court said, “make a persuasive 
case for requiring strict scrutiny.”  Id. 
 416. Id. at 247 n.5. 
 417. Cf. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (“‘[D]iscriminatory 
purpose’ . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences.  It implies that 
the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ 
not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”) (citations and footnotes 
omitted); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (“[A] basic equal protection principle [is] that 
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If the claim were permitted to go forward, review under strict scrutiny 
would ask whether the race-based remedial measure was narrowly tailored 
to serve a compelling government interest that justified the specific burden 
imposed—here, stigmatic harm.  Assuming the same government interest 
in redressing the effects of race discrimination in the construction industry, 
the analysis would likely find that a race-based classification giving some 
preference to minority-owned business candidates in obtaining 
government-funded construction contracts was narrowly tailored to achieve 
a compelling government interest with the resulting rejection of the stigma 
claim.418  This determination would not be a particularly difficult one given 
that the race-based preference would be limited and directly responsive to 
the particular problem of race-based disadvantaging in the construction 
industry.  Indeed, if the government’s stated goal is to redress racial 
discrimination, it is difficult to imagine what, other than a racial 
classification, the government might use more effectively to realize its aim.  
As a result, strict scrutiny’s narrowly tailored inquiry would not necessarily 
lead to the invalidation of a race-based affirmative action program because 
of stigmatic harms to members of the beneficiary class.  Thus, the Court’s 
suggestion that concern with stigma mandates application of strict scrutiny 
does not bear up under close analysis. 
Considering the same scenario under the proposed single standard, the 
Court would determine, as set forth above, whether the government could 
plausibly explain its use of a race-based distinction with a justification 
limited to the regulatory context.  The single standard would then screen 
for unduly broad or general justifications for the differential treatment 
being challenged.  Because the race-based classification in Adarand was 
highly focused on, and limited to, the particular industry where a problem 
of race discrimination had been identified, the explanation for the 
differential treatment would be both plausible and context-specific.  As a 
result, the program could be sustained under single standard review as well, 
notwithstanding the potential for stigmatic harm.419  Ultimately, it appears 
 
the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a 
racially discriminatory purpose.”). 
 418. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (discussing the determination in United States v. Paradise, 480 
U.S. 149, 167 (1987) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion), that eradicating race-based discrimination 
constituted a compelling government interest). 
 419. See id. at 206–08.  The actual classification in Adarand required minority-owned enterprises 
to “opt in” to the preference program; the program did not automatically encompass nondisadvantaged 
minority-owned business candidates.  See id.  If this refinement were to survive the narrowly tailored 
inquiry, then strict scrutiny arguably would have succeeded in achieving a more refined classification 
than the single standard otherwise would have inspired.  From a constitutional rather than political 
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that under either standard of review, a context-sensitive use of race as a 
remedial measure could, conceivably, survive a challenge.420 
In short, racial classifications, whether within or outside of the 
affirmative action context, do not absolutely compel the use of strict 
scrutiny as insurance against invidious forms of differential treatment.  To 
the contrary, the Court has suggested repeatedly throughout the spectrum of 
cases reviewing race-based classifications that differentiation based on race 
is rarely legitimate or relevant.  As shown above, even a unified standard 
has no difficulty identifying and rejecting the use of race for impermissible 
discriminatory purposes.  Yet the single standard brings with it the 
additional advantage of context sensitivity.  Therefore, in situations where 
race is used as a basis for remedying past discrimination, a reviewing court 
would possess not only the power to screen for the presence of prejudice or 
overly general justifications, but also the flexibility to consider whether, 
when analyzed in context, a legitimate explanation justifies the remedial 
use of a racial classification. 
 
standpoint, however, it is not clear that the opt-in provision was necessary for the classification to be 
sustained. 
 420. Cf. id. at 237.  The Court in Adarand commented, 
[W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is strict in theory, but fatal in fact.  The 
unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination 
against minority groups in this country is an unfortunate reality, and government is not 
disqualified from acting in response to it. 
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 
(1980) (Marshall, J., concurring)). 
Application of the single standard to the use of race in admissions by the University of Michigan 
in its law school and undergraduate programs reinforces this conclusion.  For both, the Court would 
examine the plausibility of the connection between the use of race in admissions and the university’s 
goal of obtaining a diverse student body to serve its educational mission of preparing students for work 
and civic participation.  The Court would also ask whether this justification would support widespread 
racial distinctions outside of the admissions process.  And finally, the Court would inquire whether the 
university’s reliance on race to achieve a diverse class embodies bias or outmoded stereotypes about 
race. 
As with the cases discussed above, these questions could be answered in ways that would reach 
the same outcomes as the Court reached in Grutter and Gratz, with the law school’s “holistic” 
admissions process avoiding the stereotyping and the class legislation-type problems that the 
undergraduate point system might encounter.  On the other hand, the Court could find little functional 
difference between the two plans, as Justice Souter’s dissent in Gratz maintained.  See Gratz v. 
Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2441 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting).  In this instance, the single standard 
will not resolve the conflicts between the majority and the dissent in either case—that is something no 
standard could accomplish.  Instead, the contribution of a single standard is in preventing a debate about 
the appropriate application of judicial scrutiny from obscuring the core equal protection inquiry into 
whether the classification amounts to class legislation based on race. 
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art2
GOLD14.DOC 4/2/2004  6:20 PM 
2004] EQUALITY WITHOUT TIERS 581 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION: THE “TRAINING” TIERS GIVE WAY TO A 
SINGLE STANDARD 
We began by considering whether the Court’s current three-tiered 
framework for equal protection review requires reconsideration, and, if so, 
whether a single standard of review might provide an alternative approach 
that would respond to current problems without creating widespread 
doctrinal instability.  Certainly, as addressed above, serious flaws 
associated with the tiers—including stagnation with respect to the set of 
suspect classifications, the categorical application of heightened scrutiny to 
classifications deemed suspect, and the unguided and unfocused doctrinal 
wavering between deference and meaningful review in the rational basis 
cases—suggest that the time for rethinking equal protection review is ripe. 
Looking back, it appears that the emergence of multiple tiers 
represented an important milestone in the Court’s response to increasing 
societal recognition that government action based on deep-rooted bias and 
archaic stereotypes takes multiple forms and causes serious harms.  The 
development of a review mechanism aimed at unearthing and invalidating 
forms of racial bias previously not apparent or troubling to many in the 
judiciary or in society’s dominant classes flowed almost naturally from the 
changes in cultural consciousness.421 
With growing societal and judicial awareness of widespread 
prejudices based on other characteristics, the Court reasonably deployed 
the same type of review it used for race-based distinctions to screen this 
new set of impermissible classifications.  Not surprisingly, the Court then 
modified the original review mechanism over a number of years to respond 
to evolving social perceptions about the relevance of various characteristics 
to government action. 
Today, however, decades after the first pronouncement regarding 
extra-rigorous review for racial classifications422 and over a quarter century 
after the Court’s decree that sex-based distinctions also merit heightened 
judicial solicitude,423 the analysis prompted by the tiers appears to be too 
 
 421. See James Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the 
American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 291–93 (1990) (proposing that social 
movements have a direct influence on “governmental and private institutions”); Robert C. Post & Reva 
B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 
110 YALE L.J. 441, 496–502 (2000) (discussing the interaction between social movements and 
constitutional jurisprudence in the 1960s). 
 422. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (stating that racial classifications 
are “subject . . . to the most rigid scrutiny”). 
 423. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197–98 (1976). 
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simplistic.  The tiered framework may have served its purpose, it turns out, 
as an unwitting training vehicle for the Court.424  The tiers became the first 
post-Lochner era method by which courts could closely review legislative 
action for impermissible stereotyping or bias.  They supported this 
heightened form of judicial review with specialized screening and 
streamlining techniques.  In effect, the tiers became a tool for judicial 
education regarding identity-based discrimination by government.  But in 
the 21st century, while education remains important, contemporary 
jurisprudence requires a more sophisticated and sensitive response to the 
complexities of a changed world.425 
This view of the tiers as a transitional analytic tool rather than a fixed, 
necessary format dovetails with the existence of common core concerns 
shared by rational basis and heightened scrutiny cases.  In particular, a 
baseline commitment to ensuring the existence of a plausible, contextual, 
and nonbiased explanation for a classification and, relatedly, to preventing 
the enforcement of class legislation, surfaces throughout the Court’s equal 
protection jurisprudence.  The proposed single standard, by reflecting these 
shared concerns, helps to illuminate the close relationship between the 
different levels of review.  In addition, its distillation of these core concerns 
into a unified review mechanism helps to stabilize and explain what 
otherwise appears to be significant confusion within the rational basis 
cases.  Regardless of whether it is the standard proposed here or a variation 
on the standards proposed in the past by individual justices that takes hold, 
it is critical at this juncture that the framework of equal protection review 
itself face ongoing review to ensure that the Constitution will continue to 
“neither know[ ] nor tolerate[ ] classes among citizens.”426 
 
 424. This is not to suggest that the federal judiciary has achieved consensus or become fully or 
even largely sensitized to all the diverse manifestations of official bias.  The argument here is more 
limited: at this point in time, a single standard of review may be as effective in ferreting out 
impermissible government action as the three-tiered approach, which, in all of its years of application, 
has not brought about consensus on the question of when impermissible bias (as opposed to a 
reasonable consideration) prompts trait-based differential treatment.  Further, for the reasons addressed 
above, the single standard fine tunes the standard of review in a way that the tiered system does not 
effectively or consistently allow. 
 425. As discussed earlier, the predominant use of strict scrutiny for racial classifications in recent 
years has been to invalidate affirmative action and redistricting measures intended to take remedial 
account of past or present racial bias, rather than to invalidate new forms of racial bias.  This dramatic 
shift in the use of suspect classification analysis raises doubts about the continuing viability of the 
current tiered approach. 
 426. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 
(1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
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